An end to the troubles unionism, nationalism, and the path to peace by Rooney, Michael J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2006-12
An end to the troubles unionism, nationalism, and
the path to peace
Rooney, Michael J.













Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited 
AN END TO THE TROUBLES: UNIONISM, 








 Thesis Advisor:   Maria Rasmussen 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2006 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   An End to the Troubles: Unionism, Nationalism and 
the Path to Peace 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Michael J. Rooney 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Understanding the roles played by the constituents to the Northern Ireland conflict is important and relevant 
for three reasons.  First, an analysis of the factors contributing to a cessation of hostilities in Northern Ireland provides 
vital insights into the manner in which armed insurrections can be brought to an end.  Secondly, as the US finds itself 
increasingly involved in the quagmire of sectarian conflict and attempts to put together governments representative of 
all major elements of indigenous proportions in both Afghanistan and Iraq, a study of past attempts by a liberal 
democratic government to create a representative power-sharing government which crossed the sectarian divide is 
particularly apt.  Finally, the success of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) seems predicated on the acceptance of 
democratic principles by the IRA via its political wing, Sinn Fein and the acquiescence of the Unionist population to a 
power-sharing arrangement which includes representation from the Republican constituency.  Neither position 
appears to have been sufficiently present in previous attempts at power-sharing.  While the long-term viability of 
power-sharing in the province remains in question, a return to violence has not occurred.  Such factors may be critical 
elements in bridging the sectarian divide not only within the context of Northern Ireland, but when resolving 
terrorist/insurgent campaigns throughout the world. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
167 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Northern Ireland, Terrorism, Negotiated Settlement 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
AN END TO THE TROUBLES:  UNIONISM, NATIONALISM, AND THE PATH 
TO PEACE 
 
Michael J. Rooney 
Major, United States Air Force 
M.A., Chapman University, 1997 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Douglas Porch, Ph.D. 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
Understanding the roles played by the constituents to the Northern Ireland conflict 
is important and relevant for three reasons.  First, an analysis of the factors contributing 
to a cessation of hostilities in Northern Ireland provides vital insights into the manner in 
which armed insurrections can be brought to an end.  Secondly, the Northern Ireland 
experience provides a roadmap for the US and others finding themselves involved in the 
quagmire of sectarian conflict.  The Ulster Troubles can provide valuable lessons learned 
in the process of forming governments representative of all major elements of indigenous 
proportions in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.  As such, a study of past attempts by a 
liberal democratic government to create a representative power-sharing government 
which crossed the sectarian divide is particularly apt.  Finally, the success of the Good 
Friday Agreement (GFA) seems predicated on the acceptance of democratic principles by 
the IRA via its political wing, Sinn Fein and the acquiescence of the Unionist population 
to a power-sharing arrangement which includes representation from the Republican 
constituency.  Neither position appears to have been sufficiently present in previous 
attempts at power-sharing.  While the long-term viability of power-sharing in the 
province remains in question, a return to violence has not occurred.  Ascription to 
democratic principles by erstwhile terrorists and acquiescence to power-sharing by the 
majority may be critical elements in bridging the sectarian divide not only within the 
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The path to a lasting peace in Northern Ireland is littered with the wreckage of 
various agreements, initiatives, conventions, proposals, and talks.  The parties within the 
province have steadfastly and repeatedly put forth their own manifestos for a resolution 
to the violence that has wrecked havoc on the lives of peoples from both sides of the 
sectarian divide.  Politicians, terrorists, and reformed terrorists have made their case for 
resolution through the constitutional political process and through acts of violence; some 
often doing so simultaneously.  Beyond the pale of the Northern Irish statelet, the British 
and Irish governments have actively engaged in efforts to restore normalcy to the lives of 
those living within the province.  Along the way, the European Union and the United 
States have lent support through economic, social, legal and direct mediation intervention 
in the hope of finding a way out of the cycle of violence.  What all have learned and 
continue to learn is that resolving the province’s problems is an arduous task requiring 
not only patience but an understanding of the deep sense of history and fear that all 
parties to the conflict bring to the negotiating table and how personal identity often 
transcends rationality in the search for an equitable peace. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The history of the Troubles in Northern Ireland dates back to the civil rights 
marches organized by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in 1968.  
However, to truly understand the origins of the conflict and the deeply entrenched 
psychological dispositions of the belligerent communities’ party to the strife, it is 
necessary to travel further back in history to the partition of the island of Ireland by the 
Government of Ireland Act of 1920.1  The act was Britain’s best attempt to resolve the 
Irish issue which had percolated since the mainly Catholic Irish Nationalists demanded 
Home Rule during the latter part of the 19th century.  While Nationalists overwhelmingly 
supported the notion of home rule for Ireland, their Protestant counterparts, who 
overwhelmingly resided in the six northeastern counties of the island, just as vigorously 
rejected the notion and instead advocated for continuation of the Union with Great 
                                                 
1 The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 partitioned Ireland into Southern Ireland with a devolved 
parliament in Dublin, and Northern Ireland with a devolved parliament in Belfast. The BBC. Available on-
line at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/timelines/ni/gov_ireland_act.shtml Current as of: 15 July 2006. 
2 
Britain.  These divergent positions demanded attention and, in the wake of the 1916 
Dublin uprising and faced with the threat of armed Unionist resistance to any form of 
home rule, the post-World War I British government moved to resolve the Irish problem 
once and for all.  The solution was to partition the island into two statelets: a 
predominantly Protestant one in the northeast and an overwhelmingly Catholic one to the 
south.  The northern statelet, Northern Ireland, received its own parliament under the 
terms of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 and was operational before a final treaty 
on partition had been negotiated with the South.  A treaty validating de-facto partition 
was accepted by the southern Irish people in 1921.  Despite an ensuing civil war waged 
between those who supported an independent Free State and those, led by the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), who unsuccessfully opposed the treaty and the abandonment of 
the six northeastern counties, partition became an accepted reality of Irish Nationalists 
south of the newly created border. 
 The situation for Northern Ireland’s Catholics was less than optimal.  Unlike their 
southern brethren, they were now a sizeable minority within the new artificial statelet 
created from six counties out of the historic nine that made up the province of Ulster.  
The gerrymandering that facilitated partition ensured that the newly created Northern 
Ireland would have a Protestant population which outnumbered Catholics by 
approximately two-to-one.  Certain aspects of the Act of 1920 which would have 
protected the rights of Catholics were ignored by the Protestant majority.  Among them, 
proposals to establish an upper house of Parliament with weighted representation and an 
initiative to establish a system of electoral proportional representation to protect minority 
voting rights.2  Also ignored in the ensuing years was the Council of Ireland provision 
designed to reconcile the two parts of Ireland and eventually facilitate reunification.3  
Instead, Britain, via partition, had succeeded in getting the Irish question off the agenda.  
For their part, the Irish government was subsumed with the task of standing up a newly 
independent nation.  The result was that, for the most part, the Unionists of Northern 
Ireland were left to their own devices and permitted to strengthen their hold on power.   
                                                 
2 Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal and the Search for Peace (New York: Palgrave, 
2002), 29. 
3 Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland (Essex: Addison 
Wesley Longman Limited, 1997), 18. 
3 
Facing a perceived threat of a majority Nationalist neighbor and a large 
Nationalistic internal minority, many Unionists developed a siege mentality.  To allay 
these fears, Unionists went about the task of securing their position by strengthening their 
control over the levers of power.  Partition was vigorously enforced in the areas of 
housing, employment, education, law enforcement, and voting rights.  Subtle and no-so 
subtle discrimination practices such as a first-past-the-post electoral system; the 
gerrymandering of electoral districts to ensure a Protestant majority; and the limitation of 
Catholic participation in local government due to the allocation of additional voting rights 
for property owners ensured a sustained Protestant ascendancy.  As Unionist control 
manifest itself in all aspects of Northern Irish life, the siege mentality partially abated and 
gave way to one of superiority and privilege.  In contrast, Nationalists became 
disenfranchised.  Their sense of self which once engendered them as a part of the 
overwhelming majority on the island of Ireland was replaced with an artificial minority 
status which fostered a siege mentality within the Nationalist community not unlike that 
felt by their counterparts across the sectarian divide.  Dispossessed of the right to 
participate and apparently abandoned by their southern co-religionists, northern 
Nationalists continually turned in on themselves and failed to effectively influence 
change in their new reality.  From a political standpoint, their perpetual minority status 
and ineffectiveness as a robust opposition led the major Catholic political movement, the 
Nationalist Party, to abstain from participating in the overwhelmingly Unionist Stormont 
government. 
 Against a backdrop of recognized discrimination and sporadic outbreaks of 
communal violence, the province, for the most part, was left in Unionist hands for the 
better part of fifty years.  During that time, the southern Irish government adopted a 
constitution in 1937, maintained independence during the Second World War, and 
declared a Republic in 1948.  Such actions did little to endear the southern government to 
Britain and greatly increased the level of anxiety felt among northern Unionists.  Of most 
concern north of the border was the claim to Irish sovereignty over the entire island of 
Ireland contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 constitution.4  Unionist fears were 
placated in 1949 when the British government, under the umbrella of the UK Ireland Act,                                                  
4 Constitution of Ireland. Available on-line at: 
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/upload/publications/297.htm Current as-of: 7 June 2006. 
4 
provided that there would be no change in the status of Northern Ireland without the 
concurrence of the province’s government at Stormont.5   This provision was of vital 
importance because it effectively handed Unionists a legislated veto over any proposal to 
change the status of Northern Ireland without their concurrence.  Despite the polarization 
between the governments north and south, cooperation did occur during the IRA’s border 
campaign of the late 1950s.  At the time, both constituencies introduced internment to 
eliminate the threat posed by terrorism. 
 The rules of the game dramatically changed during the 1960s.  Attempts at top-
down reform within Ulster unionism were greeted with vehement opposition within the 
predominant Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and within the Protestant community as a 
whole.  Inspired by the U.S. civil rights movement, Northern Ireland’s Catholics 
mobilized under the umbrella of NICRA to demand an end to discrimination in housing 
and employment; an end to repression under the Special Powers Act; the disbandment of 
the B-Specials paramilitary police; and an end to gerrymandering of political districts.  In 
an exercise of their civil liberties, NICRA took their protest demands to the streets.  In 
September 1968, NICRA organized a march in Derry, Northern Ireland’s second largest 
city.  The march was banned and, when NICRA attempted to defy the ban, they were set 
upon by members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) who inflicted many injuries 
on the marchers.  Television images of the mayhem led to rioting in Derry .  The pattern 
of civil unrest which dogged the province for the better part of the following year was set.  
In the ensuing months, marches were greeted with open hostility from the province’s 
Unionist population.  The province reached a boiling point on 12 August 1969 when 
clashes broke out between the Catholic residents of the Bogside neighborhood of Derry 
and Loyalist marchers.  The riots spread throughout the major towns and cities of 
Northern Ireland as those in the Nationalist community demonstrated their solidarity with 
their co-religionists in Derry.  Loyalists, often in collusion with the RUC, attacked 
Catholic neighborhoods.  As the situation continued to deteriorate and local law 
enforcement demonstrated its inability to restore order, the British government took 
action.  On the 14th of August 1969, British troops were deployed to the province to 
restore the rule of law and separate the warring communities. 
                                                 
5 Stormont served and continues to serve as the seat of devolved government in Northern Ireland. 
5 
 The troop deployment was significant for two reasons.  First, the soldiers were 
initially welcomed by the Nationalist community who viewed their presence as a 
welcome relief from a police force that persistently enforced the law in a biased manner.  
Secondly, the deployment, coupled with the IRA’s inability to defend their community 
against Loyalist, RUC, and B-Special incursions, spurred the rebirth of Republican 
resistance in the form of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). 
This IRA inability to protect Nationalist communities stemmed from the fact that 
the organization’s Dublin leadership refused to provide weapons to their northern 
counterparts for fear of exposing them before they had attained sufficient support within 
the Catholic community to further the goal of a leftist uprising.  They had hoped their 
plan would ultimately lead to a united Ireland under a Marxist IRA leadership.  This issue 
greatly contributed to the January 1970 split of the PIRA from the Dublin leadership 
which assumed the moniker of the Official IRA.  The unencumbered PIRA were free to 
pursue tactics directly aimed at ending British rule in Northern Ireland and those tactics 
combined with the misapplication of British military force against Catholics led to the 
establishment of the PIRA as a terrorist organization. 
Deployed British troops greeted as saviors and plied with a continuous supply of 
tea and sandwiches were to find their popularity short lived.  While initially successful in 
winning the hearts and minds of the Catholic community, their efforts were undercut by a 
policy change which forced them into indiscriminate security operations against the 
minority population.  Part of the problem as it existed for the army was that they had 
become the de facto police force within the Catholic enclaves.  The RUC with heavy-
handed tactics and discriminatory enforcement had long since lost their credibility and 
ability to police Nationalist neighborhoods.  A change in administration in Westminster 
coupled with IRA agitation and Protestant calls for action led to curfews, search and 
seizures, intimidation, and imprisonment of Catholics at the hands of the British army.  A 
sea change in minority attitudes had happened in a relatively short period of time.  The 
army, once viewed as saviors, soon became an army of occupation no longer intent on 
defending Catholics from attacks or injustice.  This rapid deterioration of the army’s 
position was precipitated by a get tough policy coupled with a glaring lack of actionable 
intelligence and the employment of force that more often than not, exceeded the need.  
6 
Hard-line tactics turned a population heretofore accepting of the British presence away 
from the army and into the arms of the IRA.6  At that point, no amount of appeasement in 
the form of better housing, better jobs, political representation or advanced education 
would be enough to bridge the divide that had been created between the army and the 
minority Nationalist population. 
With the military campaign to restore law and order abandoned in favor of a 
counterinsurgency/counterterrorist policy against the IRA, the British and Northern Irish 
governments initiated a series of legal punitive measures designed to eliminate the 
terrorist threat.  From a comparative perspective, these measures and their effectiveness 
or lack thereof are interesting insofar as they share similarities with certain initiatives 
employed by the U.S. in pursuit of the war on terror.  Measures used by Britain included 
proscription, search and seizure, extended detention without charge, internment, Diplock 
trials, and the reliance on the supergrass system.  While each legal maneuver was 
designed to bring about the destruction of terrorist organizations and their ability to 
effectively function, flawed and biased application set against the constraints of a liberal 
democratic society doomed them to failure and in many instances served as a recruitment 
tool for the very organizations they were designed to defeat. 
The advent of the 1970s ushered in many internal political changes for Northern 
Ireland.  Constitutional nationalism found a new advocate in the form of the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP).  Ulster Unionists lost their devolved Stormont 
government when it was prorogued in 1972 in favor of direct rule from Westminster.  
Reforms to the equality agenda which had been slow in coming from the Stormont 
administration were implemented by the London administration.  Despite the intensity of 
the IRA’s campaign against British rule, a basis for dialogue existed between the 
communities and the London and Dublin governments on restoring a devolved 
government representative of the two main traditions in Northern Ireland.  Essentially, 
the time was right to begin the process of bringing Northern Ireland out of the shadow of 
fear and suspicion and into an era of trust and cooperation beneficial to all the province’s 
residents. 
                                                  
6 Tony Geraghty, The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict between the IRA and British Intelligence 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 34. 
7 
B. THESIS OVERVIEW 
While much discussion has focused on the IRA’s transition from violence to 
political involvement, relatively little attention has been paid to the dynamics of this 
transition over the course of the three major initiatives designed to bring peace to 
Northern Ireland.  Similarly, the manner in which the attitudes and actions of the Unionist 
population shaped the current state of non-violence from the IRA has also received 
relatively little critical examination.  If the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 was as 
Seamus Mallon7 described “Sunningdale8 for slow learners,”9 why did it take 
Unionists/Loyalists and Nationalists/Republicans so long to come to a consensus on 
ending the violence?  If Mallon was correct, why would Sinn Fein/IRA support an 
agreement which, on the face of it, was no better than that offered 25 years before?  If 
unionism rejected the power sharing arrangement of 1973, why would they agree to 
accept an agreement cut from the same cloth in 1998?  Given the steepness of the 
learning curve for both communities, what can be learned from the efforts to bring peace 
to Northern Ireland?  
Despite their seemingly intractable differences, the parties to the Northern Ireland 
conflict have managed to move toward a power-sharing arrangement representative of 
both communities while foregoing key elements of their structural platforms.  Sinn Fein 
and the IRA have agreed to recognize the will of the majority within Northern Ireland, 
accepted the province’s position within the United Kingdom, and agreed to end their 
armed struggle against British rule in Ireland.  For their part, the Unionists have come to 
recognize the rights of the minority population; have, with outside mediation, negotiated 
a settlement with Republicans; and have entered into a power-sharing arrangement with 
Sinn Fein despite reservations about their sincerity of commitment to the peace process.   
Given the overwhelming difficulties in traveling the long path to peace, both 
communities were influenced not only by the actions of external third parties but by the 
                                                 
7 Seamus Mallon was the deputy leader of the Social Democratic and Labor Party and Deputy First 
Minister in the Northern Ireland Assembly that convened after the passage of the Good Friday Agreement. 
8 The name given to the agreement reached in December 1973 to establish a power-sharing Executive 
in Northern Ireland and also to set up a Council of Ireland. CAIN Web Service. Available on-line at: 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/glossary.htm#T Current as-of: 30 May 2006. 
9 Maurice J. Bric and John Coakley, From Political Violence to Negotiated Settlement (Dublin: 
University College Dublin Press, 2004), 122. 
8 
actions of each other.  As such, this thesis is a case study of the Northern Ireland 
Troubles with a focus on the manner in which Nationalists/Republicans and 
Unionists/Loyalists influenced and shaped the three major initiatives designed to bring 
peace to the province.  The intent is to trace the processes of influence each community 
had on the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, and the 
Good Friday Agreement of 1998.  In doing so, the author will examine the pressure that 
Unionists/Loyalists exerted on the British Government in Westminster and how they 
manipulated the levers of power at the local government level to shape a position on each 
initiative.  The thesis also examines Unionist ability to mobilize the Protestant population 
of the province in opposition or support of the respective agreements.  Similarly, it will 
trace the influence that Nationalists had in shaping the debate leading to negotiated peace.  
It explores how Republicans, through Sinn Fein and the IRA, exerted their influence on 
each proposal by engaging in acts of violence, participating in constitutional democracy 
via the ballot box, or by taking part in overt and covert negotiations.  This thesis will 
dedicate a chapter to each of the three major peace initiatives and will conclude with an 
analysis of the respective agreements and how they ultimately contributed to the current 
peace within Northern Ireland.  
 Chapter II will examine aspects of the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 as the first 
substantive effort to achieve peace through a power-sharing arrangement and improved 
cross-border cooperation.  It provides an analysis of the political landscape within the 
province prior to the agreement.  It examines the parties to the agreement and reviews 
their mandates by analyzing the pressures the parties to the agreement faced from 
dissidents within their organizations.  It will also analyze the impact respective 
communal opposition had on accommodating those not willing to support total allegiance 
to the crown or complete loyalty to the goal of a united Ireland.  After examining the 
political environment within Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, this chapter provides a 
review of the Sunningdale Agreement, the election of the power-sharing assembly, the 
appointment of the power-sharing executive, and an examination of the events leading to 
the demise of the province’s first power-sharing experiment.  The chapter concludes with 
a look at the positions of the key players in the post-Sunningdale era of the mid 1970s.  
9 
Chapter III provides an analysis of the events leading up to the signing of the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement, provides an assessment of the key features of the agreement, and 
evaluates the roles played by the British and Irish governments and the subsequent 
response of the Nationalist and Unionist communities to the agreement.  A critical aspect 
of this chapter is the role played by the political parties in developing initiatives which 
paved the way to the agreement or sought to provide an alternative arrangement for 
governing the province.  The chapter concludes by examining the agreement in terms of 
its utility in addressing Northern Ireland’s  political and paramilitary malaise.  
Chapter IV assesses the initiatives of the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP) and the two governments as they sought to pave the way for a comprehensive 
and inclusive agreement capable of attaining broad cross-community support during the 
latter part of the 1980s and the early 1990s.  The author will discuss measures initiated to 
create an environment conducive to a negotiated settlement and examine the Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA) in terms of what incentives it provided to each community.  The 
chapter traces the process of promoting the GFA and the resultant difficulties posed by 
differing interpretations and how such difficulties translated into a labored 
implementation process.  The chapter concludes by evaluating how the Catholic and 
Protestant communities in Northern Ireland perceived the agreement in terms of the gains 
and losses. 
Finally, the thesis will conclude with the examination in Chapter V of the lessons 
learned throughout the iterative process of developing and implementing the three peace 
initiatives.  The author will compare how key aspects of each agreement and the 
associated negotiations changed over time and how the Good Friday Agreement led to 
the cessation of hostilities by the IRA. Ultimately, this thesis will attempt to evaluate the 
intensity of actions employed by each community and the shifts in ideology required to 
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II. THE SUNNINGDALE AGREEMENT AND POWER-SHARING 
This chapter examines the first substantive effort to achieve peace through a 
power-sharing arrangement and improved cross-border cooperation.  To understand the 
initiative, it is first essential to have an understanding of the political landscape within the 
province prior to the agreement.  Who were the parties to the agreement and what were 
their constituencies and mandates?  What constraints were placed on the parties by the 
weight of history and their sense of identity?  Finally, what pressures were the parties to 
the agreement facing from dissidents within their organizations?  How did communal 
dissent to accommodating those unwilling to support total allegiance to the crown or 
complete loyalty to the goal of a united Ireland impact the political parties? 
 After examining the political environment within Northern Ireland in the early 
1970s, this chapter provides a review of the Sunningdale Agreement, the election of the 
power-sharing assembly, the appointment of the power-sharing executive, and an 
examination of the events leading to the demise of the province’s first power-sharing 
experiment.  To illuminate the rationale for the failure of Sunningdale, this chapter 
provides an analysis of the roles played by the parties to the agreement, those opposed to 
the agreement, and the sovereign governments.  The chapter concludes with a look at the 
positions of the key players in the post-Sunningdale era of the mid 1970s.  
A. THE PRE-SUNNINGDALE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
1. Moderate Nationalism:  The Social Democratic & Labour Party 
(SDLP) 
I think if people had then been asked what is your dream, your dream 
would have been to participate in a coalition government with the 
Northern Ireland Labour Party and some liberal Unionists (Ben Caragher, 
SDLP policymaker)10 
 
The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) grew out of the civil rights 
movement of the late 1960s as an amalgamation of the old Nationalist Party, the 
progressive National Democratic Party (NDP), and Republican Labour.  The party 
borrowed heavily from the membership and guiding principles set out by the NDP with 
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approximately 80 percent of the party’s initial membership coming from NDP11 and early 
policy heavily influenced by the concern for civil rights and the development of ties with 
the Irish Republic with a view to achieving eventual reunification with the consent of the 
majority of people both north and south of the island’s border.  Unlike the old Nationalist 
Party, the SDLP sought to actively represent its constituents by fully participating in the 
old Unionist-dominated Stormont assembly.  As such, the party demonstrated a 
willingness heretofore missing within the Nationalist community and political apparatus 
to work within the political structures of the Northern Irish statelet and, in doing so, 
recognizing the legitimacy of the Stormont assembly to govern the peoples of Northern 
Ireland.   
By recognizing the legitimacy of Stormont, the party hoped to work within the 
constitutional political system and with moderate Unionists to effect reform of the 
apparatus of governing the province.  The central planks of the party’s platform focused 
on improving minority rights and achieving recognition of the Irishness of the Nationalist 
community.  Yet, the party’s hopes for achieving reform through participation were 
severely undermined by the actions of the British army and the Unionist government.  
The Falls Road curfew of 1970 followed by mass detentions and the eventual 
introduction of internment12 without trial in 1971 forced the SDLP to withdraw support 
for and participation in the Unionist controlled Stormont Parliament.  While the party’s 
desire to participate in the political process remained strong, its inability to extract even 
the most minor reforms from the Stormont government coupled with the increasing 
dissatisfaction of the Nationalist community made continued participation in the 
assembly a futile undertaking.  The party’s July 1971 decision to abstain from further 
participation in the Stormont assembly was founded in the realization that representative 
governance in Northern Ireland could only be achieved by depriving the Ulster Unionist 
Party (UUP) of its monopoly on power.  The introduction of internment without trial in 
August 1971 further galvanized the SDLP’s opposition to continued majority rule and it 
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actively sought the abolition of the Stormont government and the transfer of power to 
Westminster.13  To assert leadership within the Nationalist community, the party 
organized a civil disobedience campaign which promoted the non-payment of rents and 
rates to local authorities.  Such non-violent protests not only played well to the 
mainstream Nationalist community but also provided a viable alternative to the violence 
espoused by the PIRA.14 
The policy of abstentionism was not without risk.  Failure to provide 
representation for the Catholic community placed the party in a position similar to that of 
the old Nationalist Party.  As such, the SDLP courted the risk of irrelevance.  Yet 
internment, which overwhelmingly impacted the Catholic community, and the inability to 
enlighten Unionist primacy to the necessities of social equity, made continued 
participation as the province’s opposition in governance an untenable position.  
Consequently, the party was forced to lobby Westminster for change by bringing down 
Stormont’s majority rule.  The party’s primacy within the Nationalist community was 
also challenged by the increasing support that the PIRA gained as a result of internment 
and the events of Bloody Sunday.15 
Withdrawal from Stormont permitted the SDLP the space it needed to consolidate 
its thinking and develop policy designed to achieve an equitable resolution to the 
problems of Northern Ireland.  A series of policy recommendations for the governance of 
Northern Ireland emerged from the architects of SDLP policy during the period of which 
many aspects came to be incorporated, in various formats, into future power-sharing 
recommendations by the British and Irish governments.  Some of the recommendations 
proposed by the early SDLP strategist John Duffy relied heavily on the Council of Ireland 
proposals contained in the Government of Ireland Act of 1920.  One proposal called for 
the establishment of a new political framework involving the British and Irish 
governments and representatives of the Unionist community.  Others focused on the twin 
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planks of equality and the Irish dimension through harmonization of legal, social, 
cultural, and economic institutions both north and south of the border.16  Other key 
elements of early policy papers included a call for the British government to clearly state 
that it had no desire to continue support for the partition of Ireland and that the Irish 
government should declare a willingness to advocate changes to the Republic’s 
constitution which might be objectionable to the Unionist tradition in Ireland.  
Ultimately, the SDLP’s early thinking saw the province’s problems in the context of 
requiring accommodation in three main areas, namely internal to Northern Ireland; 
between communities north and south of the border; and between to British and Irish 
governments.17  In a departure from the traditional Nationalist position, the SDLP 
outlined the fears of the Protestant community and not British imperialism as the main 
obstacle to Irish unity.18 
While early discussion papers focused to a large extent on reviving many aspects 
of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, the party, recognizing its divergent 
background and the need to distinguish itself from its predecessors, adopted a 
condominium approach by which Northern Ireland would be governed jointly by Britain 
and the Republic of Ireland.  This policy approach was articulated in the party’s Towards 
a New Ireland proposal.  In essence, the policy was seen as a means of recognizing 
Unionist identity by maintaining the link to Britain while providing the Catholic 
community with an end to Protestant domination and discrimination, the withdrawal of 
British troops, and an opportunity to actively participate in power sharing.19  The tenets 
of the early policy papers and the condominium approach proposed in Towards a New 
Ireland formed the basis of the SDLP’s negotiating position for future participation in the 
power sharing executive and assembly. 
The prorogation of the Stormont Assembly on 24 March 1972 was broadly 
welcomed by the SDLP but it did not mean the end of internment which continued as part 
of British policy within the province until 1975.  Yet, the collapse of Stormont and 
majority Unionist rule was a success for the SDLP.  It was seen to pave the way for a 
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level playing field with the potential of creating favorable conditions for a future power 
sharing arrangement with moderate Unionists.  Stormont’s demise enabled then British 
Conservative Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, William Whitelaw, to publish a 
discussion paper for the future of the province.  In this paper, Whitelaw outlined the 
British government’s recognition that after four years of violence and in order to achieve 
any lasting peace in the province, it would be necessary to engage the Irish government in 
constructive talks and provide an incentive for cooperation by offering a voice in the 
affairs of government for Northern Ireland.  It also identified simple majority rule in the 
province as a thing of the past.  Future governance would require the inclusion of the 
minority Nationalist population in the exercise of executive power.20  By 1973 the 
blueprint for devolved government in Northern Ireland was established on the pillars of 
the proportional representation electoral system,21 a renewed commitment to the place of 
Northern Ireland within the UK and a desire to improve north-south cooperation through 
the establishment of a Council of Ireland.  Whitelaw’s proposals were generally in 
keeping with many of the recommendations outlined in their early unpublished SDLP 
policy papers.  These papers offered, through the Council of Ireland, the potential of 
increasing the Irish dimension believed necessary for any satisfactory resolution of the 
conflict within the province.  While not addressing all of the SDLP’s concerns with 
regard to police reorganization and suspension of internment, the White Paper appeared 
to offer sufficient concessions to permit the party to support the concept of a revitalized 
Northern Ireland Assembly.22  
2. Extreme Nationalism: Republicanism, Sinn Fein, & The Provisional 
IRA 
While the SDLP pursued the constitutional path to reform in Northern Ireland, the 
PIRA were busily plotting a course for the statelet’s destruction via the exercise of 
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extreme political violence.  Indeed, the IRA’s strategy as defined in their Green Book23 
was based on the following five principles: 
o A concerted war of attrition against British forces to force their 
withdrawal 
o A bombing campaign against British financial interests in Northern 
Ireland  
o To make the six counties ungovernable except by colonial military rule 
o To utilize propaganda and publicity to gain national and international 
support 
o Further the war by punishing criminals, collaborators, and informers24 
Once Stormont was prorogued, the Provisionals viewed any proposal made by Britain to 
devolve power back to the province as a desperate attempt to maintain influence in a war 
they were sure to lose.  Lacking any political involvement in the electoral process in 
Northern Ireland or elsewhere, the Republican movement in general and, the PIRA 
specifically, saw the Stormont power sharing arrangement as nothing more than a 
distraction.  Their goal remained the removal of all vestiges of British rule and military 
presence from Northern Ireland as the first step in the process of eventual unification with 
the rest of Ireland.  To that end, they continued their bombing campaign in an effort to 
make the province ungovernable.25  When the local and assembly elections were held in 
1973, the PIRA, lacking a grass-roots political presence, tried to organize an electoral 
boycott across the Nationalist communities but failed.  
The Provisional’s attempts to boycott the constitutional political approach to 
addressing Northern Ireland’s problems was partially symptomatic of their political 
ineptitude and partially framed by a fear that the Nationalist community might reject their 
platform.  Consequently, any attempt to develop Sinn Fein as a political movement in the 
power-sharing era was forsaken and the party was considered little more than an 
afterthought to the military campaign against British occupation.  Yet, despite the focus 
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on military tactics, the Republican movement was not without politics.  While not 
politically adept in the Sunningdale era, the IRA nonetheless was heavily involved in 
covert shuttle diplomacy with the British government and senior members of the British 
opposition.  On three separate occasions throughout 1972, the Provisionals conducted 
secret talks with representatives of the British Conservative Party in government and 
representatives of the opposition Labour Party.  The first such meeting took place in 
Dublin on 13 March 1972 between the IRA and Labour leader Harold Wilson and his 
shadow Secretary for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees. It was the last day of one of the 
many IRA ceasefires during the early 1970s and the gathering served more as a getting to 
know you meeting rather than one resulting in any substantive breakthroughs.  The 
second meeting took place on 7 July 1972 at Cheyne Walk, the Chelsea home of then 
Northern Ireland Secretary William Whitelaw’s Minister of State, Paul Channon.26  As a 
precondition to attending the talks the IRA demanded and was granted political status for 
prisoners and the ability to select their own delegation to the talks.27  At the talks, the 
IRA reiterated their demands for the British government to recognize the right of the 
unitary Irish people to determine their future, the withdrawal of British troops, and the 
end of internment with an amnesty for all.  The talks proved inconclusive.28  The final 
meeting took place on 18 July 1972 between the Labour leader, Harold Wilson, Merlyn 
Rees, and Joe Cahill of the IRA.  The goal of the meeting was to attempt to restore a 
ceasefire to curb the escalating violence which had claimed the lives of 42 people over 
the course of 11 days.  Again, the meeting failed to yield substantive results.29  What 
seems clear is that the IRA leadership used these occasions more as a platform to make 
their demands known rather than as a genuine vehicle for earnest negotiations on a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict. 
The Republican movement’s incentive to actively participate in the political 
process greatly diminished when Prime Minister Edward Heath prorogued Stormont and 
introduced direct rule from London on 24 March 1972.30  Given that the fall of the 
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Stormont government achieved one of the IRA’s three main demands,31 the development 
was viewed by the Republican movement as a sign that their military campaign was a 
success.  The suspension of Stormont clarified the conflict as one between the IRA and 
Britain.  Throughout the remainder of 1972, the IRA was convinced that victory was at 
hand as Britain was sure to tire of events in Northern Ireland. 
The advent of the power-sharing agreement and the return of devolved 
government at Stormont were anything but positive developments for the IRA.  Indeed, 
Republicans were openly hostile to the Sunningdale agreement because they believed that 
it did not go far enough in recognizing the aspirations of Irish nationalism.  Perhaps the 
greatest hostility within the Republican circles was reserved for the SDLP.  The 
Republican movement was highly critical of the SDLP decision to participate in a power-
sharing arrangement.  Richard English expresses the sentiment that this opposition went 
beyond the philosophical differences that separated constitutional nationalism from the 
practitioners of armed revolt.  In his view, Republicans were attempting to garner greater 
support within the Nationalist community by casting the SDLP as a party too willing to 
compromise to achieve power and, once in power, a party lacking the resolve to 
adequately represent the Nationalist case.32  Underlying this criticism was a realization 
among Republicans that their exclusion from the Sunningdale talks and the 
implementation of a power-sharing arrangement was a dangerous attempt to marginalize 
them and, if successful, threatened to diminish their constituency within the Nationalist 
community.33   
3. Unionists/Loyalists 
For more than forty years, the Ulster Unionist Party was an unchallenged 
monolithic presence in the governance of Northern Ireland.   The party had taken its 
mandate from the formation of the statelet through the Government of Ireland Act of 
1920 and formed every government within the province from 1921 through the abolition 
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of the Stormont parliament in 1972.  Throughout the course of the Stormont assembly’s 
existence, the Ulster Unionists ensured that it remained, in the words of Lord Craigavon, 
the first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, “a Protestant parliament for a Protestant 
people.”34  Indeed Unionists were united not only by the institutions of government 
which they controlled but also by their Protestant faith and organizations such as the 
Orange Order.35  Yet, despite the institutions created to preserve Northern Ireland’s place 
within the United Kingdom, the statelet’s Protestant majority have often labored under a 
siege mentality born from a mistrust of the intentions of their benefactors in Westminster, 
a fear of being subsumed into a majority-Catholic Irish republic, and a fear of the 
aspirations of the province’s minority Catholic and mostly Nationalist population.  The 
perception of the Nationalist enemy within and outside the statelet remained a core facet 
of the Ulster Unionist sense of siege36 and was readily evidenced by the successive 
policies of Unionist governments designed to subjugate the Nationalist population within 
Northern Ireland’s borders while limiting contact with the Republic of Ireland until the 
constitutional position within the UK was recognized and accepted by the southern 
government. 
The unraveling of the Unionist united front began in earnest with the ascendancy 
of Terence O’Neill to the position of Northern Ireland Prime Minister in 1963.  O’Neill, 
having served in the Stormont assembly since 1946, had a radically different vision for 
the future of Northern Ireland that that of his predecessors.  As part of his early economic 
platform for the province, he sought rapprochement between the Protestant and Catholic 
populations.  In his view, Catholics who had heretofore been economically, socially, and 
politically marginalized could be made to live like Protestants if presented with the 
means to do so.  In his words, “If you treat Roman Catholics with due consideration and 
kindness, they will live like Protestants in spite of the authoritative nature of their 
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Church.”37  While his sentiment was not completely embraced within the mainstream of 
Ulster unionism, his attempts to improve cross-border relations with the southern Irish 
government met with alarm within the party and open hostility from fundamental 
Loyalists such as the Reverend Ian Paisley who led street demonstrations to highlight the 
danger of O’Neill’s policies to the Protestant people of Northern Ireland.  Within 
mainstream unionism, opposition to O’Neill’s radical departure from the status quo came 
from William Craig, the Home Affairs minister within his cabinet.38  From a Nationalist 
perspective, O’Neill’s cross-border diplomacy resulted in the Nationalist Party 
temporarily abandoning its long-standing abstentionist policy and assuming their seats in 
the Stormont assembly as the main opposition party to Unionist hegemony. 
 Yet, for all his outward attempts at rapprochement, O’Neill firmly believed in the 
Union, insofar as loyalty to the British monarchy rested on the monarchy remaining in 
Protestant hands.  As such, he realized that any attempt to break this allegiance would be 
resisted by force.39  The rhetoric of minority inclusion was tempered by his Unionist 
background.  Therefore, he tended to characterize the problems of Northern Ireland as 
being rooted in behavioral differences between the communities and not in structurally 
based discrimination.  As such, his behavioral approach offered little towards bridging 
the divide upon which Unionist supremacy was based.40  Yet, O’Neill’s proposals, 
however modest or prompted by overt pressure from Westminster, failed to account for 
the radicalizing effect they would have upon the Unionist establishment within the 
province.  Both Craig and Paisley used O’Neill’s modest proposals to make political 
capital with the latter linking the rise of the civil rights movement in Ulster to the policies 
of liberalization advocated by O’Neill.41  Ultimately, O’Neill’s downfall was cemented 
when, facing mounting pressure form the Westminster government, he introduced a five 
point plan designed to meet the demands of the civil rights movement with regard to 
housing, local representation, discriminatory policing, independent oversight of 
complaints, and review of local authority corruption in Derry.  Paisley and Craig seized 
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upon these initiatives to ferment further discontent among the Protestant population.42  
Facing increasing dissent within the party and pressure from a disgruntled electorate, he 
resigned in April 1969 and was replaced as Prime Minister by his cousin, James 
Chichester-Clark.  However, by the time he ceded power, O’Neill had sealed a legacy of 
disintegration of Stormont and the splintering of the Unionist party.43 
The collapse of the majority-rule Stormont government in 1972 had a deep and 
lasting psychological effect on Ulster Unionists.  For Protestants, the imposition of direct 
rule form London meant the end of both the regime and state they had known for 50 
years.44  The fractures within unionism had since crystallized into specific camps and 
constituencies.  William Craig formed the Ulster Vanguard as an umbrella for traditional 
Loyalist groups which emerged from the IRA violence on 197145 while Ian Paisley 
formed the Democratic Unionist Party in September 1971.46  For his part, Brian Faulkner 
continued to lead the mainstream UUP.  Within each strand of unionism, differing 
pictures of Ulster’s future began to emerge.  Craig, through his Vanguard movement, 
advocated for a Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI).  For his part, Paisley 
preferred total integration of the province into Britain.  However, total integration was an 
unacceptable option for many Northern politicians who stood to lose influence in the 
grander scheme and scale of British politics.  Integration also faced additional opposition 
from the British and Irish governments who concurred in the opinion that, whatever 
Ulster was, it was anything but British.47  The Faulkner-led faction of the UUP saw 
shared government as the way forward.   
Unfortunately for Faulkner, a large percentage of his party did not support the 
notion of power sharing and consequently formed an alliance with Craig’s Vanguard to 
form the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC).48  In the general election of 1974 the 
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UUUC took eleven of the twelve Westminster seats allocated to Ulster with Gerry Fitt of 
the SDLP taking the final seat.  The level of discontent within Ulster’s Protestant 
community was unmistakable and did not bode well for the implementation and 
execution of the power-sharing arrangement. 
B. THE SUNNINGDALE AGREEMENT 
The publishing of the Westminster government’s White Paper in March 1973 
established the construct under which a power-sharing arrangement would operate.  The 
paper, Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals, called for the establishment of a 78 
member assembly with devolved powers and the development of a Council of Ireland to 
establish cross-border cooperation.  While power was to be devolved to the new power-
sharing assembly, London would retain responsibility for the province’s legal and 
security apparatus.  Assembly elections took place in June and resulted in 72.3% of the 
electorate casting ballots.  Given the Republican boycott and incidents of intimidation, 
the turnout was quite a success.  While initial results indicated those supporting power-
sharing garnered 52 of the 78 seats available, many of the 24 UUP representatives elected 
would subsequently come to oppose the power-sharing executive.49  
With the composition of the assembly determined by the June elections, the work 
of forming an executive was initiated when an agreement in principle was reached 
between the moderate Ulster Unionists, the SDLP, and the Alliance party.  For those 
Unionists agreeable to power sharing, the executive provided an avenue to restore the 
primacy of their majority status within the province.  The SDLP had long since 
recognized that, until the majority of the people of Northern Ireland agreed to unification 
with the south, there could be no change in the Britishness of the province.  As such, the 
executive and the power sharing assembly offered the best hope for political inclusion 
and the possibility to establish institutions which might pave the way to a united Ireland.  
By November 1973, the framework for the executive was finalized.  There would be six 
Unionists, four SDLP, and one Alliance Party50 member.  The body would be headed by 
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Brian Faulkner as first minister while the leader of the SDLP, Gerry Fitt would be the 
deputy.  With the executive set and the assembly elections already completed, all that 
remained to be accomplished was to establish the roles of the respective governments and 
to determine the shape and nature of the proposed Council of Ireland. 
The Sunningdale Agreement came about as a result of a conference hosted by the 
British government and attended by representation from the Irish government, the UUP, 
the SDLP, and the Alliance Party.  Conspicuous by their absence were the uninvited 
representatives of dissident Ulster unionism and the Republican movement.  The 
conference took place at Sunningdale in December 1973 and produced several initiatives 
that were to form the basis for initiating the first power sharing executive arrangement 
between the province’s majority Protestant and minority Catholic peoples since the 
establishment of the state under the terms of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. 
 The conference itself afforded the parties in attendance an opportunity to voice 
their position on the current and future status of Northern Ireland.  Interestingly but not 
unexpectedly, the Irish government and the SDLP expressed a desire for the integration 
of Northern Ireland into a united Ireland with the consent of the majority population of 
the province.  Yet, the Irish government’s recognition of the will of the majority was in 
direct contradiction with Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution of 1937 which laid 
claim to whole of the island of Ireland.  This issue would prove problematic as the 
agreement was executed.   
For their part, the Unionists and Alliance Party delegation reaffirmed their desire 
to remain part of the United Kingdom. The British government expressed their desire to 
resolve the difficulties by constitutional democratic means and recognized and accepted 
that the majority of the people of Northern Ireland desired to remain a part of the UK.  
The British delegation also demonstrated flexibility on the issue by recognizing that, if at 
some point in the future, the majority of the people of Northern Ireland wished to 
terminate their relationship within the Union and become a part of a greater united 
Ireland, they would willingly support such a position.51 
 The establishment of a cross-border institution designed to improve cooperation 
on areas of mutual interest to the northern and southern governments proved to be the                                                  
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most nettlesome arrangement contained within the agreement.  This body, known as the 
Council of Ireland, was to consist of a Council of Ministers charged with executive 
functions and a Consultative Assembly charged with advisory and review powers.  The 
Council of Ministers would consist of fourteen members drawn equally from the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Dail.52   While vested with executive 
responsibilities, the Council of Ministers would be limited by the requirement to achieve 
unanimous consent on any proposal before them.  The Consultative Assembly would 
consist of 60 members, 30 members from the Dail and 30 members from the Northern 
Ireland Assembly. The agreement identified myriad and far-reaching areas for 
cooperation between the two governments.  Sunningdale also recognized the difficulties 
associated with identifying the common interests of both entities and which executive 
powers should be delegated to the Council of Ministers.  As such, the attendees agreed to 
defer identifying specific areas of responsibility until after the power sharing executive 
was operational.  The agreement did provide that the Northern Ireland Assembly and the 
Dail had final authority over what functions would be delegated to the Council of Ireland. 
 Sunningdale provided Unionists the opportunity to express their concern that 
members of the IRA were effectively using the Irish Republic as a safe haven.  Having 
launched paramilitary operations in Northern Ireland, they could seek refuge from the 
pursuing Northern Irish security services within the safe confines of the Republic.  While 
the Irish government was sympathetic to the Unionist concerns, it recognized the 
complexities of legal issues associated with extradition, joint jurisdiction, and extension 
of domestic jurisdiction when trying suspects for offenses committed outside the state.  
As such, the issue was deferred for future review beyond the scope of the agreement.53 
 The Sunningdale conference also recognized the need for police reform to 
increase the appeal and effectiveness of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) within 
Northern Ireland.  The agreement called for the establishment of northern and southern 
policing authorities under the auspices of the Council of Ireland and called for the 
establishment of independent procedures for dealing with complaints against police 
actions.  In recognition of the tremendous unpopularity of detention among the 
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Nationalist community of Northern Ireland, the British government made a commitment 
to end the practice as soon as the security situation within the province permitted.  As a 
gesture of good will, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland committed to the release 
of selected detainees before Christmas 1973.54 
 To ensure the expeditious implementation of the terms of the Sunningdale 
Agreement, the British government immediately undertook the process of seeking 
authority from Parliament to devolve appropriate powers to the new Northern Ireland 
Executive and Assembly.  Such action paved the way for the appointment of the 
Executive and convening the Assembly in January 1974. 
1. Power Sharing & Its Demise 
No sooner had the executive met than its troubles began.  The first blow came 
when on 4 January 1974; the Ulster Unionist Council55 rejected the Sunningdale 
Agreement and forced Brian Faulkner to resign his leadership of the party. Within a 
month, the British Prime Minister called a general election.  The event undermined the 
Executive by providing the anti-agreement Unionists the opportunity to effectively voice 
their displeasure.  The election would also jeopardize Westminster’s underlying support 
if the Conservative government was not returned to power.  The problems for Faulkner 
continued to snowball with constitutional challenges to Dublin’s support for the 
agreement and questionable statements about the primacy of Irish claims to sovereignty 
over Northern Ireland by Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Liam Cosgrave.56   When combined 
with the continued pace of IRA activities and the refusal of Dublin to extradite wanted 
Republicans for trial in Northern Ireland, the level of Protestant discontent continued to 
grow. 
2. The Ulster Workers Council (UWC) Strike 
The British general election of February 1974 provided the UUUC the first major 
opportunity to leverage Unionist power as never before to express their displeasure at the 
Sunningdale agreement and to wield increased influence over the British government.  
By agreeing to field only one anti-Sunningdale candidate in each electoral district for the 
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Westminster parliament, the UUP, DUP, and Ulster Vanguard were able to capture 
eleven of the twelve seats allotted to Northern Ireland.  The SDLP captured the remaining 
seat and represented the only pro-Sunningdale voice of those elected.57  The vote 
highlighted the overwhelming unpopularity of the agreement within the Protestant 
community in the province.  The fact that the opposition Labour Party was returned to 
power in Britain with a minority government only served to further the influence that the 
Unionists could leverage to achieve their objectives when it came to policy setting in 
Northern Ireland.  The aforementioned problems and the success of the UUC further 
undermined the legitimacy of the executive.  Yet despite the growing Unionist opposition 
to the executive within the Northern Ireland assembly itself, the body continued to 
operate and perform the functions of government designated to it. 
 Given the failure of constitutional politics to bring down the power sharing 
executive, anti-Sunningdale Unionists turned to the tactic of civil disobedience as a 
means to achieving their goal.  Using a province-wide strike to convey their anger at the 
executive and its support for Sunningdale, the Ulster Workers Council (UWC), 
representing key workers within critical industries such as electricity generation, fuel 
supply and distribution, shipbuilding, and other heavy industry, provided the anti-
agreement Unionist cause the impetus needed to bring unrelenting pressure to bear on the 
executive.    While Unionist and Loyalist politicians had initially rejected the notion of a 
strike, they rapidly climbed on-board when it appeared that the action was having the 
desired effect.  In initiating the strike, the UWC’s manifesto included the following 
demands: 
o Dissolution of the executive and the resumption of powers by the 
Secretary of State 
o New assembly elections before September 1974 
o A reduction in the size of constituencies 
o Rejection of the Council of Ireland – even as a point for discussion 
o Loss of veto power for Secretary of State once the new assembly is in 
place58 
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 The strike itself had a slow beginning.  Indeed, during the first day of the action, 
the majority of people went to their places of employment.  It was not until members of 
the Protestant paramilitary Ulster Defense Army (UDA) took it upon themselves to 
enforce the strike that the concept took hold.  In many instances workers were 
intimidated by paramilitaries, cars were hijacked, places of business shut down and 
barricades erected to prevent the population from going about their work.59  Yet, the 
intimidation alone was not enough to bring the strike’s effectiveness home.  The UWC’s 
control of the key industries of electricity generation and fuel distribution enabled it to 
ratchet up the pressure on both the Northern Ireland Executive and the British 
government and force reconsideration of the Sunningdale agreement.  During the course 
of the two week strike, the UWC was able to force industries to close their doors because 
they lacked electricity to conduct normal operations.  As such, those workers who were 
not supporting the strike were effectively shut out from their places of work. 
 From the Executive’s perspective, their position was exacerbated by the fact that 
it had no mandate over matters of security.  As such, it was unable to direct either the 
RUC or the army to take effective steps to break the strike.  Not that such power would 
have done any good as it is highly unlikely that the RUC would have acted to break a 
strike which, on a personal level, many of within the force actually supported.  
Throughout the strike, the army had kept its distance instead choosing to continue to 
focus its efforts on counter-terror operations and patrols.  The view from the army 
command structure was that dealing with the strike was a law enforcement function and 
therefore fell to the RUC.60  Yet, the belief persisted that, had the army and RUC acted 
quickly to break up the strike, momentum would have been lost and the population would 
have returned to work. 
 The persistent blackouts, the reduction in the availability of basic food stuffs and 
fuel, and the threat to the water and sanitation system had the desired effect on the 
Executive.  In an effort to placate the strikers, the implementation of the agreed Council 
of Ireland provisions was suspended until after the next Assembly election.  First 
Minister Faulkner asked the recently appointed Labour government’s Secretary of State 
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for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees to begin a dialogue with the UWC to end the strike.  
When this request was refused, Faulkner saw no alternative but to resign.  His resignation 
effectively ended the power sharing executive and brought to an end the first major effort 
to inclusively bring the Troubles to an end. 
The UWC strike did not bring Unionists back to the glory days of the Northern 
Ireland that they had controlled for almost 50 years through the execution of simple 
majority rule.  It did, however, restore their sense of purpose and unity.  While many 
internal divisions still remained, unionism was at the zenith of its post-direct rule power.  
In national elections, hard-line candidates had taken eleven of the twelve seats at 
Westminster.  Through organization and cooperation, they had brought down a power 
sharing executive they viewed as a threat not only to their interests but to their position 
within the Union.  Their membership, by controlling vital positions within key industries, 
had brought the province to a standstill.  Finally, they demonstrated their willingness to 
veto any solution to the problems of Northern Ireland which might diminish their status 
within the community. 
C. WHY THE POWER-SHARING EXPERIMENT FAILED 
Much analysis has been done on the failure of the power sharing arrangement of 
1973-1974.  Some, including the then leader of the SDLP Gerry Fitt, have proposed that 
the inclusion of the Council of Ireland provision was a bridge too far for Unionists to 
cross as it was seen as a mechanism leading to the eventual reunification of the island.61 
Others such as Miller have questioned whether Unionists were ready to share power with 
Nationalists.62  Another argument is that the Irish or British governments failed to 
provide the necessary support for the institution by respectively abandoning territorial 
claims or effectively dealing with the strike by the UWC which ultimately brought down 
the Assembly and Executive.63  The reality is that a combination of these and other 
factors were greatly instrumental in the failure of the power sharing arrangement and the 
continuation of the troubles for an additional 25 years. 
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1. Nationalists 
For the Nationalist population as represented by the SDLP, Sunningdale and the 
power sharing executive provided not only a voice in government that they had not 
known since the partition of Ireland but also a vehicle in the Council of Ireland which 
might ultimately pave the way for the peaceful reunification of the island.  While 
Sunningdale did not provide an immediate end to internment, it did provide for the 
release of some prisoners held in detention without trial.  As such, assuming a role in a 
power sharing executive offered many of the key demands the party had made central to 
their political manifesto. 
The collapse of the power sharing executive helped Nationalists realize the 
limitations of their power.  By insisting on the inclusion of the provisions for the Council 
of Ireland, the SDLP effectively forced the hand of moderate Unionists such as Brian 
Faulkner who was unable to sell the proposal to his constituency because it held the 
potential to undermine the very foundations of the Union with Britain.  Yet, the inclusion 
of the Council was viewed as essential by many within the SDLP.  Without it, the fear 
was that Republicans would soon erode the support for moderate nationalism and, with it, 
support for the SDLP.  Others such as the executive’s Deputy First Minister, Gerry Fitt 
saw the Council proposal as a poison pill which working class Protestants would never 
swallow.  In his view, the accession of Nationalists into a power sharing executive was 
the most that could be achieved at the time.  Anything more would harden the Protestant 
resolve and jeopardize the entire arrangement.64  In his view, it was more important to 
build confidence among the Catholic and Protestant communities by emphasizing the 
power-sharing element of the executive first and then turning the party’s attention to 
issues associated with the Council of Ireland.  Ending discrimination and providing equal 
opportunities greatly outweighed all facets of north-south cooperation.65  Conversely, the 
majority of the party’s members viewed Unionist opposition to the Council of Ireland 
skeptically.  Many felt that the issue had been conveniently hijacked and used as a reason 
for abstention from participation in power-sharing with representatives of the minority 
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community.66  In retrospect, both Fitt and those fearing the erosion of the SDLP’s 
position within the Nationalist community were correct.  The Council of Ireland was 
indeed a bridge too far for the Protestant majority while later Republican engagement in 
constitutional politics would erode SDLP support within the Nationalist community and 
make it the second choice of Catholics within the province. 
2. Republicans 
From a Republican perspective the Sunningdale Agreement and subsequent 
power sharing executive provided little in the way of advancing their cause and therefore 
gave them little incentive to support the arrangement.  The agreement itself not only 
recognized the partition of Ireland but guaranteed that there would be no change in the 
constitutional position of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority of the 
population within the province.  Republicans viewed such a guarantee as a de facto 
Unionist veto which, given the demographic situation, would mean that it would be a 
very long time, if ever, before a Catholic, let alone Republican, majority held sway within 
the province.  Of course, the exclusion of Republicans from the Sunningdale talks was an 
attempt to marginalize their influence with the hope of decreasing their support among 
the Catholic population.  Yet, to produce tangible results, the agreement and executive 
needed to yield a decrease in violence to reassure members of each community that 
power sharing could produce governance which was capable of restoring normalcy to 
their everyday lives.   
By excluding a Republican element form the talks, the British government failed 
to consider the impact this vital constituency would have in undermining the 
effectiveness of the executive as it went about its mandate to govern.  Had the British 
authorities managed to initiate covert negotiations with the IRA leading to a temporary 
cease fire in exchange for minor concessions such as an increased release of detainees 
held under internment or a scaling back of army patrols, the new executive could point to 
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3. Unionists 
Although divided on the power sharing executive, Unionists were totally opposed 
to the tenets of the Council of Ireland.  Moderate Unionists were prepared to accept the 
concept of sharing power with Catholics if the arrangement was cemented with a 
guarantee of the province’s position as unquestionably part of the UK and was 
accompanied by a measurable decrease in the level of violence.  Unfortunately, the 
Council of Ireland, territorial assertions by the Dublin government in relation to Articles 
2 and 3 of the Irish constitution, and the continued pace of paramilitary activity 
undertaken by the IRA undermined what Sunningdale had attempted to achieve to such a 
degree that many within the Protestant community felt little option but to bring their 
protest to the streets.  In doing so, the UWC quickly reminded moderate Unionists, 
Nationalists, and the sovereign governments that real power within the province lay in the 
hands of the Protestant people and, when their wishes were ignored, they would use that 
power to restore the status quo. 
 In essence, the strike served as a vehicle for the majority of Protestants to make 
their voices heard on the Council of Ireland issue.  It also served as a vehicle to reassert a 
Protestant identity which, despite a growing Catholic middle class and a proportional 
decrease in Unionist power, was still strongly held within the community.  For 
Protestants who supported the union with Britain, no power sharing executive would ever 
create a joint nationality with Catholics.67  In a strange irony, the strike which at its 
center held firm to the notion of the strength of the union with Britain, served to alienate 
the British government from their traditional Unionist allies.  Indeed, the British 
annoyance at the strike was so great that Prime Minister Harold Wilson publicly 
chastised the strikers by saying  
Yet people who benefit from this [British expenditures] now viciously 
defy Westminster, purporting to act as though they were an elected 
government, spend their lives sponging on Westminster and British 
democracy and then systematically assault democratic methods.  Who do 
they think they are?  It is when we see the kind of arrogant, undemocratic 
behavior now going on that the patience of citizens, parents, taxpayers 
becomes strained.68 
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As such Ulster Unionists, in asserting their right to preserve the bond with Britain had 
undermined the trust in democratic principles which were at the heart of being British.  
4. The British Government 
Given Britain’s desire to establish a power sharing executive in Northern Ireland, 
the level of commitment displayed in trying to bring an end to the UWC strike was 
strangely lacking.  While it is true that the election in February 1974 returned a Labour 
government perhaps not as invested in the process as its Conservative predecessor, there 
can be little doubt that a more determined approach by the RUC and army to stop 
intimidation and remove barricades during the early days of the UWC strike may well 
have led to its collapse.  Indeed, Andy Tyrie, the leader of the UDA and one of the key 
figures behind the organization and enforcement of the strike admitted as much when he 
conceded that a major show of force from the RUC or army at the start of the strike might 
have destroyed the momentum and led to its collapse.69 
5. The Irish Government 
The Irish government also played a critical role in the failure of the Sunningdale 
Agreement and the power sharing executive.  By recognizing Northern Ireland as a 
separate entity and accepting of the will of the people as the key determinant of that 
entity’s future, the government had taken the first steps in formalizing relations between 
the two states.  Yet, the inability of the Republic’s government to deal with the territorial 
claims to Northern Ireland contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the constitution continued to 
be a major impediment to a Unionist accepting that southern intentions were less than 
hostile.  Unionist unease was aroused further by court challenges against southern 
participation in Sunningdale.  Finally, unwillingness to extradite wanted IRA members 
from the Republic to the North greatly contributed to the impression of state sponsorship 
of the IRA held by many Unionists. 
 Given that Sunningdale came just four and a half years after the beginning of the 
troubles, it is doubtful that the government would have garnered sufficient popular 
support within the Republic to initiate a referendum to change Articles 2 & 3 of the 
constitution.  They could, however, have been more cooperative on the extradition issue.   
While it may not have been enough to save power sharing by itself, it may have paved the 
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way to softening the support for anti-agreement Unionists within Northern Ireland’s 
Protestant community. 
D. THE POST-SUNNINGDALE ERA 
1. The SDLP 
The collapse of Sunningdale proved particularly difficult for the SDLP.  Internal 
debate focused on the reasons behind the collapse of the power-sharing arrangement.  As 
previously mentioned, party leader Gerry Fitt blamed the heavy emphasis the party 
placed on the importance of the Council of Ireland.  Others, led by deputy party leader 
John Hume blamed the weakness of the British government in standing up to unionism 
for the failure.  Yet another position was taken by prominent party members such as 
Paddy Devlin (a former Minister for Health in the power-sharing executive) and Austin 
Currie who reiterated the view that Sunningdale failed because Unionists simply were not 
ready to share power with Catholics.70 
 As the party moved beyond the wreckage of Sunningdale, the next opportunity to 
advance their agenda of power sharing and the necessity of an Irish dimension in any 
settlement plan for Northern Ireland came when then Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland, Merlyn Rees proposed a Constitutional Convention.  The purpose of the 
convention was to attempt to have the political parties within the province produce an 
internal solution based on popular support and devoid of interference from sources 
outside the province itself.  While not enamored with the chances of achieving any 
meaningful breakthroughs, the SDLP fought the convention elections in May 1975 on a 
platform of renewed power-sharing and a clearly defined Irish dimension.71  The party 
attained 23.7 percent of the electorate and secured 17 seats in the 78-member 
Convention.  The combined forces of the anti-Sunningdale UUUC secured 47 seats, 
ominously demonstrating the depth of feeling among rank and file Protestants.72  Despite 
their substantial minority position at the convention, the SDLP continued to pursue an 
Irish dimension to any future settlement whilst also advocating for reform of the RUC to 
make it a more professional and representative police service.  Yet, given the UUUC’s 
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overwhelming majority at the convention, the SDLP’s ability to achieve any progress on 
its agenda within the constraints of the convention was severely curtailed.  Indeed, when 
the final report was presented to the British government in November 1975, only the 
Unionist position was conveyed.73 
2. Republicans 
In a strange historical irony, the UWC which ultimately brought down the power-
sharing executive in May of 1974 was largely supported by Republicans.  In their 
somewhat naive view, Loyalists were heroically standing up to British imperialism.  
Republicans still clung to the belief that they were better positioned to come to an 
accommodation with working class Protestants than those operating within the 
constitutional process.74  This belief evidently demonstrated the immaturity of 
Republican political thinking.  Whereas the SDLP clearly viewed Unionist intransigence 
and fears as the major obstacle to Irish reunification, the IRA were trapped in belief that 
British colonialism was the major impediment to the exercise of the Irish identity. 
The real genesis of political activity within republicanism came during the IRA 
truce of 1975.75  The ceasefire afforded the British forces breathing space to improve 
their intelligence capabilities on IRA membership and tactics while attempting to split the 
organization by drawing its members into constitutional politics.76  From a Republican 
perspective, the ceasefires give rise to the opening of incident centers77 which provided 
the Provisionals and Sinn Fein a base for local political and community involvement.78  
They were a watershed in the public perception of Sinn Fein.  The organization now had 
a public face, political standing, and a physical presence within the Nationalist 
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community.79  Although the ceasefire collapsed in September 1975 due to sectarianism, 
the resumption of the IRA campaign, and the government’s failure to meet the political 
demands of republicanism,80 the period did provide Sinn Fein with its first meaningful 
taste of political engagement during the troubles. 
3. Unionists/Loyalists 
The collapse of the power-sharing arrangement was a victory honed by the actions 
of the Loyalist-initiated UWC strike.  The amalgamation of the anti-power sharing UUP 
members with Craig’s Ulster Vanguard and Paisley’s DUP into the UUUC went a long 
way towards repairing the Unionist divisions which surfaced during the premiership of 
O’Neill.  The effective management of candidate nomination within constituencies 
ensured the anti-agreement forces garnered eleven of the twelve seats available to 
Northern Ireland representatives within the Westminster parliament.  The UUUC carried 
this power base forward through the May 1975 elections for the Constitutional 
Convention proposed by Merlyn Rees.  Those opposed to power-sharing secured 47 of 
the 78 seats available at the Convention.81  The Convention assembled in May and 
logged 30 sessions which culminated in the publishing of a report in November 1975. 
The report amounted to a Unionist wish-list, seeking a return to majority rule and ruling 
out any new Council of Ireland. Also recommended was a return to Stormont under 
majority rule and with enhanced powers, a doubling of Northern Ireland seats at 
Westminster, and the introduction of an oath of allegiance to the Queen for all major 
appointments. The single olive branch offered to Nationalists was the possibility of 
chairing some committees.82  The proposals were rejected by the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP), the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI), and the British 
government. While the Convention did reconvene the following February, further 
progress beyond the impasse created by the UUUC demands was impossible and Rees 
dissolved the Convention in March 1976.83 
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 Internal disagreements and the failure to achieve a return to the majority-rule 
system of devolved government within Stormont via the Paisley-led Loyalist strike of 
1977 led to the disintegration of the UUUC.  For Unionists, the institutions of power 
were gone, their regime had collapsed and their state was in ruin.84  The years following 
the collapse of the majority-ruled Stormont meant that, in the words of David Miller, “the 
fact that it (the Protestant) state was not immediately succeeded by some other state has 
meant that the province has been through a period in the state of nature, where life does 
indeed turn out to be nasty, brutish, and short.”85 
In retrospect, it is possible that the Sunningdale Agreement and the power sharing 
executive of 1974 were ahead of their time.  The circumstances surrounding the 
establishment and dissolution of the executive indicate a failure on the part of all parties 
to make the sacrifices necessary to reach a real and lasting peace for the province.  Of 
course, central to this peace initiative’s failure was the lack of maturity demonstrated by 
both the Unionist and Nationalist communities of Northern Ireland.  A recalcitrant 
Protestant population in the majority but living with a siege mentality and fearing 
southern interference coupled with a Catholic population seeking to break their own siege 
mentality by reaching out for greater southern engagement both overplayed their hands 
and paved the way for an additional quarter century of terror and destruction.  
Unfortunately, it would take almost thirty years of violence within the province before 
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III. THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT 
After the collapse of the 1974 Sunningdale power-sharing experiment, the British 
had, until the implementation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA), attempted to resolve 
the conflict predominantly in the context of Northern Ireland.  The AIA signified the 
beginning of the process whereby the British government accepted the SDLP thesis for 
resolving the NI conflict.86  The process was complicated by political instability in the 
Irish Republic resulting in several changes in government and the divergent attitudes of 
the British and Irish governments to issues ranging from the treatment of hunger strikers 
and the Falklands war to whether the primary focus should be on the need to improve the 
security situation within Northern Ireland or decrease the alienation felt by the Province’s 
Nationalist population. 
This chapter provides an analysis of the events leading up to the signing of the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement; presents an assessment of the key features of the agreement; and 
evaluates the roles played by the British and Irish governments and the subsequent 
response of Nationalist and Unionist communities to the agreement.  A critical aspect of 
this chapter is the role played by the political parties, specifically the SDLP, in 
developing initiatives which paved the way to the agreement or sought to provide an 
alternative arrangement for governing the province.  The chapter concludes with an 
examination of the agreement in terms of its utility in addressing Northern Ireland’s  
political and paramilitary malaise.  
A. THE PRE-ANGLO-IRISH ENVIRONMENT 
1. The Governments 
The lack of progress in finding a political solution within the confines of Northern 
Ireland led the new Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher to seek alternative 
avenues in moving the process forward.  The first opportunity to do so presented itself in 
May 1980 when Thatcher and Taoiseach, Charles Haughey agreed to establish an Anglo-
Irish Intergovernmental Council to examine cooperation in the areas of security and the 
economy; develop new institutional arrangements for the Province; and encourage mutual 
                                                 
86 Murray and Tonge, 139. 
38 
understanding between the governments and across the sectarian divide.87  The dynamics 
of the inter-governmental relationship was often driven by selfish considerations.  For her 
part, Thatcher, an admitted Unionist at heart,88 was most concerned with the security 
situation along the border and hoped to obtain guarantees that the Republic would take a 
more active role in pursuing IRA terrorists within its borders and extraditing those 
wanted for crimes in Northern Ireland.  The Irish government was more concerned with 
increasing its ability to gain political influence into the governance of the Province.  At 
the heart of this desire lay the fear that, in the wake of the1981 hunger strikes, Sinn 
Fein’s political influence within the Nationalist community would grow and lead to the 
eventual displacement of the SDLP.  It was also feared that, if such a scenario was 
allowed to transpire, Sinn Fein might successfully expand their political base within the 
Republic and destabilize the island as a whole. 
 The British government initially paid scant attention to Irish concerns over the 
growth of Sinn Fein.  The election of Bobby Sands, a hunger striker, to the Westminster 
Parliament and upon his death, his replacement by his campaign manager, served as a 
wake-up call to the Conservative administration.  While Margaret Thatcher understood 
the polarization that had taken place within Northern Ireland as a result of the hunger 
strikes and the government’s response, she believed the growth in support for Sinn Fein 
was as much a result of the ineffectiveness of the SDLP.89  Still, the need to check Sinn 
Fein’s influence was obvious and further solidified at the intergovernmental summit in 
November 1981.  The summit resulted in the formal establishment of the Anglo-Irish 
Intergovernmental Council which provided the blueprint for potential Dublin 
involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland90  Despite the best intentions of the early 
intergovernmental summits, implementation of recommendations and agreements were 
suspended due to the Irish government’s less than wholehearted support for the British 
position as it related to the Falklands conflict. 
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 While the British government had become more receptive to seeking an 
accommodation with the Irish government, they had not abandoned the idea of finding a 
solution within the confines of Northern Ireland.  The establishment of a Constitutional 
Conference in 1980 followed by an Advisory Council with the goals of examining 
government departments, legislation, and initiatives on the future of the province proved 
unacceptable to Nationalists on the grounds that they took a one-dimensional provincial 
approach to finding workable solutions.  In early 1982, the new Northern Ireland 
Secretary, James Prior proposed a U.S.-style separate Executive and Assembly 
arrangement with separate powers and built-in protections to prevent any party form 
implementing a veto in an attempt to bring down the Assembly.  The proposal was 
enticing to constitutional Nationalists because it provided an avenue towards power-
sharing but was abandoned in favor of a form of rolling devolution91 which, when 
proposed by Secretary Prior in his White Paper, abandoned any prospect for an Irish 
dimension in the governance of Northern Ireland.  While the White Paper initially called 
for a modest Irish dimension, Prior was instructed by Thatcher to remove the provision.  
The SDLP rejected the proposal and, although they contested elections to the devolved 
assembly, they refused to take their seats.  Prior would later lament that the decision to 
remove the Irish dimension was ‘probably our greatest mistake.’92  Nationalist 
expectations, which had been raised by the prospect of power-sharing, were dashed by 
the reality of rolling devolution.  The entire exercise resulted in an unrepresentative 
assembly with minor powers and served to further polarize the Nationalist and Unionist 
communities. 
 In order to break the impasse, it was becoming increasingly obvious that a more 
comprehensive and focused solution was required to move the province toward a lasting 
peace. 
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2. The Rise of Political Republicanism–The Hunger Strikes & Sinn Fein 
While the ceasefire of 1975 afforded Sinn Fein an opportunity to establish a public 
face, political standing, and physical presence within the Nationalist community in Northern 
Ireland via incident centers, the party still clung to abstentionist policies and refused to 
contest elections.  Instead, the Republican movement focused its efforts on attempting to 
form coalitions with groups thought sympathetic to their cause.93  Thus, the only electoral 
alternative to SDLP for Nationalists favoring a tougher policy towards partition was the Irish 
Independence Party (IIP)94  Consequently, at the beginning of the 1980s, Sinn Fein had taken 
on the characteristics of a social organization for those too timid or too old for continued 
service in the IRA.95  Yet, within Republican circles there was a realization of a need for 
change.  The armed struggle was not achieving the desired goal of driving the British out of 
Northern Ireland by military means and the inability to secure concessions on the hard-line 
policies of criminalization which eroded political prisoner status96 introduced under the 
former Labour government’s Northern Ireland Secretary, Roy Mason, represent a continued 
source of frustration for the movement.  Indeed, the progressively worsening conditions 
within the prisons which had graduated from a blanket protest in 1976 to a dirty protest in 
1978 and an abortive hunger strike in 1980 in order to secure the restoration of political 
prisoner status led Sinn Fein to organize the H-Block97 Committee’s appeals to the Church, 
Fianna Fail,98 and the SDLP for political and moral support.99 
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 The continued failure to secure concessions from the British government led 
Republican prisoners to embark on a second wave of hunger strikes at the beginning of 
March, 1981.  The strike was not welcomed by Sinn Fein who viewed it as a total 
diversion of the movement and organizationally distracting.100  Despite their displeasure, 
the organization was presented an opportunity to open a second front against Britain 
when on 5 March, 1981, the independent Member of Parliament representing the 
Fermanagh/South Tyrone district died suddenly.  The vacated seat provided Sinn Fein the 
opportunity to capitalize on massive Catholic sympathy for the hunger strikers by 
entering the political arena on very favorable terms.101  Bobby Sands, a hunger-striker, 
was chosen to represent the prisoners.  His selection was based on the fact that he was the 
prisoner closest to death and had been convicted and sentenced on minor weapons 
charges and therefore presented the most acceptable side of the Republican movement.102  
The by-election to fill the vacant seat was held on 9 April and, after much deliberations 
leading to an SDLP abstention, the election came down to a straight contest between 
Bobby Sands and Harry West of the UUP.  Sands was elected to the Westminster 
parliament having secured just over 51% of the vote.   
Despite the overwhelming public relations value of Sands’ election, the British 
government stood firm and refused to concede political status to the prisoners.  Sands 
died on 5 May 1981 after 66 days on hunger strike.  In the by-election to fill his seat, his 
campaign manager, Owen Carron was elected.  Emboldened by their early political 
success, Sinn Fein decided to test the waters in the Irish Republic.  In the June 1981 
general election, two hunger strikers were elected to the Dail.  While it may have initially 
appeared that Sinn Fein had generated sufficient support to present a viable Nationalist 
position in the South, the illusion was quickly shattered by the failure of all seven party 
candidates to secure a single seat in the Republic’s general election of March 1982.103   
The hunger strikes leading to the deaths of 10 prisoners had a tremendous impact 
on the political landscape of Northern Ireland and enabled Sinn Fein to set the political 
agenda throughout the 1980s.  The election of Bobby Sands showed at least tacit support 
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among the Nationalist community for the cause of the hunger strikers.  His subsequent 
death proved problematic for Anglo-Irish relations in light of Britain’s unwillingness to 
negotiate a settlement.  The hunger strikes were particularly problematic for the SDLP 
who saw their position within the Nationalist community eroded by sympathies for the 
hunger strikers and the subsequent upsurge in support for Sinn Fein.  Indeed, the party 
had to temper its sympathies for the prisoners with the need to conduct business at the 
local government level despite Sinn Fein requesting SDLP withdrawal to show support 
for the prisoners.104  For Sinn Fein, the transformation was startling.  The party had 
grown from little more than a flag of convenience for the IRA into a political 
organization.105  Electoral politics, once viewed as a burdensome distraction to the armed 
struggle suddenly provided a new front in the campaign.  The hunger strikes not only 
invigorated the political campaign, it also garnered international sympathy for the 
Republican movement while breathing life into the military campaign by increasing the 
recruiting base and injecting a fresh sense of energy and commitment into the 
organization.106  Carron’s victory in August 1981 provided Sinn Fein a springboard for 
contesting all elections in the North.  Indeed, the new departure of marrying the political 
campaign with the armed struggle is best summed up in the words of Danny Morrison at 
the 1981 Sinn Fein Ard Fheis.107  Referring to the new approach, he asked the attendees 
“Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box?  But will anyone 
here object if, with a ballot paper in one hand and the Armalite in the other, we take 
power in Ireland?”108  For much of the rest of the 1980s Sinn Fein was able to garner 
approximately 11 percent of the vote in Northern Ireland elections109 
 The rise in Sinn Fein’s fortunes rang alarm bells in both Dublin and London.  In 
Dublin, Prime Minister Garrett FitzGerald was most concerned with the potential for 
Sinn Fein to eclipse the SDLP as the majority voice for northern nationalism while an 
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emboldened Republican movement might set in motion a campaign to destabilize the 
whole of Ireland.110  For the British government, the concern was expressed by the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland when he indicated that the Provisionals might turn 
Ireland into ‘a Cuba off our Western coasts.’111  The fears of both governments were not 
unfounded as the British General Election results of June 1983 saw the Sinn Fein vote 
climb to 13.4 percent against the SDLP’s 17.9 percent.  The response was a redoubling of 
Anglo-Irish contacts and the involvement of the constitutional Nationalist parties on the 
island of Ireland in the New Ireland Forum. 
3. The New Ireland Forum 
The failure of the Sunningdale power-sharing arrangement of 1974 and the 
subsequent inability to cement agreements with moderate Unionists on the formation of 
an acceptable means of devolved government within Northern Ireland led the SDLP to 
reevaluate their position.  Indeed, Unionist intransigence led party strategists to believe 
that, while the majority community enjoyed the assurance provided on their constitutional 
future within the United Kingdom, no progress could be made towards a comprehensive 
settlement.  Consequently, the party’s focus shifted from seeking an internal solution 
within the confines of the province to one involving the British and Irish governments.  In 
1979, a policy document entitled Towards a New Ireland appeared and called on the two 
governments to work jointly to create the conditions whereby both traditions in the North 
could function together to create peace, stability, and unity.112  The party further defined 
its thinking in a second policy document, Northern Ireland – A Strategy for Peace which 
called on the British government to renounce its claim to selfish interests in Ireland while 
continuing to provide the Unionist population a constitutional guarantee which 
contributed to their unwillingness to actively negotiate a good faith political settlement.  
It defined the Northern Ireland problem in a multi-dimensional framework consisting of 
inter-community relations, North-South relations, and Irish-British relations.  This 
document foreshadowed the New Ireland Forum in that it identified a unitary state or a 
federal/confederal arrangement as possible solutions to address the Irish problem.113  
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Binding all SDLP initiatives together throughout the early 1980s was the continuing 
desire to achieve an Irish dimension and the desire to highlight the negative impacts that 
the Unionist veto was having on the search for lasting peace.114 
The hunger strikes and resultant increase in support for Sinn Fein served as a 
wake up call to the SDLP. They could no longer claim the title as the singular 
representatives of Northern Ireland’s Nationalist community.  Something had to be done 
to stem the rising tide of support for Sinn Fein and bolster the SDLP’s flagging electoral 
base while reviving the Anglo-Irish process.  The SDLP duly responded by proposing a 
Council for a New Ireland.  While the Unionists took the somewhat cynical view that the 
proposed council was nothing more than a Nationalist attempt to justify an abstentionist 
policy from the recently formed Assembly,115 the SDLP viewed the concept as a means 
of integrating their philosophy and ideology into the mainstream of southern Irish policy 
towards the North.116  While opinions may vary on the SDLP’s rationale for proposing 
the council, it is generally agreed that the project did offer an alternative to participation 
in the Stormont Assembly while providing a means by which the party could be seen to 
be actively representing Nationalist interests while pursuing a solution to the Troubles.  
Thus, when the Assembly elections took place in October, 1982, the SDLP Manifesto 
clearly identified the desire to pursue a council consisting of all democratic parties and 
willing to discuss how best to accommodate unionism in a New Ireland while debating 
alternatives within an Anglo-Irish construct.117 
The SDLP’s concept of a Council for a New Ireland was transformed into the 
New Ireland Forum which was launched in March 1983.  All parties engaged in 
constitutional politics on the island of Ireland were invited to participate in the forum.118  
Sinn Fein’s continued association with violence excluded them from the process.119  
Believing that the forum would offer nothing substantive and secure within their 
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constitutionally guaranteed position, the Unionist parties of Northern Ireland declined the 
invitation to officially participate.  In doing so, the Unionist parties missed an historical 
opportunity to positively portray their position to a broader Irish audience and influence 
the course of the final forum report to reflect the Unionist position. 
The New Ireland Forum convened until May 1984 when it issued its final report.  
The strong influence of the SDLP throughout the forum’s deliberations is witnessed in 
the recommendations contained in the final report and highlighted a shift in traditional 
Nationalist thinking towards openness in accepting the Britishness of the Protestant 
tradition within a new Ireland and a need for a new Irish constitution to accommodate a 
pluralistic society.120  Through their active involvement, the SDLP had been able to 
create a new paradigm in traditional southern political thinking towards the North.  While 
the Forum Report did contain an option expressing a desire for a unitary state as the 
preferred solution, the option was accompanied by other proposals for a federal state, a 
confederal state, and a joint authority option which would see the Province administered 
by both Britain and Ireland. 
In many ways, the Forum was a triumph for the SDLP.  At the outset, it provided 
the party an alternative political avenue to Secretary Prior’s devolved Assembly.  It 
afforded the SDLP a unique opportunity to exert their influence on southern Irish 
thinking on Northern Ireland and, in so doing, shape a pan-Nationalist solution set 
meriting further discussion and consideration.  It also put the party squarely in the 
limelight of northern Nationalist consciousness and stunted the growing popularity of 
Sinn Fein within that community.  The Forum responded to Sinn Fein’s accusation that 
the SDLP tried to be ‘all things to all men’121 by accommodating the divergent positions 
of all colors of Nationalist thinking from both sides of the border while affording the 
opportunity to examine the motives behind Unionist fears of association with the Irish  
Republic.  To the SDLP, it was the Unionist’s hostility towards the South which 
remained the primary problem thwarting efforts to obtain a political settlement and 
prohibiting a power-sharing arrangement with an Irish dimension.122 
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Despite the fact that the forum report recognized the existence of a rival tradition 
in the community and a commitment to seeking an acceptable settlement with the 
Unionist community via political means,123 the report which appeared in May 1984 was 
not well received by Northern Ireland’s Protestants.  After many years of contented 
inaction, the major Unionist parties were spurred to action by the prospect of the forum 
report stealing the limelight and dictating the pace of political developments in the North.  
The UUP were the first to respond when they preempted the publication of the final 
forum report by circulating The Way Forward in April 1984.  This document proposed 
increased legislative powers for a devolved Assembly operating under a committee 
structure with membership divided on a proportionate party basis.  It also proposed a bill 
of rights to protect minority Catholic rights while categorically ruling out any role for the 
government of the Irish Republic in the affairs of Northern Ireland.124  Given the 
overwhelming majority held by the two Unionist parties within Northern Ireland, The 
Way Forward effectively offered little appeal to the Catholic minority.  For their part, the 
DUP offered two responses to the New Ireland Forum Report.  The first, The Unionist 
Case: The Forum Report Answered was little more than a castigation of the SDLP while 
describing the joint authority option contained in the Forum Report as a major step on the 
road to a united Ireland.  The second document, Ulster: The Future Assured, called for 
the restoration of a devolved and comprehensive majority rule with a cabinet government 
answerable to the Assembly.  It also proposed committee oversight of legislation and 
referral of potentially discriminatory legislation to the Secretary of State.  Again, the 
major failing of such a proposal is that it ignored the desires of the Nationalist 
community.125  Within the confines of the now exclusively Unionist Northern Ireland 
Assembly, the Devolution Report Committee published the Catherwood Report in 1985  
which mimicked many of the recommendations put forth in The Way Forward including 
extension of legislative devolution to the existing Assembly  and the implementation of a 
minority bill of rights.126 
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Sensing an impending agreement between Dublin and London, the UUP and DUP 
formed a joint working party in August 1985 with the intention of blocking any role for 
Dublin in the affairs of Northern Ireland.  The Unionist joint leadership then sent a letter 
to Prime Minister Thatcher in September offering to protect minority interests, while 
indicating a willingness to engage in discussions with Dublin on issues of mutual interest, 
but no cabinet positions for Nationalists in any future devolved Executive.127  Beyond 
unionism, the response to the New Ireland Forum Report was mixed.  Sinn Fein, having 
been excluded form the forum, saw merit in the unitary state option but on the whole 
dismissed the report as a ‘show trial for Irish unity that created the illusion of political 
movement when nothing at all was happening.’128  Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein 
went further by criticizing the Forum Report for failing to challenge British claims of 
sovereignty in Ireland and for failing to express the right of Irish national self-
determination.129  For its part, Sinn Fein had revised its notion of Irish unity.  Gone was 
concept of federalism outlined in their policy paper Eire Nua130 which held out the 
possibility that Unionists could conceivably attain majority rule in an expanded nine-
county Ulster.131  In its place, a vision of a 32-county Republic with a renewed 
commitment to decentralized socialism.132  By abandoning the federalist state concept, 
Sinn Fein hoped to demonstrate the equality of all people born on the island of Ireland, 
regardless of their religion, and put an end to the existence of the Northern statelet 
through the exercise of Irish self-determination.133  Yet, despite the harsh rhetoric and 
condemnations from Republicans, little was offered in the way of a constructive  
alternative.  Republicans instead chose to stick to the traditional approach of discounting 
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unionism while laying the blame for the continuing violence at the feet of the British 
government and the institutions of partition. 
The British government reaction was initially receptive to the Forum Report.  
Addressing the report before the House of Commons in July 1984, Secretary Prior 
expressed approval at the emphasis the report placed on recognizing the importance of 
majority consent within Northern Ireland, the condemnation of violence, the willingness 
of constitutional nationalism to understand the Unionist identity, and the willingness to 
discuss the views of others in resolving the conflict.134  An unofficial inquiry into the 
Forum Report was commissioned by the British Irish Association.  The inquiry, headed 
by Lord Kilbrandon, produced Northern Ireland: Report of an Independent Inquiry which 
was published in November1984.  The report sought ways to accommodate a greater role 
for the Dublin government in the affairs of Northern Ireland while providing a critical 
analysis of the British response to the New Ireland Forum Report.  The Kilbrandon 
Committee report proposed a bill of rights, the abolition of the Flags & Emblems Act,135 
abolition of Diplock courts136 and introduction of trial by two judges and a tradeoff 
between increased Irish participation in the affairs of Northern Ireland in exchange for 
increased southern cooperation on security issues.137  On more substantive issues, the 
committee was split and consequently published two differing assessments.  The 
Kilbrandon majority favored granting extensive executive and consultative rights to the 
Irish government with representation on the police authority.  The majority also 
recommended legislative devolution for Northern Ireland with subsidiary roles for the 
London and Dublin governments.  In contrast, the Kilbrandon minority recommended a 
minor role for the Irish government while rejecting power-sharing and proposing limited 
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local-government powers for any future Ulster assembly.138  Interestingly, the 
Kilbrandon Report foreshadowed the Anglo-Irish Agreement by containing a 
recommendation that any treaty between the British and Irish governments should be 
deposited with the United Nations.139   
The impact of the Kilbrandon Report was greatly diminished by the IRA’s bomb 
attack on the Conservative party conference held at the Grand Hotel in Brighton in 
October 1984.  The attack, designed to murder the Prime Minister and her cabinet, came 
close to doing so but ultimately claimed the lives of five lesser party members or their 
spouses.140  Margaret Thatcher, already disposed to a pro-Unionist stance,141 was in no 
mood for compromise on Northern Ireland’s constitutional position within the Union.  
Consequently, after meeting with Taoiseach FitzGerald at the Anglo-Irish Summit at 
Chequers in November 1984, she appeared to deliver a critical blow to the 
recommendations of the New Ireland Forum Report.  In her post summit press 
conference, the Prime Minister brusquely rejected the unitary state, federal state, and 
joint sovereignty options with a straight-forward ‘That is out, that is out, that is out’142 
statement. 
Despite the negativity of Thatcher’s remarks, the November summit did produce a 
joint communiqué which reiterated the belief that no change in the status of Northern 
Ireland would come about through the use of violence, recognized that the province’s 
society consisted of two distinct traditions whose rights were to be safeguarded, and 
reiterated a desire to increase security cooperation to create stability and defeat 
terrorism.143  In retrospect, the summit sent mixed signals with regard to the British 
government’s intent.  On the one hand, the joint communiqué laid the foundations for 
future cooperation between the two governments which would ultimately lead to the 
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Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) while on the other, Thatcher’s unequivocal rejection of the 
Forum Report’s recommendations led many Unionists to believe constitutional 
nationalism had no option but to negotiate a political settlement within the context of 
Northern Ireland.144  Indeed, this misunderstanding on behalf of Ulster unionism was to 
have significant ramifications in the wake of the AIA. 
B. THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT 
1. The Governments 
Margaret Thatcher’s outright rejection of the Forum Report recommendations 
after the Chequers summit came as quite a shock to Irish diplomacy and generated much 
anti-British sentiment in the Irish Republic.  Yet, despite the brusque and public nature of 
Thatcher’s rejection, negotiations resumed to construct an agreement between the 
governments which would address the British concern over security and the Irish concern 
over the alienation of the Northern Nationalist population.  Thus, the agreement which 
was unveiled at Hillsborough Castle in Northern Ireland on 15 November 1985 amounted 
to a hybrid designed to accommodate the positions of both governments.   
 The agreement itself started out with Article 1 declaring that there would be no 
change in the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority of the people 
within the Province and also reiterated the two governments’ understanding that, at the 
time the agreement was signed, the majority wished to remain a part of the United 
Kingdom.  The agreement did leave open the possibility that if, at some future date, the 
majority wished to become a part of a united Ireland, then the governments would 
introduce legislation to accommodate such a wish.  There is little doubt that this 
declaration was designed to reassure Ulster Unionists who feared that an agreement they 
were not a party to negotiating could only lead to a weakening of their constitutionally 
guaranteed position and amount to nothing less than a step along the road to Irish unity.  
Article I was also designed to hold out hope for the Nationalist community that the 
possibility for unity still existed if a majority in the North agreed on such a course of 
action.  For both governments, the first article demonstrated the delicate nature of 
compromise.  For the British, they were demonstrating a degree of impartiality in the 
conflict and a willingness to recognize Nationalist aspirations towards a united Ireland.  
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For their part, the Irish government recognized the will of the Unionist population and 
their desire to maintain their identity and position within the UK.  This recognition 
demonstrated that, despite the continued territorial claim to Northern Ireland, the 
Republic’s government had finally come to accept the reality of the situation as it existed 
in the province. 
 Articles 2 through 9 focused on the establishment of the Inter-Governmental 
Council (IGC) for political, security, legal, justice, and cross border cooperation. These 
articles effectively granted the Irish government a say in the affairs of Northern Ireland.  
While the Irish government had no executive power, the IGC provided a forum to express 
concerns and act as an advocate for the interests of northern Nationalists.  In those 
instances where the governments disagreed, the IGC provided an avenue for both to make 
determined efforts to resolve their differences within the framework of the conference.145  
While being an obvious concession to the desires of constitutional nationalism, the IGC, 
by allowing the Irish government a consultative role in the affairs of the North, provided 
the Thatcher government an active ally in the running of Northern Ireland and blunted 
international criticism of Britain for her handling of the troubles.   
The degree to which such a role mattered can best be judged by how the IGC 
provision was interpreted by the governments.  The Irish Prime Minister, Garret 
FitzGerald viewed the AIA as ‘as near to Joint Authority as one can get,’ while Margaret 
Thatcher believed that the Irish role was little more than consultative.  In her view, ‘Far 
from representing any threat to the union of Northern Ireland with the United Kingdom, 
the Agreement reinforces the Union.’146  She continued to present the problem in the 
context of security cooperation and decreased the emphasis on Nationalist grievances. 
Indeed, the differing views of the agreement held by each government continued as each 
sought to reassure its constituents that the AIA was fulfilling divergent needs.  Explaining 
the meaning of the AIA in December 1985, the Northern Ireland Secretary Tom King  
pointed out that the agreement was a recognition and acceptance by the Irish government 
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that ‘for all practical purposes there will never be a united Ireland.’  The agreement was 
expressly designed to present ‘a united front against gunmen.’147 
 Despite their differing views on the AIA, both governments agreed that the 
agreement produced no erosion of British sovereignty but it did permit the Irish 
government to increase their influence in the North without having to modify their 
constitutional claim over the province.  The AIA, by excluding the parties to the conflict 
and instead focusing on a government to government construct, did succeed in removing 
the de facto guarantee that political progress depended upon Unionist authorization.  
Significantly, the agreement incorporated many of the SDLP’s goals for attaining 
Nationalist equality and presented formulas for aligning the Nationalist and Unionist 
traditions.148  The willingness of Britain to accede to the SDLP analysis of the situation 
in Northern Ireland was perhaps influenced by the manner in which constitutional 
nationalism had reinvented itself and, in so doing, recognized the intransigence of the 
Unionist community. The agreement also demonstrated the level of commitment to 
finding a joint solution to the problem.  This commitment was supported by the fact that, 
unlike the Sunningdale Agreement which was nothing more than a joint communiqué, the 
AIA was an internationally recognized treaty and registered at the United Nations.149  
 Ultimately, the AIA was ambiguous enough to allow both governments to claim it 
to be more than it was.  By accommodating a consultative role for the southern 
government, the Republic could claim to be representing the interests and aspirations of 
the Nationalist community while avoiding the need for sacrifice, adjustment and 
compromise that would be necessary in order to fulfill its territorial claim to the North 
and, at the same time, contain the spread of the IRA’s armed struggle.150  At the same 
time, Britain could claim to have strengthened the Union through security arrangements 
with the Republic while offering the carrot of a united Ireland if the majority of the 
province’s population agreed to such an arrangement.  If neither side felt fully vindicated 
by the arrangements contained in the agreement and negotiated on their behalf by the 
national governments, Article 10 provided that they could always seek an internal 
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accommodation by agreeing to work together towards the establishment of a devolved 
power-sharing government.  Under the terms of Article 10, failure to achieve an 
acceptable form of devolved government would result in the IGC continuing to function 
as the ‘framework for the promotion of cooperation between the two parts of Ireland 
concerning cross border aspects of economic, social and cultural matters in relation to 
which the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland continues to exercise authority.’151  
Obviously, such a provision was designed to prod Unionists into negotiating a power-
sharing arrangement or face the prospect of continued interference into the province’s 
affairs by the Dublin government. 
2. The Nationalist & Republican Response 
The implementation of the AIA proved to be a vindication of the SDLP’s 
persistent efforts to find a workable solution to the Northern Ireland problem.  While the 
SDLP consisted of several factions who supported divergent solutions which found 
expression in the Forum Report, the party as a whole had moved on and realized that the 
most promising avenue toward a lasting peace required a strengthening of the Anglo-Irish 
axis with some form of joint authority or joint sovereignty.  As such, paragraphs 4.15 and 
4.16 of the Forum Report established the baseline for the Anglo-Irish negotiations which 
led to the signing of the AIA.  These paragraphs emphasized that new political structures 
and institutions were required to  
accommodate together two sets of legitimate rights: the right of 
Nationalists to effective political, symbolic and administrative expression 
of their identity; and the right of Unionists to effective political, symbolic 
and administrative expression of their identity, their ethos and their way of 
life and secondly, these rights had to transcend Northern Ireland and 
involve the London and Dublin governments.152   
 
In hindsight, despite Margaret Thatcher’s dismissal of the Forum Report’s proposals, the 
document did form the basis for stimulating discussion and ultimately negotiations 
between the two governments on the Northern issue. 
Perhaps more importantly for the SDLP, the AIA showed an acceptance by the 
British government of three key points that the party had long advocated.  First, the 
problem could not be resolved within the confines of the Province and would require the 
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active participation and interaction of the Dublin and London governments.  Next, both 
governments had a responsibility to adjudicate the implementation of a devolved power-
sharing government in the North.  Without the backing of the governments, it would be 
unlikely that the Unionists or Nationalists would be willing to support an arrangement 
where they felt their respective interests were not being backed by the governments 
acting as guarantors.  Finally, it ended British claims that the province’s problems were 
strictly an internal British affair.153 
Yet, despite the SDLP’s success in gaining general acceptance of their analysis by 
both governments and the incorporation of that analysis into the AIA, the party had 
mixed success in achieving its objectives with regard to the implementation of the AIA’s 
structures.  The SDLP had hoped for an executive role for the Irish government in the 
affairs of Northern Ireland; a name change and reorganization of the RUC; changes to the 
province’s legal system; the phasing out of the UDR,154 and implementation of the right 
of Nationalists to fly the Irish flag.  Their agenda produced mixed results.  The positive 
side of the balance sheet reflected a victory when the Flags and Emblems Act was 
repealed permitting the display of the Irish flag in the North.  Other victories included 
new guidelines on fair employment, and greater representation of Catholics on many 
public bodies.155  While the UDR was eventually disbanded and merged with the Royal 
Irish Regiment in 1992, the Irish government did not receive an executive role in the 
affairs of the province and it would not be until the implementation of the Good Friday 
Agreement that substantive reform of the province’s police force and legal systems were 
implemented. 
 From a Republican perspective, the AIA proved problematic.  The agreement 
itself was broadly supported throughout the Republic and was widely viewed as a 
positive development within the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland.  Coupled 
with the fact that is was so overwhelmingly resented and opposed by the Unionist 
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community, it made outright condemnation or simple opposition a difficult proposition.  
The leadership was split on the AIA and many senior figures within Sinn Fein and the 
Republican movement as a whole actually endorsed the positive aspects of the 
agreement.  While some of the more radical Republicans such as Danny Morrison 
claimed that ‘SDLP bartering power flows from IRA firepower’ others such as Mitchell 
McLaughlin offered a more balanced assessment when he noted that ‘there is a negative 
counter-insurgency dimension to it (the AIA), but in fact as a result of it the British 
Government position has changed and changed irrevocably, they have actually indicated, 
in terms of historical perspective that they can be moved along.’156  Within the ranks of 
Sinn Fein, polls indicated that as many as one-third of their voters supported the AIA.157  
Consequently, Sinn Fein was forced to attack the agreement over its de facto recognition 
of the partition of Ireland and the recognition of a British identity within Northern 
Ireland.  Sinn Fein also attempted to gain credit for the IRA by pointing out that their 
actions had provided the SDLP political leverage to extract concessions from the British 
government.158 
 Regardless of how Sinn Fein attempted to portray the AIA, it rapidly became 
clear that the electorate were strongly behind the SDLP in their efforts to garner 
concessions via the IGC and the inter-governmental secretariat.  When the SDLP chose to 
contest only four constituencies in the 1986 by-election, they gained a seat in Newry-
South Armagh at the expense of the UUP and also managed to increase their share of the 
vote by 6 percent while Sinn Fein experienced a decrease from 41.9 percent to 35.4 
percent of the Nationalist vote.159  
3. The Unionist & Loyalist Response 
Persistent in the belief that no agreement was possible without their consent, the 
UUP leader, James Molyneaux, led his party and mainstream unionism to an opt out 
policy when it came to negotiations on the future of Northern Ireland.160  On the whole, 
Molyneaux favored complete integration of the province into the United Kingdom; 
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therefore, negotiations leading in other directions were not to be encouraged.  Set against 
such a backdrop, it is little wonder that the Unionist response to the publication of the 
AIA was immediate and illustrated not only the deep sense of betrayal at the hands of the 
British government but also reflected the psychological impact the agreement had on the 
Unionist psyche.  The sentiment was best summed up by UUP MP Harold McCusker 
who, during a speech before the House of Commons, described his shock and dismay  
 
This Agreement deals with my most cherished ideals and aspirations….I 
stood outside Hillsborough, not waving a Union flag – I doubt whether I 
will ever wave one again – not singing hymns, saying prayers or 
protesting, but like a dog and asked the Government to put in my hand the 
document that sold my birthright.  They told me that they would give it to 
me as soon as possible.  Having never consulted me, never sought my 
opinion or asked my advice, they told the rest of the world what was in 
store for me.  I stood in the cold outside the gates of Hillsborough castle 
and waited for them to come out and give me the Agreement second 
hand….I felt desolated because as I stood in the cold outside Hillsborough 
castle everything I held dear turned to ashes in my mouth.161 
 
Despite the fact that the AIA clearly provided assurances from both governments that there 
would be no change in the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority, 
the agreement, by excluding Unionists from participating in shaping the document, struck at 
their basis of power and their Britishness.  The AIA was delivering the promise of 
continuing the Union without the active participation of the Unionists.  Indeed, many 
Unionists immediately recognized the agreement for what it was: an attempt to level the 
playing field by disenfranchising them and removing their hands from the levers of power.  
On the whole, it was a crushing end to the Unionist ascendancy and put the decision-making 
process for the province in the hands of the Anglo-Irish Conference of Ministers.162 
 Unionist shock and dismay soon gave way to a prolonged series of organized 
protest designed to discomfort the governments into abandoning the AIA by 
demonstrating that, without their consent, no agreement could be made to work in the 
province.  Within eight days of the publication of the AIA, Unionist leadership had 
organized a massive street rally which attracted 250,000 people expressing their 
opposition to the agreement.  Pressure was maintained by the combined efforts of DUP 
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and UUP councilmen to make local government inoperable.  In the Irish Republic, two 
UUP members brought a legal challenge against the AIA to the Irish Supreme Court.  In 
an ironic twist, they attempted to prove that the agreement violated the territorial claim 
that the Republic exerted over Northern Ireland and contained in Articles 2 & 3 of the 
Irish constitution.163  Leadership turned to using the rump rolling devolution Assembly 
created by Secretary Prior to vent their anger at the agreement.  When these efforts failed 
to achieve any movement on the behalf of the governments, the Unionists resigned their 
15 seats at Westminster in the hope of utilizing the resultant by-election as a referendum 
on the AIA.  The by-election, held in January 1986, produced mixed results for the anti-
agreement campaign.  While securing 44% of the electorate, the campaign did result in 
the loss of one Unionist seat in the Newry and South Armagh district where the SDLP 
deputy leader Seamus Mallon was elected to parliament.164  The combined anti-
agreement campaign next turned to a ‘Day of Action’ protest.  While many were calling 
for a full-scale strike similar to that which brought down the Sunningdale power-sharing 
executive, the UUP instead preferred a non-violent one day protest which wouldn’t 
unduly damage the business community.  While the DUP leader Ian Paisley agreed to a 
peaceful protest he did indicate that companies who failed to shut their doors in support 
of the work stoppage would be blacklisted.165  This mild intimidation coupled with the 
riots, looting, and attacks on the RUC which accompanied the protest exposed fissures in 
the anti-agreement alliance between the UUP and DUP.  Indeed, the UUP support for  
street protests significantly waned in the wake of the one year anniversary rally for the 
anti-agreement forces.  The rally at Belfast City Hall on 15 November 1986 ended in riots 
with one dead, 76 injured, and 110 arrested.166 
   Anti-agreement tactics continued into 1987 with a petition to the Queen; a boycott 
of all rates demands and withholding payment of television and vehicle license payments; 
and a day of defiance against public order laws.167  While tactical divisions remained 
between the UUP and DUP leaders, both entered into a pact for the 1987 General 
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Election.  The anti-agreement campaign again sought to use the election as a referendum 
on opposition to the AIA.  The result was a lower voter turnout for the anti-agreement 
forces and, yet again, the loss of another parliamentary seat to the SDLP.168  It was 
rapidly becoming clear that the public’s anger against the AIA was on the wane.  While 
the anti-Agreement pact between the UUP and the DUP was still holding together, it had 
become obvious that the militancy espoused by the DUP had failed to appreciably move 
the governments to reconsider the merits of the AIA.  Slowly but surely, the UUP under 
the leadership of Molyneaux began to reassert control.  Where all else had seemingly 
failed, he intended to maintain the partnership in opposition to the agreement while 
waiting for the AIA to collapse on itself.169 
 While mainstream unionism attempted a balancing act to keep the UUP and DUP 
alliance alive, those tending toward the Loyalist brand of unionism sought to proactively 
dismantle the AIA by any and all means necessary.  In its embryonic state, the Loyalist 
response consisted of the establishment of a network of defense groups aimed at derailing 
the Anglo-Irish talks before they actually produced the AIA.  These groups came to be 
known as Ulster Clubs and were organized by the United Ulster Loyalist Force (UULF) 
and, much like the political leadership within unionism; they resorted to historical 
precedents to deal with current crises.170  Unfortunately, the Ulster Clubs were made up 
of many of the extreme groups rejected by mainstream Unionists and they relied heavily 
on the threat of the use of force and civil disobedience to demonstrate that Loyalists 
controlled the levers of power within Ulster and no agreement could be imposed on the 
people without the consent of the majority.  Given the changing landscape of the political 
environment within Northern Ireland and the determination of the British government to 
impose a solution to the province’s problem, the organization overestimated its political 
clout and ability to derail the Anglo-Irish process.171   
 For their part, the UDA initially recommended support for the constitutional 
process and urged support for the Unionist parties in the wake of the AIA.  Support began 
to dissipate as the rhetoric of mainstream politicians seemed to be making little headway 
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and by December 1985 the movement was split by those who openly advocated violent 
confrontation with the British government and those who insisted on the constitutional 
process receiving more time to roll back the agreement.172  The tensions within the UDA 
somewhat mirrored those within the UUP-DUP anti-agreement coalition.  The UUP 
firmly supported the constitutional process while the DUP often tinkered with the notion 
of violent resistance while realizing the constraints of political process.  The UDA 
leadership’s frustration with a lack of tangible progress grew in the wake of the March 
1986 Day of Action protest.  Successive street protests and demonstrations led to violent 
clashes between protesters and the police with Loyalist paramilitaries launching a 
systemic campaign of intimidation against RUC personnel.  Homes were petrol-bombed 
with 500 police homes attacked and more than 150 officers forced to relocate.173  All the 
while, the Loyalist rhetoric against the anti-agreement forces continued to grow.  DUP 
leader, Ian Paisley, attempted to court and harness the extremes of loyalism by supporting 
the establishment of a new ‘Loyalist army’ under the moniker Ulster Resistance.174  
Despite his rhetoric and promise to lead the Ulster people into battle, Paisley was viewed 
warily by the UDA who questioned not only his commitment to fight but also his 
political prowess by taunting: 
Mr. Paisley will learn quickly that Ulster people will no longer be used 
like Pavlov’s dogs by people who have not the courage to fight, nor the 
intelligence and integrity to find a settlement.175 
 
 Ultimately, Unionists and Loyalists alike faced a critical dilemma: How far were 
they willing to go in their battle with the British government to preserve their position 
within the Union?  Protests and demonstrations seemed to only strengthen the 
government’s resolve and further drive a wedge between Britain and Unionists.  
Inflexibility, unwillingness to compromise and a lack of any substantive political 
creativity in the post-Sunningdale era had left Unionists and Loyalists devoid of any 
vision for a way out of the Province’s impasse beyond restating entrenched positions.  In 
many ways, the status quo provided by direct rule had lulled Unionists into a false sense 
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of security.  Consequently, the willingness to actively develop initiatives designed to end 
the troubles rarely, if ever, entered the strategic policy development process.  When crisis 
did strike in the form of the AIA, Unionists, lacking forethought relied on historical 
precedence for guidance and reverted to the negative aim of destroying the AIA without 
offering any positive alternatives for consideration.  The Unionist/Loyalist position was 
further complicated by the deep divisions that existed between the anti-agreement forces 
which, for the sake of compromise and the desire to present a united front, eschewed 
opportunities to negotiate and seek accommodation with the Nationalist community.  The 
UUP, by placating Paisley and the DUP, created an environment where initiative was 
sorely lacking and the status quo prevailed.176  Unionism had painted itself into a corner 
where the only option available was to wait-out the AIA in the hopes that it would go 
away. 
C. THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT: A BRIDGE TO PEACE 
The single most endearing characteristic of the AIA was that it was impervious to 
a Unionist/Loyalist or Nationalist/Republican veto.  The agreement, being between the 
two sovereign governments did not depend on the political concurrence of the parties to 
the conflict or their representatives.  Conversely, its single biggest failing was that it 
ignored not only the constitutional political parties in Northern Ireland, but also the 
paramilitaries.  Whereas Sunningdale attempted to address the inter-community relations 
within the Province and their relationship with the Irish Republic, the AIA sought to 
resolve the conflict on a government to government basis.  As such, the AIA served more 
as an interim arrangement rather than a final solution.   It was a roadmap which sought to 
level the playing field for Nationalists while attempting to reassure Unionists on their 
constitutional status within the United Kingdom.  The aftermath of the agreement’s 
implementation made clear the need to address the problem not only on an 
intergovernmental level but also on an intercommunity and cross-border basis.  
Despite the hopes of the SDLP and the prognostications of doom from the 
Unionist and Loyalist camps, the AIA failed to substantially alter the political 
environment within Northern Ireland.  Although progress was made in redressing basic 
concerns of the Nationalist population, major areas of concern continued to go 
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unreformed.  Proposals to modify the security environment were hampered by a judicial 
system which continued to operate within an emergency legislation framework.  
Recommendations to reform policing within Northern Ireland went unheeded and 
recommendations put forth by the Irish government to reform the Diplock court system 
with a three-judge panel were rejected by the British government who clearly felt their 
Irish counterparts were overstepping their consultative mandate.  Further hindering 
progress was the reelection in 1987 of a Fianna Fail government headed by Charles 
Haughey in the Irish Republic.  Haughey, despite overwhelming support among the 
electorate for the AIA, was never fully enamored with the agreement and consequently 
failed to invest the efforts of his government in the utilization of its structures to further 
the cause of northern nationalism.177 
For their part, the British government also acted to restrict the agreement from 
living up to its full potential.  The British response was influenced by the need to contain 
Unionist fury and because efforts to increase security through the AIA were complicated 
by legal restraints which impeded the extradition of suspected terrorists from the Irish 
Republic.178     
Perhaps the greatest achievement for the AIA was that it encouraged Sinn Fein to 
modify its political framework and abandon an isolationist policy in favor of engaging 
further in the constitutional political process.  Broad-based electoral support among 
Nationalists north and south of the border coupled with recognition within the Republican 
movement that the agreement had achieved some progress in removing the Unionist veto 
made it very difficult for Sinn Fein to continue to remain on the periphery of the political 
process.  The agreement brought Sinn Fein’s political agenda into sharp focus and laid 
bare the fallacy that the socialist agenda of 1916 was still relevant or acceptable to a 
Nationalist population which had become accustomed to the realities of partition.  It 
became increasingly obvious that the Irish government has strongly advocated the AIA 
out of a desire to check the growing popularity of Sinn Fein both north and south of the 
border after the hunger strike of 1981.  In time, electoral returns clearly demonstrated the 
agreement had effectively achieved this end.  Improving Anglo-Irish relations meant a 
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stabilization of the British position in Ireland and the Dublin government was now a party 
to the containment of the situation within Ulster.179  The question for Sinn Fein became 
how the party could broaden its support base in order to increase their claim to moving 
the negotiating process toward an all-island political solution.180  A reevaluation of Sinn 
Fein’s internal problems revealed that it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain 
support for the armed struggle; the electorate had a very limited desire for revolutionary 
socialism; and the continuation of the policy of abstentionism was hindering the party’s 
ability to achieve political change on its terms.  Consequently, the party moved to a 
greener agenda more in keeping with the issues of concern to the Nationalist 
electorate.181  In 1986 the party eventually dropped their policy of abstaining from taking 
their seats when elected to the Dail in the Irish Republic. 
 In the final analysis, the AIA was not an agreement which sought to solve the 
Troubles and create an instantaneous peace and stability environment within Northern 
Ireland.  Rather, it was a framework designed to create the conditions for future 
agreements capable of creating a lasting peace acceptable to all parties to the conflict.  By 
bringing the two sovereign governments together, the AIA instilled ownership.  Although 
each government entered the agreement to achieve their own goals whether they be 
security or joint authority, neither could divorce itself from the obligation to work 
together to solve the province’s conflict.  The agreement attempted to promote peace and 
stability by reconciling the Nationalist and Unionist traditions and by increasing contacts 
between the governments.  In order to create an environment conducive to a lasting 
peace, the agreement had to present a carrot and stick dilemma to all parties within the 
province.  From a Unionist perspective, the carrot was contained in Article 2(b), which 
stipulated that those matters which were devolved would not be within the remit of the 
Irish government.  The sticks were enshrined in Articles 5(c) & 10 (b), which provided 
that in the absence of devolution the Irish government could put forward views and 
proposals within the IGC on all transferred matters.  As such, the AIA was designed to 
act as a catalyst for devolved government in Northern Ireland.182  To reassure Unionists, 
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the AIA, via Article 1, provided formal notification that Northern Ireland would remain a 
part of the United Kingdom until the majority of its citizens demanded otherwise.  Yet, 
despite this reassurance, the agreement also removed the Unionist veto on the exclusivity 
of policy formulation within the province.  For the Nationalist population, the carrot 
came in the form of improved social conditions and status via the efforts of the IGC.  The 
stick for nationalism lay in the understanding that the Irish government’s role in 
advocating the Nationalist position was purely consultative and recommendations 
presented on their behalf could be disregarded at the whim of the British administration.  
For both parties, their vested interests would clearly be best served by a commitment to 
work together in a power-sharing arrangement.  The AIA attempted to provide the 
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IV. THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT  
This chapter further assesses the initiatives of the SDLP and the two governments 
as they sought to chart a course towards a comprehensive and inclusive agreement 
capable of attaining broad cross-community support during the latter part of the 1980s 
and the early 1990s.  The author will discuss measures initiated to create an environment 
conducive to a negotiated settlement and examine the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in 
terms of what incentives it provided to each community.  The chapter traces the process 
of promoting the GFA and the resultant difficulties posed by differing interpretations and 
how such difficulties translated into a labored implementation process.  The chapter 
concludes by evaluating how the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern 
Ireland perceived the agreement in terms of what it provided to their respective 
communities. 
A. PRE-GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT INITIATIVES 
1. Pan Nationalism:  The SDLP & Sinn Fein 
In the wake of the AIA, Sinn Fein were polling between nine and twelve percent 
of the electorate in Northern Ireland.  Regardless of how they felt about the AIA itself, an 
analysis of the agreement and the negotiating process had clearly demonstrated to 
Republicans that negotiations could move Britain towards concessions. Organizationally, 
however, the party was still very much the second choice to the SDLP within the 
Nationalist community.  Also important was the fact that, having been excluded from the 
New Ireland Forum and subsequent input into the Forum Report, the Republican 
movement was now very much at odds with mainstream nationalism both north and south 
of the border.  While Sinn Fein had been exploring avenues to broaden the political 
option as a complement to the armed struggle, lackluster results from the military 
campaign combined with the marginalization of the organization by the main political 
parties because of their affiliation with the IRA continued to frustrate their efforts 
towards acceptability and representation.   
Despite Sinn Fein’s pariah status, the SDLP, under the leadership of John Hume, 
reached out across the ideological divide and initiated talks with Sinn Fein’s leader, 
Gerry Adams in 1987.  For Hume, the olive branch was offered in hopes of convincing 
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the Republicans of the futility of their efforts.  By bringing Sinn Fein into the political 
mainstream a common platform for expressing a Nationalist agenda could be developed.  
Putting all their conventional rhetoric aside, Sinn Fein entered the talks on the premise 
that a broadened Nationalist alliance could bring concerted pressure on the British 
government to recognize the right of the Irish people to self-determination.  At the heart 
of their argument lay their common themes: namely, British occupation was an 
impediment to self-determination; occupation necessitated the option of an oppressed 
people to use force; and the entity known as Northern Ireland had facilitated an artificial 
Unionist majority capable of vetoing Irish self-determination.183  In Republican eyes, the 
only path to peace lay in a British withdrawal, an end to partition of the island, and the 
expression of the Irish people as a whole of their right to national self-determination.  
 Against these divergent approaches, initial talks commenced on a basis of 
defining and redefining the concept of self-determination.  The Sinn Fein position was 
that of self-determination of the people of the island as a whole.  In their view, Unionists’ 
objections to a united Ireland could not be permitted to stand in the way of the will of the 
Irish people both north and south of the border.  To acknowledge the right of unionism as 
a majority in a statelet which Sinn Fein refused to recognize would be tantamount to a 
legitimization of the right to veto the will of all Nationalists on the island.  Making such a 
concession was not something the Republican movement was prepared to do in the latter 
part of the 1980s.  For his part, John Hume presented the SDLP case that had been 
advocated at the New Ireland Forum; namely that a united Ireland was an unachievable 
goal without the consent of Unionists.  Therefore, self-determination had two 
constituencies: a northern one and a southern one.  If the ultimate Nationalist goal of a 
united Ireland was ever to be achieved, Unionists would have to be enticed by 
constitutional means and convinced that their best interests and identity would be best 
served and preserved in a united Ireland.184 
 While the first round of SDLP-Sinn Fein talks ended without producing any 
substantive agreement on self-determination or a prospect for a truly pan-Nationalist 
approach to further negotiations over the future Northern Ireland, they did foster a greater 
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political understanding between the parties and clearly established a channel for future 
contacts.  Indeed, contact between the parties was again established in 1992/1993 by John 
Hume as he sought to find a formula for bringing the IRA’s paramilitary campaign of 
violence to an end and thus open the door for Republicans to actively involve themselves 
in the process of finding a peaceful solution to the troubles.  The significance of the 
second round of talks lay in the apparent fundamental shift in the traditional hard-line 
Republican position on self-determination.  Without directly saying so, the joint 
statement issued by the SDLP and Sinn Fein leadership after the talks in April 1993 
seemed to allude to the need to accommodate the Unionist position.  The statement 
indicated that an all-Ireland future was ‘only achievable and viable if it can earn and 
enjoy the allegiance of the different traditions on this island, by accommodating diversity 
and providing for national reconciliation.’185  While not directly saying so, this statement 
hinted at the first signs that Sinn Fein was slowly maneuvering itself into a position 
where it could prepare the Republican base for the need to negotiate.  Their position on 
self-determination and their recognition and acceptance of the elements of partition 
would have to change. 
2. Unionists 
Despite their best efforts to scupper the AIA, the Unionist alliance had achieved 
little between 1985 and 1990 other than alienating the British Conservative government 
and contributing to a growing sense within the halls of Westminster that Unionists were a 
large part of the Irish problem.  Overall, the Anglo-Irish partnership remained strong and 
the Irish government’s influence in the affairs of the province via the Intergovernmental 
Conference and its permanent secretariat remained a symbol of hope for Nationalists and 
a symbol of unwelcome interference for Unionists.  It became increasingly clear to the 
Unionist leadership that their attempts to effect change to the AIA through protest and 
nonparticipation had failed miserably.  The prevailing mood led Unionists to realize that 
change could only be achieved through inclusion in the political process and, in order to 
terminate the AIA, a power-sharing arrangement garnering broad cross-community 
support had to be implemented.  As such, the dawning of the 1990s saw a Unionist 
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alliance more willing to negotiate a settlement.186  The Brooke-Mayhew talks of 
1991/1992 provided an opportunity for Unionists to end their self-imposed political exile.  
The opportunity to do so came about as a result of an address given by then Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke on 9 January 1990 when he indicated that if the 
parties within Northern Ireland could reach agreement to improve upon the manner in 
which the AIA was functioning, such recommendations would receive favorable attention 
by the British and Irish governments.187  Unionists interpreted this comment to mean that 
the government had come to its senses and was now open to an alternative to the AIA.  In 
reality, Brooke was merely restating a basic principle of the agreement which provided 
for its own replacement with a power-sharing arrangement acceptable to both 
communities within the province.  Regardless of how the statement was interpreted, the 
response did indicate a willingness of behalf of the Unionist community to negotiate.  
In spite of their overwhelming desire to end their political isolation, Unionists 
adopted negotiating tactics during all early talks which were very much constrained by 
the position they had taken in the wake of the AIA.  In many respects, the main Unionist 
parties had tied their own hands and their position was based on the promise made to 
their constituents to destroy the AIA.  Rhetoric designating the agreement as a diktat 
negotiated without their consultation and imposed upon their community without consent 
proved difficult to discard.  Their hard-line position failed to consider the merits of the 
agreement; the continued commitment of the two governments to support the agreement; 
and the appeal of the AIA within the Nationalist community.  The rejectionist policy of 
Unionists hamstrung the alliance’s willingness to enter meaningful negotiations on a way 
forward without the imposition of requirements to suspend the mechanisms established 
by the AIA.  Indeed, as a condition to participating in negotiations, the alliance demanded 
two concessions: the suspension of the AIA while talks were in progress and the 
exclusion of the Irish government from negotiations until substantial progress had been 
made by the parties.188 
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3. The Governments 
a. Brooke/Mayhew Talks:  Round 1 
After much wrangling over the terms for initiating negotiations and with 
all the key players bringing their respective baggage to the negotiating table, the talks 
process finally got underway in May 1991.  The objectives for the talks were to reach 
agreement on the political structures for Northern Ireland and to explore options for 
replacing the AIA with a comprehensive agreement deemed more acceptable to the 
participants and their respective communities.189  The talks themselves consisted of both 
governments and representatives of the UUP, DUP, SDLP, and the cross-community but 
Unionist-leaning Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI).  Despite having suffered 
politically as a result of the AIA, Sinn Fein continued to command in excess of 10 
percent of the electorate and was the fourth largest party in Northern Ireland at the time.  
Their continued support for the PIRA campaign ensured their exclusion.  Their absence 
and subsequent course of the talks contributed to the SDLP thesis that a substantive 
agreement was not achievable without the participation of all parties subject to the 
conflict.   
The talks served a vital purpose because they allowed the main 
constitutional parties an opportunity to express their agendas.  For the British 
government, the talks provided an opportunity for it to convey its position with regard to 
the conflict and to educate the Republican movement on the way forward.  Brooke 
articulated his government’s position by relaying the point that partition was not a British 
objective but rather an expression of the desire of the majority of the population of 
Northern Ireland and, as such, a hard reality.  He also attempted to portray British 
involvement in the province as not being the result of any grand colonial design but 
rather a necessity in light of the security situation and sectarian divisions.190 
(1)  The Nationalist/Republican Position.  The SDLP continued to 
advocate positions which had been conveyed in previous negotiations.  Among them a 
proposal which involved the administration of government in Northern Ireland under the 
direction of six commissioners and an elected assembly.  The proposal had a distinctive 
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Irish and European dimension and harkened back to the Towards a New Ireland policy 
document circulated in 1972.  The proposal was problematic insofar as it invited direct 
European involvement in what had routinely been cast as a British domestic affair.191  
Despite the rejection of such an idea, the SDLP’s influence on British thinking was 
clearly on display as the very structure the talks assumed followed the three-strand 
approach to resolving the conflict which had been the touchstone of the party’s thinking 
since the New Ireland Forum.  The Forum had advocated a three-strand approach to 
resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland.  The strands involved resolving relationships 
within Northern Ireland; defining the North-South relationship; and formalizing the 
British-Irish dimension to the problem.  Finally, as the sole representatives of the 
Nationalist community, the SDLP advocated an acceptance of the AIA while promoting a 
political solution and rejecting violence.   
(2)  The Unionist/Loyalist Position.  Not surprisingly, the Unionist 
parties were primarily concerned with the constitutional guarantee that Northern Ireland 
remain a part of the UK.  The DUP did distinguish itself from the UUP by advocating a 
neighborly relationship with the Irish Republic and a desire for representative 
government not simply based on majority rule.  In essence, this position was quite a 
departure for a party that had previously committed itself to the primacy of majority 
rule.192  In contrast, the UUP, while firmly supporting the constitutional guarantee, 
tailored their argument more toward an integrationist platform while acknowledging the 
need for a regional assembly with limited powers.  In many ways, their position 
continued in the tradition set forth by their leader James Molyneaux whose integrationist 
credentials were well established.  The APNI’s position played to its constituency by 
stressing self-determination in a cross-community Northern Ireland context and calling 
for a strong devolved government while acknowledging the province’s relationship with 
the Republic of Ireland and with Britain.193   
The Brooke-Mayhew talks provide an interesting insight into the 
Unionist mindset and tactical position with regard to the negotiations process.  Having 
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secured a commitment from the British and Irish governments to suspend the 
Intergovernmental Conference and secretariat for a period of ten weeks, the combined 
UUP and DUP alliance then initiated a series of delaying tactics which precluded to 
initiation of talks while the issue of mediators for Strand Two (North-South relations) 
was decided.  By the time meaningful talks were initiated, only four weeks remained 
before the AIA mechanisms resumed.  While Nationalists viewed their tactics as a ploy to 
stall progress and spur another suspension of the AIA which would ultimately lead to its 
obsolescence and reinvigorated rejection by the Unionist community, the reality was that 
the Unionist parties remained intent on maintaining their socially superior status rather 
than reach a compromise agreement with the minority.194  By effectively scuppering the 
talks by refusing to compromise, the Unionist alliance condemned themselves to a return 
to the AIA mechanisms which they so obviously despised. 
b. Brooke/Mayhew Talks:  Round 2 
These early positions gave a critical glimpse into the differences that 
existed between the parties and of the difficulties which would lie ahead if a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict was to be negotiated.  The differences continued into a second 
round of talks which convened in March 1992. Whilst the agenda remained the same the 
make up of the British and Irish delegation had changed substantially. Sir Patrick 
Mayhew had replaced Brooke as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the change 
in government in Dublin brought with it a new Irish ministerial team to the talks.195   
(1)  The Nationalist/Republican Position.  The SDLP continued to 
advocate for a proposed government by a special commission consisting of 
representatives of the Irish and British governments with locally elected commissioners 
and one appointed by the European Union.196 In addition, the SDLP was joined by the 
Irish government in its call for an independent executive function for north-south 
institutions.  Neither party’s desire to resurrect the ghost of the Council of Ireland had 
diminished with time.  On a second front, the SDLP’s seduction of Sinn Fein was well 
underway with the advent of the Hume-Adams talks.  While not included directly in the 
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talks, its opinion did matter and was noted by the governments and the SDLP.  If Sinn 
Fein could agree to commit itself to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, the door would 
be opened for their participation in discussing the way forward.  An early incentive to 
Republicans was offered by the previous Secretary of State Peter Brooke who conceded 
that the IRA could not be defeated militarily and that Britain had no selfish strategic or 
economic interest in Northern Ireland.  From a Republican perspective, such concessions 
at the time appeared to be an admission by the government that a military stalemate had 
been reached and that Britain was open to negotiating a settlement.197  The reality of 
British policy was probably closer to their desire to actively seek Republican involvement 
in the political process as a means to move the paramilitaries away from their campaign 
of terror.  While Brooke may have conceded that the British army could not defeat the 
IRA using acceptable tactics, the effects of war weariness and the desire to reap the 
rewards from a generation of fighting left the IRA and Sinn Fein searching for an exit 
strategy.198  In light of Brooke’s overtures and the promising nature of the talks with the 
SDLP, the onus for developing a strategy to carry the Republican movement toward the 
political arena rested with Gerry Adams.  The key to success lay in the ability to convert 
the historical aspirations for Irish unity into a policy which could accommodate the 
Unionist majority within Northern Ireland.  Making such a transition required a migration 
from unity to self-determination wrapped in the concept of the will of the Irish people as 
a whole.  While vague in nature, such language was essential if Sinn Fein was to fully 
transition from being nothing more than the voice of the IRA to a full-fledged 
constitutional political party.  Self-determination for the Unionist population of Northern 
Ireland was permissible if the principle was agreed to by people north and south of the 
border.  In this regard, acceptance of the Irish people, taken as a whole, would determine 
the issue of consent and, when presented in such a manner, the Republican movement 
could make little argument to contradict the will of the people they claimed to represent.    
The transformation of Sinn Fein and traditional republicanism was underway.  In 
1992, the party issued Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland.  This document reflected the 
changing views of the party and was a genuine attempt at offering an olive branch to 
                                                 
197 Murray and Tonge, 176. 
198 Ibid., 179. 
73 
Britain.  Gone was the bellicose calls for immediate British withdrawal and in their place 
a call for Britain to persuade Unionists on the merits of a united Ireland and an 
acknowledgement that partition had failed.199 
(2)  The Unionist/Loyalist Position.  The resurrection of the talks 
process further demonstrated how little unionism had moved despite the resumption of 
the AIA.  Prior to the 1992 British General Election and in anticipation of a Conservative 
Party more dependent upon their support to form a working government, the Unionists 
began to posture for concessions.  Not surprisingly, the UUP, under the leadership of Jim 
Molyneaux, continued to advocate for a more integrationist policy towards Northern 
Ireland.200  Unfortunately for Molyneaux and the UUP, the Conservatives secured an 
election victory sufficient to precluded dependence on the UUP or DUP.  When talks did 
resume, the Unionists again demanded and secured a suspension of the AIA.  While the 
talks did progress beyond Strand One (internal to Northern Ireland), Strand Two (North-
South relations) discussions floundered when the DUP refused to negotiate until the Irish 
government agreed to address their plans for removing Articles 2 and 3 from the 
constitution.  For their part, the UUP continued to chip away at the AIA and demanded 
that the agreement and its Irish dimension be replaced with a British-Irish agreement 
which was general in nature and didn’t apply either explicitly or exclusively to Northern 
Ireland.201  When the talks had ended without agreement in November 1992, Unionists 
had achieved little.  Rather than facilitate an enhanced bargaining position, the UUP-DUP 
alliance produced little and may have restrained progress.  Hardliners within the DUP 
attacked their own leader Ian Paisley for agreeing to talks with the Irish government and 
also attacked the UUP for conducting direct talks with Dublin during Strand Two.  In the 
words of the DUP’s Rev. William McCrea, the talks were a ‘betrayal of the Loyalist 
people.’202 
c. The Downing Street Declaration 
The Brooke/Mayhew talks ended in November 1992 and produced no 
significant agreement on the way forward.  Other than the revelation that John Hume and 
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Gerry Adams were again involved in a dialogue for peace, no significant political 
developments transpired until the Taoiseach and British Prime Minister issued a Joint 
Declaration in December 1993.  The declaration itself is interesting for two reasons.  
First, it presented a set of recurring themes which can be traced back to the AIA and 
positions previously advocated by the SDLP.  The declaration spelt out how self-
determination applied in the case of Northern Ireland.  Implicit in this position was the 
understanding that the people of the province had a right to determine their future 
irrespective of the wishes of those in the south.  It also identified the conditions under 
which the status of the province might change if the majority of voters expressed a desire 
for such a change.  The familiar SDLP themes of a three-strand relationship (that between 
the communities in the North, that between the North and the South, and that between 
Ireland and Britain) was present and had become a bedrock of the Anglo-Irish 
relationship.  The themes of an agreed meaning for self-determination and the three-
strand approach to the relationship could trace their lineage to the New Ireland Forum 
and the AIA and would repeat themselves throughout the negotiating process leading to 
the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of April 1998.  The second point of interest in the 
Joint Declaration relates to the dynamic at play between the two governments.  For their 
part, the British government emphasized its role as a facilitator to achieve an agreement 
which encompassed the totality of relationships while reiterating a statement previously 
made by the former Secretary of State Brooke that Britain had no selfish strategic or 
economic interest in Northern Ireland.  As such, Britain had come a long way since the 
early 1980s.  Similarly, the Irish government reiterated its commitment to the principles 
spelled out in the AIA while agreeing to further the cause of reconciliation between the 
two traditions on the island of Ireland by establishing a Forum for Peace and 
Reconciliation to examine how the Republic could better achieve the goals of being a 
democratic and pluralist society.203 
In a general sense, the Joint Declaration was greeted positively by all with 
the notable exclusion of the DUP and Sinn Fein.  For the DUP, it conceded too much to 
republicanism and left the door open just a little too much to the possibility of a united 
Ireland.  For Sinn Fein, the declaration continued to contain the built-in Unionist veto 
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couched as self-determination defined in terms of Northern Ireland.  But taken as a 
whole, Sinn Fein’s position on a Unionist veto was definitely a minority of one given that 
the successive Irish governments and the SDLP had consistently supported the consent 
principle as spelled out in the AIA.  Sinn Fein was also out of step with their 
understanding of the political realities of the veto as it existed within Northern Ireland.  In 
a purely political sense, the veto did exist for the Unionists insofar as no internal political 
progress was possible without their consent.  However, this veto was not exclusive to 
Unionists.  Nationalists also had a political veto and were very capable of using it as 
demonstrated by the SDLP’s refusal to take their seats in Jim Prior’s rolling devolution 
assembly of 1982 which led to its eventual suspension in 1986.  Ultimately, the DUP’s 
rejection was predictable but the grounds for Sinn Fein rejecting the declaration were 
somewhat suspect and rang hollow given the realities on the ground.  Yet, despite the 
rhetoric, the Joint Declaration established a framework which outlined rejection of 
violence as the price of admission into the negotiations process.  Sinn Fein’s eagerness to 
actively involve itself in such negotiations can be seen from the relative speed with which 
Gerry Adams was able to convince the IRA Army Council to declare a conditional 
ceasefire in August 1994. 
From a Republican perspective, Britain’s reiteration in the Downing Street 
Declaration (DSD) of its position as a facilitator for the wishes of the majority of the 
people in Northern Ireland, forced the movement to reevaluate its commitment to 
violence via the PIRA or commit itself to a peaceful political resolution of the conflict 
through Sinn Fein.  Having already advocated a form of self-determination, albeit less 
than that contained in the DSD, Sinn Fein was compelled to continue along the path to 
constitutional politics.204  This compulsion did not, however, mean that the PIRA had 
completely abandoned their military campaign.   
The Downing Street Declaration spawned a number of activities designed 
to expedite the process of negotiating a durable settlement.  The first, the Forum for 
Peace and Reconciliation was established by the Irish government in October 1994 and 
extended an open invitation to all parties to participate.  As they had with the New 
Ireland Forum, the major Unionist parties refused the invitation.  For Sinn Fein, it 
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amounted to their first brush with constitutionally elected politicians in a consultative 
forum.  While the party continued to maintain its opposition to separate self-
determination for the northern and southern parts of the island, it did gain an appreciation 
of the need to compromise.  The Irish initiative was followed in 1995 by the joint 
issuance of a Frameworks for the Future document which spelled out the two 
governments’ expectations for power-sharing, the nature of all-island structures, and how 
the Anglo-Irish structures would accommodate the hopes and aspirations of members of 
the Unionist and Nationalist communities within Northern Ireland. 
Yet, with the processes for negotiations well defined, the parties were 
unable to overcome traditional enmities.  Unionists were unable to either trust or 
negotiate with Sinn Fein while it continued to maintain the link with the IRA and, despite 
the implementation of a ceasefire to facilitate such negotiations, retained the option of 
resorting to the use of force if negotiations were not to their liking.  For Sinn Fein, the 
stumbling block remained its continued mistrust for the motives and actions of the British 
government.  It is entirely possible that Sinn Fein’s recollections of the last major 
ceasefire concession to the government almost resulted in the complete collapse of the 
IRA and the Republican movement during the mid-1970s.  Additionally, the Frameworks 
document held the most promise from a Republican perspective of an all-island approach 
to politics which was a necessity for the movement’s continued participation.  However, 
the British government, with a weakened electoral mandate and under pressure from 
Unionists whose votes they now depended upon in order to remain in office, failed to 
fully implement much of the Frameworks’ initiatives.205   
Frustrations with the pace of political process and the non-admission of 
Sinn Fein into all-party talks led to a resumption of the IRA’s military campaign in 
February 1996.  The resumption of the IRA campaign only served to further isolate Sinn 
Fein from the negotiating process. Yet, despite the renewal of violence, Sinn Fein 
continued to make positive noises about the need for a political solution and, in May 
1996, they agreed to endorse the Mitchell principles which advocated a purely political 
solution and the complete rejection of paramilitary activities.  The willingness to continue 
to pursue a political resolution was not universally accepted among the rank and file 
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membership of the IRA or by some on the Army Council.  When the decision was made 
to recommit to a ceasefire in 1997, dissidents had broken away to form the Real IRA206 
and, by the latter part of the year, Adams had consolidated his support among the Army 
Council membership for a policy of negotiated settlement.207  The peace ticket moved 
forward secure in the knowledge that it retained the support of the party and the Army 
Council. 
B. THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT 
1. Elections 
Elections were held at the end of May 1996 to determine the composition of the 
negotiating teams.  Despite their exile, Sinn Fein managed to increase their vote from 10 
percent at the 1992 Westminster elections to 15.5 percent (see Table 1 below).  The 
growth of Sinn Fein’s electoral mandate coupled with the landslide election victory for 
the Labour Party in Britain’s 1997 General Election and the election of a new coalition 
government in the Republic paved the way for the readmission of Sinn Fein back into the 
talks process after a new ceasefire was declared on 19 July 1997.208 
 
 
Table 1.   1996 Forum Election Results.209 
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2. Negotiations 
The admission of Sinn Fein into the talks process prompted the immediate 
departure of the DUP and the smaller Loyalist United Kingdom Unionist Party 
(UKUP).210  Despite their withdrawal, the majority of key players were finally in place to 
negotiate a comprehensive and inclusive settlement to the conflict. 
The negotiations process began on 15 September 1997 with three primary 
committees established on the basis of the three-strand approach and two additional 
subcommittees: one dealing exclusively with the decommissioning of paramilitary arms 
and the other tasked with developing confidence building measures such as human rights, 
economics, employment, culture, and prisoner release.211  The fact that the negotiations 
were the only game in town acted as an incentive to all participating parties to focus their 
attentions on reaching a workable settlement.  Without agreement, Nationalists and 
Republicans faced continuation of direct rule from Britain.  Similarly, a failure of the 
negotiations process would lead to the reactivation of the AIA secretariat.  With the 
specter of the AIA hanging over its head and when faced with the reality of a tangible 
power-sharing agreement within the context of Northern Ireland, the UUP discarded 
much of the intransigence it had displayed during the latter stages of the Brooke-Mayhew 
talks.  The party had come to embrace the concept of reaching an accommodation 
acceptable to the two communities within the province.  On the issue of the role to be 
played by the Irish government, the UUP opposition remained but the party was willing 
to concede a minor consultative role without executive powers in exchange for removal 
of Articles 2 and 3 from the Irish constitution.  For their part, the SDLP simply reiterated 
what they had been saying since the New Ireland Forum.  The party stressed the 
importance of the individual identities of the two communities within Northern Ireland 
while advocating for strong cross-border ties and a need for a continued Anglo-Irish 
partnership.  In contrast, Sinn Fein repeated the standard Republican mantras of the 
failure of partition, the need to remove the British presence from Ireland, and a desire for 
a united Ireland.  Additionally, the party argued for issues which were already within the 
purview of the ‘confidence-building’ subcommittee.  Despite the repetition of demands, 
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the key issues of equality and prisoner release provided Sinn Fein sufficient maneuver 
space to bargain on what had been their core issues while still being able to claim 
concessions in light of the final agreement. 
In an effort to facilitate progress within the negotiations the governments took 
three actions.  First, they affirmed their joint commitment to consent and self-
determination via democratic means.  Next, they issued a Propositions for Heads of 
Agreement document which outlined their expectations on what the final agreement 
should contain.  It then followed up with clarification on what cross-border cooperation 
should look like.  While for differing reasons the documents posed specific difficulties to 
Unionists and Republicans alike, all parties to the negotiations realized that they had 
arrived at the best opportunity for peace in almost thirty years of conflict.212  Finally, 
while the governments had set a deadline of May 1998 to conclude the talks, the 
Chairman, George Mitchell expedited the process and set a deadline of 9 April to 
conclude negotiations.  Despite critical divisions particularly as they related to the key 
issues within the remit of the confidence-building and decommissioning subcommittees, 
an agreement was reached on Good Friday, 10 April 1998. 
3. The Agreement 
The agreement signed by the parties and governments on 10 April 1998 and later 
endorsed by referenda both north and south of the border in May 1998 was a monument 
to the negotiating process and an historic breakthrough because it provided a unified 
vision for a way out of the bloodshed that had plagued the province for nearly thirty 
years.  The length and contentiousness of the negotiations process are a testament to the 
differences that exist within Northern Irish society and each section of the final 
agreement bears witness to the tradeoffs made by the respective participants in achieving 
a settlement.  The agreement, while comprehensive, essentially defines the status of 
Northern Ireland in constitutional terms and addresses strands one through three and the 
subcommittee issues identified during the multi-party talks of 1997. 
 On constitutional issues, the agreement bound the political parties and the two 
governments to respect the consent principle as expressed by the majority of the people 
of Northern Ireland whether they saw their future as part of the Union with Great Britain 
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or as part of a united Ireland.  In recognizing the right of the majority of the people of 
Northern Ireland to maintain their status within the United Kingdom, the agreement 
addressed the primary concern of Unionists and Loyalists alike: namely, the preservation 
of the Union.  However, by recognizing that, if at some future date, the majority of the 
people of Northern Ireland decide to join the Irish Republic, then both governments 
would be obliged to actively support such a desire by introducing legislation in their 
respective Parliaments to make the aspiration a reality.  This stipulation was clearly 
aimed at showing the Nationalist community that the path to a united Ireland remained 
open and potentially attainable through the constitutional process.  Additionally, the GFA 
bestowed a unique right on the people of Northern Ireland to claim citizenship of Britain, 
Ireland, or both.  This privilege would remain regardless of the status of the statelet.  
Finally, the agreement committed the governments to making fundamental legislative and 
constitutional changes.  For the British, this entailed the repeal of the Government of 
Ireland Act of 1920 and its replacement with an act containing the principle of consent.  
For their part, the Irish government was obliged to initiate a referendum which would 
amend Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution to remove language claiming territorial 
sovereignty over Northern Ireland and to insert the principle of consent.213     
 Strand One of the GFA was designated to address governmental institutions 
within Northern Ireland.  The agreement called for the establishment of a 108-member 
Assembly elected on the basis of proportional representation and capable of exercising 
legislative and executive responsibility over devolved departments.  To ensure cross-
community inclusion, the agreement established safeguards to ensure equitable 
ministerial portfolio distribution based on proportional party strength and weighted 
voting procedures on legislation.  Effectively, passage of legislation would require the 
consent of 60 percent of the members present and voting, and at least 40 percent of both 
Nationalist and Unionist members present to concur.  This provision was designed to 
ensure that legislation avoided sectarianism and protected the rights of the minority 
community.  Of course, implementation required representatives to register as either 
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Unionist or Nationalist and, as such, did not facilitate the breaking down of barriers 
between the respective communities.214 
 Executive authority for the Assembly was delegated to a First Minister, a Deputy 
First Minister, and up to 10 Ministers with departmental responsibilities.  The First and 
Deputy First Ministers would be elected by cross-community majorities within the 
Assembly while the departmental Ministers would be allocated based on party 
representation based on the d’Hondt system.215  Ministers would have executive power 
over their department but would ultimately be responsible to the Executive.  All Ministers 
would be required to take an oath of office requiring them to discharge their official 
duties in good faith; commit themselves to peaceful and democratic government; to serve 
the people in an unbiased manner; to participate actively in a program for government; to 
work within the mechanisms of the Executive Committees and to support the decisions of 
the same; and finally, to comply with the Ministerial Code of Conduct.  Interestingly, 
there was no requirement to pledge allegiance to the Queen or British parliament, a 
concession in recognition of Nationalist sensitivities.216 
 Strand Two of the agreement focused on the North/South Ministerial Council 
(NSMC).  While the Nationalist community under the SDLP and Sinn Fein had long 
campaigned for a council with independent executive powers, it was obvious that their 
Unionist counterparts would not be amenable to such an arrangement.  As a compromise, 
the GFA proposed an arrangement whereby the NSMC would be accountable to the 
respective assemblies both north and south of the border from which they derived their 
power.  For Unionists, this arrangement avoided any possibility that an independent body 
with executive powers could be usurped by Nationalists to bind Northern Ireland into a 
closer relationship with the Irish Republic.  At the same time, the NSMC did provide an 
avenue for Nationalists to strengthen north/south cooperation on an array of issues which 
were mutually beneficial to residents on both sides of the border.  Further protections for 
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Unionist and Nationalist interests were included in paragraphs 12 and 13 of Strand Two.  
Paragraph 12 provided a guarantee that proposals developed in the NSMC would require 
the endorsement of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Parliament to take effect.  
In large part, this arrangement provided an additional check and balance to ensure the 
Unionist parties maintained an effective veto capability for cross-border arrangements 
which they deemed to be not in their interests.  In a similar vein, paragraph 13 was 
designed to meet a long-held Nationalist aspiration for closer links to the south.  The 
language of the paragraph ties the Northern Ireland Assembly to the NSMC and 
stipulates that one cannot function without the other.  In effect, Nationalist negotiators 
were able to build-in a provision which ensured the continuity of a cross-border 
arrangement while a devolved Assembly operated in the North.  Any desire that 
Unionists might have to destroy the NSMC would result in a corresponding collapse of 
the Assembly.  The NSMC would also incorporate a European Union dimension and a 
possibility for developing a joint parliamentary forum – two issues near and dear to the 
SDLP agenda.  Finally, Strand Two identified twelve areas for potential North-South 
cooperation but failed to specifically mandate specific areas of responsibility. 
 Issues relating to the British-Irish Council (BIC) were covered in Strand Three.  
While addressing an original SDLP concern that any agreement should consist of an 
Anglo-Irish dimension, Strand Three was primarily a way of further reassuring the 
Unionist population on their constitutional position.  The BIC was not specific to the 
Anglo-Irish relationship as it pertained to Northern Ireland but was inclusive of Scotland, 
Wales, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands.  As such, the BIC dealt with the ‘totality 
of relationships among the peoples of these islands.’217  This stipulation went a long way 
in decreasing the impact of the Anglo-Irish relationship as it pertained to provisions 
found in the AIA.  The inclusion of the BIC also met the Unionist concern that there 
should be a reciprocity of linkages which would provide a mechanism to maintain the 
link to the UK in the event that Northern Ireland were to become a part of the Republic at 
some future date.218  The provision for the establishment of the British-Irish 
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Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC) essentially killed the Anglo-Irish 
Intergovernmental Council and secretariat which had been established under the AIA.  
The consultative role that the Irish government had in the affairs of Northern Ireland 
would continue but only to the extent that they pertained to non-devolved matters. 
 The agreement also addressed matters such as human rights, cultural issues, 
decommissioning and police reform which were within the purview of the 
Decommissioning and Confidence Building Subcommittees during the multi-party talks.  
On the issue of decommissioning paramilitary weapons, the agreement identified a 
commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations and called on the 
parties to the agreement to exert their influence over paramilitaries to achieve the goal of 
total decommissioning of weapons within two years of the agreement being endorsed via 
referendum.  As such, the GFA was specific about the desire to have paramilitary 
weapons decommissioned within two years but did not actually mandate the destruction 
of weapons within that specific timeframe.  The vagueness of language contained in this 
stipulation would prove extremely problematic with regard to the implementation of the 
agreement and the standing up of the devolved Executive.  Additionally, the agreement 
required the British government to incorporate the European Human Rights Convention 
(EHCR) into the law of Northern Ireland and establish a Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission.  The focus of this commission would be the development of supplementary 
legislation which, when taken in conjunction with the EHCR, would form the basis for a 
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.  Culturally, accommodations were to be made for the 
acceptance and support of the Irish language.    Finally, policing reform would be 
addressed through the establishment of an independent commission.  The commission’s 
mandate would include a review of the composition, recruitment, training, culture, ethos, 
and symbols of the police force to ensure support from the community as a whole.219  
Ultimately, the commission was headed by Chris Patten and in September 1999 issued its 
report A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland which contained 175 
recommendations for changes within the RUC.220 
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C. POST GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT: TROUBLED TIMES 
1. Selling the Agreement 
In the wake of the GFA and in the run up to the referendum vote, unionism and 
loyalism were divided like no other time since the Sunningdale Agreement.  The pro-
agreement camp consisted of a divided UUP and the Loyalist PUP and UDP.  The anti-
agreement forces were led by the DUP who were joined by defectors from the UUP, the 
Loyalist UKUP, and the leadership of the Orange Order.  Most troubling for the pro-
agreement camp was the split within the UUP which primarily revolved around the issues 
of decommissioning and police reform.  The effect of the division was to put the UUP 
leader David Trimble in the precarious position of having to defend the GFA and forming 
an uneasy alliance with the SDLP and Sinn Fein.221  Yet, despite such common ground 
with the Nationalist parties, it would have been political suicide for the UUP to form an 
alliance across the sectarian divide and to campaign in support of a yes vote in the GFA 
referendum held in May 1998.  As a result, each camp was left to campaign individually 
and highlight to their respective communities the benefits secured for each.  In the case of 
the UUP, this meant emphasizing how the agreement would strengthen the Union via the 
BIIC and the enshrinement of the province’s constitutional position via the principle of 
the consent of the majority and how the Good Friday Agreement would bring an end to 
the much-despised AIA.  In contrast, the DUP and other dissenters seized upon the Sinn 
Fein analysis that the agreement was a stepping stone to Irish unity.  The rhetoric from 
party leader Rev. Ian Paisley, the most visible and vocal of the anti-agreement forces, 
was uncompromising.  While the times had certainly changed, the theme remained 
consistent with that of Unionist opposition to the AIA.  In Paisley’s words: ‘This is a 
struggle for the lifeblood of our country.  We will not be bullied by a foreign country who 
wants a say in our future.’222   
 Within the Nationalist community, the agreement was a much easier sell, perhaps 
because it tangibly offered an opportunity for the community to actively participate in 
their own governance on equal terms with their Unionist counterparts.  The agreement 
held out the prospect of real progress for Nationalists.  It provided for a voice in 
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government; it contained provisions for continued north-south cooperation via the 
NSMC; it promised reforms in human rights and policing; and, most importantly for 
Republicans, it offered a timeline for the early release of prisoners.  While not fulfilling 
the desire of a united Ireland, it offered realistic and attainable objectives for a population 
denied equality for the better part of eighty years.  As such, selling the agreement in the 
Nationalist neighborhoods of Northern Ireland was a relatively easy goal. 
 While the May 1998 referendum ultimately produced an overwhelming 71 
percent vote in support of the GFA, a deeper analysis of the Unionist vote further 
highlighted the deep divisions that existed within the community. Although the 
referendum was conducted on a single constituency basis, best estimates indicated that 
the over-whelming majority of Nationalists voted ‘yes’ perhaps by as much as 96 or 97 
percent of the voting electorate. In the case of Unionists who voted ‘yes’ it is estimated 
that the figure was between 51 and 53 percent in favor.223 
2. Assembly Elections 
Following the passage of the GFA via the May 1998 referendum, the path was 
clear to hold Assembly elections the following month.  Divisions remained very evident 
within the Unionist camp.  Again, Unionist campaigned from their respective positions 
with regard to the agreement.  The UUP offered a positive message which highlighted 
their role in negotiating a settlement which secured the union by institutionalizing the 
consent principle while removing the mechanisms of the AIA and securing the repeal of 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution.  Despite the positive spin the UUP put on the 
agreement, the June 1998 Assembly elections resulted in the DUP making significant 
inroads into the Ulster Unionist’s base.  As Table 2 below indicates, the DUP secured 18 
percent of the electorate.  The UUP saw their electoral percentage slump from 32.7 in the 
1997 Westminster General Election to 21.3 percent. 
 The electoral story on the Nationalist side of the sectarian divide was also 
interesting.  The SDLP, for the first time in its history secured more first preference votes 
than any other party.  It was also the first time in the history of the Northern Irish statelet 
that a Nationalist party surpassed the main Unionist party in votes received.  Their 
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success was attributable to larger voter turnout in Nationalist-held constituencies.224  Of 
equal significance was the continued rising popularity of Sinn Fein.  Their support 
advanced with the party garnering just over 18 percent of the vote – an increase of more 
than 2.5 percent from that achieved during the 1996 Forum campaign.   
 Ultimately, the composition of the Assembly after the 1998 election provided for 
a significant cross-community majority which supported the GFA with a still vigorous 
and vocal opposition. 
 
 
Table 2.    1998 Assembly Election Results.225 
 
3. Decommissioning & Stalemate 
The post agreement era was problematic as Unionists and Republicans continued 
to jockey for position with regard to the issue of decommissioning.  The pro-agreement 
Unionist camp led by David Trimble had firmly nailed their colors to the post by stating 
that they would not enter government with Sinn Fein without a decommissioning of IRA 
weapons first.  Indeed, the establishment and effective operation of an Executive 
floundered on the issue and delayed full implementation of devolved government in 
Northern Ireland until December 1999 – a full 18 months after the Assembly elections.  
In the interim, the Assembly got down to its business.  It debated and agreed new 
government structures for departmental ministries, North-South structures, the Civic 
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Forum, and British-Irish Council.226  Despite tentative progress, the decommissioning 
issue continued to impede full implementation of devolution.  To kick-start progress the 
governments issued the Hillsborough Declaration in April 1999 which sought to 
designate decommissioning as an obligation of the GFA.   
While pleasing Unionists, Republicans felt betrayed and made their position 
known.  To placate Republicans, the governments reverted to reiterating the goal of 
achieving decommissioning of arms within the timeframe set out by the original language 
contained in the GFA.227  Unionist discontent led to further delays which were 
compounded with the steady progress of prisoner release and the publication of the Patten 
Commission report on police reform.  This confluence of events put further pressure on 
the pro-agreement Unionist camp.  To prevent further damage to the fragile support 
remaining within unionism for the GFA, a review was initiated under the leadership of 
Senator George Mitchell who had brokered the original GFA.  The review lasted ten 
weeks and by November 1999 had produced a solution whereby devolution would be 
granted, the Executive would meet, and paramilitary representatives to the 
decommissioning body would be appointed.  The choreography and sequencing of events 
were vital to political parties which had grown to view each others’ motives in a less than 
favorable light. 
 The way forward clearly lay in a joint arrangement and it became incumbent upon 
both Republicans and Unionists to deliver on their commitments.  Towards this end, the 
IRA agreed to appoint a representative to the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning228 and the UUP agreed to move from their stated policy of ‘no guns-no 
government’ to ‘government, then guns.’  While the UUP agreed to enter government 
with Sinn Fein, they did so with a proviso that positive moves on decommissioning 
would be made within the predefined time limits and established a February 2000 
deadline to reevaluate progress.  To add further incentive to the decommissioning 
process, the UUP leader David Trimble authored a post-dated letter of resignation as First 
Minister for Northern Ireland with an effective date of February 2000.229  These 
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concessions and stipulations paved the way to a short-lived Executive which historically 
included all the major political parties including the DUP whose opposition to the GFA 
did not extend to excluding themselves from the levers of power.230  Slow progress on 
decommissioning again plagued proceedings and the Assembly and Executive were 
suspended by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland before the UUP review had time 
to take place.  Negotiations were held with the IRA and led to an agreed sequencing for 
decommissioning and paved the way for a resumption of devolution in June.   
The decommissioning question refused to go away.  The IRA used the issue as a 
bargaining chip to gain concessions from the British Government on troop levels and 
their presence within the province.  Indeed, during the negotiations to resume the power-
sharing arrangement after its first suspension, the joint statement issued by the 
governments contained a proviso that if the paramilitaries put their weapons beyond use, 
the British government would ‘take further substantial normalization measures by June 
2001.’231  At this point, semantics entered the equation.  Beyond use became the new 
currency of Republican thinking while Unionists were still wed to the notion that 
decommissioning equated to destruction. 
4. The Power-Sharing Government 
The operation of the power-sharing Assembly and Executive can only be 
described as fitful at best.  Having established the Executive on 29 November 1999 and 
receiving devolved power on 2 December, the power-sharing arrangement only survived 
until 11 February 2000 when it was suspended by Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
Peter Mandelson to prevent the resignation of First Minister David Trimble.  Perhaps the 
most notable achievement for the first power-sharing executive was the appointment of 
Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness as minister for education and Bairbre de Brun as 
minister of health.232  The power-sharing arrangement resumed operations on 29 May 
2000 after the PIRA provided assurances that it was ready to begin a process that would 
"completely and verifiably" put its arms beyond use.  This second attempt at conducting 
the business of government lasted until 10 August 2001 when the Assembly was again 
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suspended by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.  The impetus behind the second 
suspension revolved around the resignation of First Minister Trimble because of the 
failure of the PIRA to initiate decommissioning of weapons.  Devolution was restored on 
12 August with a proviso that substantive decommissioning of paramilitary weapons 
takes place within a six week timeframe.  Although the PIRA issued verbal commitments 
to the process of engaging the monitoring commission, no decommissioning actually took 
place and the power-sharing arrangement was suspended for a third time.  After the 
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) announced that it 
had witnessed a significant decommissioning of PIRA weapons, the path was once again 
cleared to devolve powers back to the Stormont Executive and Assembly.233  By this 
time, anti-agreement sentiment among Unionist assembly members had grown to the 
point of making David Trimble’s position tenuous at best.  His mandate to reconvene 
governance was only made possible by the re-designation of Alliance Party members as 
Unionists during a leadership vote on 5-6 November.234  Such maneuvering was 
necessary to satisfy the communal voting requirements identified in the GFA.235  
Devolved government reconvened once again and lasted until its most recent suspension 
on 14 October 2002.  This final suspension was brought about by allegations of Sinn Fein 
intelligence gathering at Stormont.  In a strange irony, the individual accused of leading 
the alleged spy-ring, Denis Donaldson, was later identified as and admitted to being an 
agent of the British intelligence services operating against the PIRA.236 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Good Friday Agreement has endured many criticisms.  One theme which 
persists in many texts analyzing the agreement from a Unionist perspective is that, as the 
only game in town, the parties had little option but to ascribe to the negotiating 
framework established by the British and Irish governments.  According to this argument, 
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the only trade space that existed was to permit the parties to attempt to strengthen or 
weaken aspects of the framework that they felt most or least comfortable with.  Indeed, 
the most contentious aspects of the agreement which have caused the greatest displeasure 
and disruption in the aftermath of the signing of the GFA involve the issues of 
decommissioning, police reform, and prisoner release.  Not surprisingly, these issues are 
the very ones which, during the negotiating process, caused the most division among the 
participants.237   
Despite the difficulties posed by these thorny issues and repeated claims by anti-
agreement Unionists that the GFA would significantly weaken their constitutional 
position within the United Kingdom, the evidence would suggest otherwise.  The primary 
issue at the heart of the Unionist cause, the maintenance of the Union, was secured.  The 
Irish government, via public referendum, had amended Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish 
constitution to repeal any claim to sovereignty over the territory of Northern Ireland and 
instead replaced such claims with recognition of the consent principle based on the 
wishes of the majority of the people within the province.  By the same token, Nationalists 
and Republicans recognized and accepted the right of the majority to maintain the Union 
while agreeing to participate in the governance of the province.   
For the SDLP, these concessions were minor issues as they had long since come 
to the realization that the will of the northern majority had to be respected and 
accommodated.  For Sinn Fein, however, these points were monumental.  The 
recognition of the right of the Unionist people of Northern Ireland to determine their own 
future and agreement to participate in a devolved power-sharing government within the 
province amounted to the recognition of partition and an acceptance of the northern state 
and all it stood for.  Also implicit in Sinn Fein’s position was a begrudging acceptance 
that a united Ireland could not come about in the immediate future without the 
acquiescence of the Unionists.  In the eyes of many die-hard Republicans, these 
concessions, when coupled with the abandonment of the armed struggle by the IRA, 
amounted to little less than a complete surrender.  In their defense, Sinn Fein proffered 
the view that the GFA was not a final settlement but rather a stepping stone to the future.  
Indeed, they would point to the agreement’s achievements as justification for their 
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transformation, participation, and support.  In return, the Unionists gave up astonishingly 
little.  The acceptance of a power-sharing executive with members of the Nationalist 
community was little more than recognition of the reality on the ground.  The 
Sunningdale Agreement of 1974 had put paid to the notion that any devolved government 
could be anything short of a cross-community arrangement.  Direct rule had taken power 
out of the hands of the province’s political class and ceded decision-making to London.  
While many Unionists were quite content with this arrangement because they believed it 
secured and strengthened the Union, the fact remained Westminster’s commitment to the 
Union was tenuous at best and very much dependent upon the whim of the party in 
power.   
Additionally, direct rule had also produced the hated AIA and institutions which 
ceded a strong consultative role into the administration of the province to the Irish 
government.  While the GFA still contained undesirable cross-border institutions, it also 
increased the scope of the British-Irish Council (BIC) and thus increased the fora in 
which the British link could be emphasized and strengthened.  The power of cross-border 
institutions was diminished by the requirement that accountability of the North-South 
Council members fell within the purview of the respective parliaments in Dublin and 
Belfast.  With regard to police reform, the GFA was less beneficial to unionism.  While 
many within the Unionist community viewed the RUC as their own police force, the need 
for a pluralistic force representative of the entire population and acceptable across 
sectarian lines was an imperative.  Recognizing that a force whose composition was 
greater than 93% Protestant238 and overwhelmingly Unionist in its approach to law 
enforcement would undergo radical change was not well received by Unionists.  The 
proposed early release of prisoners was similarly problematic.  In Unionist eyes, prisoner 
release was little more than a general amnesty for convicted terrorists who had 
perpetrated a cycle of violence lasting thirty years.  Despite the fact that the prisoner 
release applied to Republican and Loyalist detainees, their release was a slap in the face 
to those who had suffered at the hands of terrorists and to the majority of law abiding 
citizens who viewed such action as an affront to their moral compass.  Finally, the issue 
of decommissioning of paramilitary weapons remained unresolved by the agreement.  At 
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the heart of the matter was the Unionist contention that it could not form a government 
with a party (Sinn Fein) which was effectively the political wing of a paramilitary 
organization (IRA) which retained the capability to conduct a terrorist campaign against 
the state if the political environment was not to its liking. 
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V. TOWARDS A LASTING PEACE 
Since the statelet’s establishment in 1921, politics and conflict in Northern Ireland 
have always been a zero-sum game.  The gain for one community was always seen as a 
loss by those on the other side of the sectarian divide.  Compounding the problem and 
consistently frustrating any attempt at progress was the siege mentality of Catholics who 
saw themselves as a minority within the confines of a northern entity, and the siege 
mentality of Protestants who lived in fear of becoming a minority in an all-Ireland state. 
This chapter examines the factors contributing to the decline in Republican 
political violence and how peace, in the Northern Ireland context, required an iterative 
process of developing and implementing the three peace initiatives.  The author will 
compare how key aspects of each agreement and the associated negotiations changed 
over time and how the Good Friday Agreement led to the cessation of hostilities by the 
PIRA. Consideration is given to the manner in which each community made ideological 
concessions to arrive at an equitable arrangement for facilitating an end to terrorist 
activities within the province.  Finally, this chapter presents the case that the province’s 
moderate political parties were essential for the establishment of a political environment 
conducive to peace, but only those on the political extreme can make the peace 
agreement and the newly formed political environment work.   
A. THE DECLINE OF REPUBLICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
Much debate has focused on why the IRA abandoned the military campaign in 
favor of constitutional politics.  Some such as Ed Moloney have postulated that the 
Republican movement was split on how to proceed.  Men like Gerry Adams and Martin 
McGuinness were moving in the direction of a political solution as early as the beginning 
of the 1980s.  Others with more militant leanings were more willing to continue the 
armed struggle.  The militarists were busy building a formidable arsenal based on 
shipments of explosives and weaponry from Libya during the mid-1980s.  The shipments, 
however, stopped with the seizure of the vessel Eksund by French authorities in 1985.  
On board were sophisticated weaponry including surface to air missiles which would 
have greatly enhanced the IRA’s capability to inflict serious losses on British forces 
within the province.  Moloney argues that the loss of the Eksund and subsequent police 
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action in the Republic to locate previous arms shipments effectively ended the militarists’ 
ability to deliver an effective campaign against British forces.  Consequently, the political 
avenue became the most viable course for achieving a favorable resolution to the 
conflict.239 
A second theory is that the success of the security forces in penetrating the 
movement via informers and saboteurs coupled with increased force protection measures 
employed by security personnel and the increasing incompetence of operatives leading to 
failed operations had effectively destroyed the IRA’s ability to conduct a credible 
campaign.  When combined with Loyalist targeting of IRA and Sinn Fein members, the 
military campaign was effectively at a dead end and had ceased to be an effective weapon 
in expelling the British military presence from Northern Ireland or in achieving the 
ultimate goal of a united Ireland. 
A third argument revolves around the desire of the current political leadership to 
reap some reward for a campaign in which they invested more than thirty years of their 
lives.  Once drawn into political engagement via the Hume-Adams talks, the allure of 
recognition and acclaim on the domestic and international political stage coupled with the 
potential for achieving political power through power-sharing governance was too 
appealing to ignore. 
A different more nuanced analysis of the rationale behind the pursuit of a political 
solution by the Republican movement is premised on an analysis of the changing political 
environment and the possibilities such change presented.  If the Sunningdale power-
sharing experiment and its subsequent collapse had taught the Nationalist community 
anything, it was that the British government lacked a commitment to the issue of equality 
within the province and, when faced with sufficient pressure, would cave in to the 
demands of the Unionist/Loyalist population.  This belief remained firm until the AIA 
was signed and implemented.  After 1985, the British government remained committed to 
the agreement and stood firm in the face of escalating Unionist demands that the AIA be 
abandoned.  The active participation of the Irish government as an advocate of 
Nationalist interests instilled a renewed sense of confidence in the political process for  
the vast majority of Catholic voters.  Additionally, demographic trends within the 
                                                 
239 Moloney, 29. 
95 
province indicated a continued growth in the Catholic population relative to their 
Protestant counterparts (see Table 3 below).   
 
Census Year 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 
Total Population 1,425,042 1,536,065 1,532,196 1,577,836 1,685,267 
No Religion Information  26,400 142,500 274,000 174,061 233,853 
Number Stated 
Catholics  497,547 477,921 414,532 605,639 678,462 
% Stated Catholics 34.90% 31.40% 28.00% 38.40% 40.26% 
Estimated Number 
Catholics  502,800 559,800 586,400 651,700 737,412 
Estimated % Catholics 35.30% 36.80% 38.50% 41.50% 43.76% 
% Increase in Catholics - 1.50% 1.70% 3.00% 2.26% 
 
Table 3.   Catholic Demographics in Northern Ireland 1961-2001.240 
 
While it can be argued that not all Catholics are Nationalist nor inclined to vote 
for an end to the Union with Britain, it is conceivable that most would share an affinity 
for the rights and aspirations of their co-religionists.  Validation of the increasing 
electoral strength of the Nationalist community is witnessed by an examination of the 
share of the vote taken by both the SDLP and Sinn Fein in major elections since the early 
1980s (see Table 4 below).   
 
Table 4.   Electoral Representation in Northern Ireland 1982-2005.241 
 
The growth of the Catholic population and its increasing interest in participating in the 
constitutional process make its voice difficult to ignore for not only Sinn Fein but also 
Unionist parties seeking to maintain the Union through an equitable power-sharing 
arrangement. 
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B. PEACE AS AN ITERATIVE PROCESS 
The description by Seamus Mallon of the Good Friday Agreement as 
“Sunningdale for slow learners” is partially correct but the description lacks a 
comprehensive analysis of the facts.  While Sunningdale and the GFA offered a devolved 
power-sharing Executive and Assembly representation based on proportional 
representation, each did so in a very different time and under differing circumstances.  
Sadly, the extreme elements in both communities were not ready for Sunningdale.  
Neither Republicans nor hard-line Unionists and Loyalists had the political maturity to 
accept an agreement which compromised the extremes for a workable middle ground.  In 
contrast, the GFA was an agreement which opened the doors to all colors of 
nationalism/republicanism and unionism/loyalism.  It brought all parties to the conflict 
together to forge a path towards lasting peace and good governance for both 
communities.  Yet, despite its lofty goals, the agreement was flawed.  In practice, it 
required the centrists such as the UUP and SDLP to negotiate but would ultimately 
require the extremes such as the DUP and Sinn Fein to execute.  
1. Sunningdale 
For Unionists, Sunningdale offered an opportunity to resume the governance of 
the province with the proviso that they do so with the assistance of the Catholic minority.  
For moderate Unionists, the arrangement was acceptable; however, the poison pill 
contained in the agreement was the Council of Ireland and the degree of control that the 
Dublin government might be able to exert within Northern Ireland.  Extreme Unionists 
and Loyalists alike viewed any role for Dublin as anathema and therefore unacceptable.  
Many also still clung to the belief expressed by Lord Craigavon that Stormont was a 
“Protestant parliament for a Protestant people.”242  Thus, the Council of Ireland and the 
thought of sharing power with Catholics served as rallying cries for Unionists to unite 
and defeat the Sunningdale experiment.  Perhaps, had Sunningdale included the extremes 
of Unionist/Loyalist thinking, a more equitable agreement which limited or excluded the 
provision for a Council of Ireland would have produced a power-sharing arrangement 
acceptable to all but the most extreme elements of Northern Irish society. 
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From a Republican perspective, Sunningdale offered nothing to a Provisional IRA 
organization in the midst of a terror campaign.  Although covertly involved in discussions 
with British government and opposition figures during the early 1970s, Republicans were 
not invited to participate in the Sunningdale negotiations.  Had they been asked to 
participate, it is highly unlikely that they would have done so.  At the time, Republicans 
had no electoral mandate, the political organization of Sinn Fein had yet to take place, 
and the movement’s leadership was convinced that their military campaign to end British 
rule in Northern Ireland was succeeding.  Despite having 23,900 British troops in the 
province in 1974,243 Republicans were proclaiming ‘Brits get ready to pull out.’244  
Devoid of any alternative other than a campaign of terror, Republicans were quite content 
to avoid the trappings of a negotiated settlement. 
Sunningdale also highlighted an immaturity of thought within the SDLP.  For a 
party seeking to extend its mandate as an inclusive social movement, it allowed itself to 
be hijacked by the strong Nationalist element who insisted on the inclusion of the Council 
of Ireland provision.  Former SDLP leader Gerry Fitt’s analysis that the Council would 
be a poison pill for Unionists proved correct.  However, the SDLP’s parochial interests 
demanded its inclusion to ensure the party’s continued relevance within the Nationalist 
community.  Perhaps Sunningdale could have succeeded if, as Fitt had suggested, the 
SDLP had placed its primary emphasis on building cross-community trust through the 
operation of the power-sharing Executive.  The Council of Ireland should have been 
subordinated to the establishment of a fully functioning Unionist-Nationalist 
government.245   
2. The Anglo-Irish Agreement 
In contrast to Sunningdale, the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) was never really an 
attempt to achieve a lasting settlement to the Troubles.  Rather, the AIA was a necessary 
step in establishing a working partnership between the two sovereign governments and 
enabled the mechanisms for devising a path towards peace.  The exclusion of Unionists 
from the negotiations process was very necessary because their success in destroying the 
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Sunningdale experiment threatened the successful implementation of any future 
agreement.  In many ways, Unionists saw themselves as the final arbiter of any political 
solution within the province and firmly believed that their constitutionally guaranteed 
position within the Union and majority status guaranteed them the right to reject any 
initiative they viewed as not being in their best interest.  Unfortunately for Unionists, 
their success in destroying Sunningdale had created a chasm of political innovation 
within its ranks.  While direct rule from Westminster did not afford a platform for the 
development of high-profile local politicking, it did induce a comfortable sense of 
security within the Union, particularly for those with an integrationist bent.  As such, it 
had become increasingly clear that unionism would have to be brought low in order to 
spur dialogue and instill a willingness to break the impasse and work towards an 
inclusive and equitable political solution.  In many ways, this is exactly what the AIA 
did.  By shaking Unionists from their political slumber, it forced them to react.  By 
negotiating an agreement over their heads and by including an increased role for the 
Republic of Ireland in the province’s affairs, the British government served notice that 
political intransigence was no longer acceptable.  Although publicly committed to the 
Union, Margaret Thatcher put Unionists on notice that Westminster would act to protect 
the interests of the nation as a whole rather than defer national policy decisions to one 
section of society.  Finally, by resisting demands to abandon the AIA, the British 
government demonstrated that the Unionist veto was limited and very much dependent 
upon the willingness of London to permit its utilization. 
 While the AIA was exactly what the SDLP had demanded (insofar as it 
established the critical government-to-government link), it still rejected republicanism.  
As Chapter Three describes, the agreement was conceived as a tool to bolster support for 
the SDLP and check the growing electoral successes of Sinn Fein.  In spite of the fact that 
the AIA excluded Republicans, it did demonstrate that constitutional political 
involvement by Nationalists could move the government from wholehearted support for 
the Unionist position to one more willing to consider the plight of the minority and make 
accommodations to the same.  The ferocity of the Unionist rejection of the AIA made 
outright Republican condemnation of the agreement an untenable position.  Moderate 
nationalism could claim victory by pointing to the fact that constitutional politics had 
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secured an agreement which increased the role of the southern government as guarantor 
of the minority’s rights and created an arrangement immune to the threat of Unionist 
destruction.  The SDLP was able to make political capital out of the AIA by increasing 
their overall percentage of the vote in major election campaigns after the implementation 
of the AIA in 1985 while, at the same time, reducing Sinn Fein’s share of the vote (see 






1983 Westminster 17.9 13.4 -
1987 Westminster 21.1 11.4 -
1992 Westminster 23.5 10 -
Nationalist Block %
 
Table 5.   Nationalist Election Trends 1982-1992.246 
 
3. The Good Friday Agreement 
By the time the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was reached in 1998, the political 
landscape within Northern Ireland had undergone a dramatic change.  The Unionist 
coalition established to destroy the AIA had been cowed by its failure in this endeavor 
and was eager to find its way out of the self-imposed political wilderness.  The SDLP had 
worked hard to nurture and grow a pan-Nationalist approach to ending the Troubles.  
Republicans had seen their electoral base decline and were finding their military 
campaign increasingly ineffective and difficult to prosecute.  The euphoric projections for 
success espoused in the early 1970s had given way to a more pragmatic approach to the 
conflict in light of British determination to remain engaged in Northern Ireland and not 
give in to terror tactics.  Indeed, the IRA’s campaign was producing ever-diminishing 
returns with the passage of each year as the security apparatus within the province 
implemented more effective force protection measures; as the intelligence services 
became more adept at penetrating the Republican movement; and as the movement 
became more reliant on less experienced members to conduct operations.  While the 
hunger strikes of the early 1980s had provided Republicans a means of opening a second 
front against British rule in the province, the movement had been politically hamstrung 
                                                 
246 CAIN Web Service. Available on-line at: 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/electsum.htm Current as-of: 13 November 2006. 
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by the AIA and had lost much of the initiative to the SDLP.  The Hume-Adams talks 
provided a way out of the abyss and presented an opportunity to broaden the base of the 
pan-Nationalist front to include Republicans.   
In effect the Hume-Adams talks and the Irish government’s Forum for Peace and 
Reconciliation were critical in bringing Sinn Fein further into the mainstream of 
constitutional politics.  It is doubtful that the conversion of Sinn Fein from being the 
mouthpiece of the PIRA into a full-fledged political party would have occurred rapidly 
had it not been for the vision and sacrifice of the SDLP’s leader, John Hume.  By 
reaching out across the ideological divide, Hume demonstrated not only great political 
courage but also a willingness to sacrifice his party’s political capital in order to attain 
peace.  Unlike Sunningdale, Hume realized that the path to peace in Northern Ireland 
would require the inclusion of those who had perpetrated political violence and the 
campaign of terror.  By bringing Adams and Sinn Fein into the political mainstream, 
Hume sacrificed his party’s preeminence within the Nationalist community and 
jeopardized the SDLP’s position as a party that moderate Unionists could work with.  
Unlike any political leader on either side of the sectarian divide, Hume demonstrated a 
willingness to expend political capital to attain peace.  There is little doubt that his 
actions prior to the GFA negotiations strengthened not only the Nationalist position but 
also went some way in convincing Sinn Fein of the need to compromise and make 
concessions for peace. 
As such, a browbeaten Unionist coalition and an invigorated pan-Nationalist 
alliance entered into negotiations leading to the GFA.  While it is true that the SDLP and 
Sinn Fein were not united in the positions they presented during negotiations (the fact 
remains they were very far apart in what they sought to achieve), the presence of 
moderate and heretofore extreme nationalism at the negotiating table was an essential 
ingredient in formulating a pathway to peace and an end to the campaign of terror. 
Not surprisingly, real progress in the negotiations process was only achieved 
when the Unionist alliance was broken.  The decision to admit Sinn Fein into the forum 
talks in the wake of the IRA renewing its ceasefire in July 1997 prompted the DUP and 
UKUP to withdraw from talks.  The absence of the second largest Unionist party with the 
traditionally more Loyalist approach and interests led to an under-representation of their 
101 
position.  The withdrawal did not, however, leave the UUP as the solitary representatives 
of unionism.  The smaller Loyalist parties, the PUP and UDP were represented as was the 
Alliance Party.  With the hardliners of the DUP in a self-imposed exile and attacking 
from without, the UUP, under the leadership of David Trimble, had only to contend with 
their own internal divisions.  Those divisions came to a head over the issue of 
decommissioning of paramilitary weapons and were further exacerbated by the early 
release of prisoners.  To many Unionists, these issues undermined the gains that had been 
made during the negotiating process and subordinated the central theme of securing the 
Union.  However, by bringing the paramilitaries to the negotiating table, the governments 
and the mainstream political parties created a political construct of inclusiveness.  An 
agreement emerging from such a process stood a much greater chance of acceptance than 
any negotiated by representatives of the mainstream political parties or by one imposed 
on the population by the governments. 
In the final analysis, the strengthening of the Nationalist position and the 
destruction of the united Unionist front produced a breakthrough in the form of the GFA 
that was unattainable during Sunningdale or the AIA.  Unfortunately, the agreement 
reached has garnered tepid support within the Unionist community with many feeling that 
too much was conceded for little gain.  While concessions were made by Unionists, the 
sacrifices were not without offsetting gains.  Unfortunately, as Chapter 4 points out, the 
implementation of the agreement has proven problematic.  Despite the reality that the 
power-sharing Executive and Assembly have been suspended since 2002, the fact 
remains that real progress has been made towards bringing the political violence 
associated with the Troubles to an end.  There has been no call for a return to arms 
among mainstream Republicans.  Similarly, the unpopularity of the GFA within the 
Unionist community has not led to a Loyalist-led province-wide strike similar to that 
organized in 1974 by the Ulster Workers’ Council to protest the Sunningdale 
arrangement.  Perhaps, the inaction of the extremists on both sides of the sectarian divide 
speaks volumes to the real level of progress made in Northern Ireland since the Troubles 
began in 1968.247  
                                                  
247 Arthur Aughey, The Politics of Northern Ireland: Beyond the Belfast Agreement (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 59. 
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C. GAINS AND LOSSES 
A side-by-side analysis of the major tenets contained in the three agreements 
reveals not only the state of bargaining between the parties subject to each agreement but  
the ultimate complexity and specificity required to achieve consensus.  Table 6 below 
provides a glimpse at the major issues contained in each agreement and what the parties 
gained or gave ground on in arriving at each final agreement.   
 
Concession Gain Concession Gain Concession Gain Concession Gain
Sunningdale Consent Consent Consent Consent
Council of Ireland Council of Ireland Council of Ireland Council of Ireland
Legal Action Legal Action
Police Reform Police Reform
End of Detention End of Detention
Devolved Govt. Devolved Govt. Devolved Govt.








Devolution Potential Devolution Potential Devolution





GFA Consent Consent Consent Consent

















































End of Emergency 
Powers












Police Reform Police Reform
Prisoner Release Prisoner Release Prisoner Release Prisoner Release
Irish Govt. British Govt. Unionist/Loyalist Nationalist/Republican
 
Table 6.   The Agreements. 
 
Not surprisingly, the Good Friday Agreement was the most complex and required 
the greatest amount of bargaining by all parties to arrive at an agreed position.  The 
complexity of the agreement was compounded by the inclusive nature of the negotiations 
and the desire to ensure that the final agreement contained sufficient detail to avoid 
confusion but ample wiggle-room to allow the parties to claim the agreement was more 
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or less than it really was.  While vagueness on issues such as decommissioning was to 
have significant long-term effects on the implementation of the agreement, such 
uncertainty provided Republican leadership time to bring the movement along within the 
confines of the peace process.  Similarly, the cross-community prisoner release initiative, 
while abhorrent to law-abiding citizens, served as an incentive to Loyalist and 
Republican extremists to support the agreement.  Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of 
the GFA which was mostly lacking from Sunningdale and completely absent from the 
AIA was the bargaining that took place between the Unionist/Loyalist and 
Nationalist/Republican representatives.  Key issues such as equality, the structure of the 
power-sharing Executive and Assembly, and the scope and nature of the North-South 
Ministerial Council (NSMC) required the representatives of each community to come 
together in face-to-face negotiations to achieve a settlement.  Ultimately, compromise 
produced an agreement not entirely satisfying to any one party but one which provided 
the best roadmap toward a lasting peace. 
D. STASIS AND THE WAY FORWARD 
In many ways, the centrist parties in Northern Ireland are the ones who paid the 
heaviest price in bringing the peace process to fruition.  In doing so, they exposed 
themselves to attacks from the extremes which, at various times, played well to receptive 
audiences in the respective communities.  On the Unionist side, the UUP paid a heavy 
price for its willingness to seek accommodation through first the Sunningdale Agreement 
of 1973 and later the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.  The first attempt at power-
sharing resulted in the party almost imploding due to internal division and the 
opportunistic snipings of fellow Unionists such as Paisley of the DUP and West from 
Vanguard.  With the GFA, centrists such as David Trimble were again subjected to 
attacks from not only fellow party members such as Jeffrey Donaldson but also from 
those Unionists in the DUP and the UKUP who had chosen to remain outside the process.  
Cognizant of the ability of extremists to play on the fears of the Unionist community, 
moderate elements within the UUP were increasingly drawn toward hard-line demands 
on decommissioning and the disbandment of the IRA before sitting in government with 
Sinn Fein.  Rather than enabled to lead the province through devolved power-sharing, the 
UUP found itself erecting barriers to the process of establishing and operating a 
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provincial government.  From the abstentionist DUP and UKUP perspective, the UUP 
was indecisive and all too willing to enter into government with former terrorists in the 
guise of Sinn Fein.  In contrast, Nationalists viewed the UUP as obstructionists constantly 
grasping for new reasons to prevent their accession into the halls of power.  The party, 
facing criticism from the extremes within its own ranks and from the DUP and UKUP, 
was in a no-win situation.  Electoral results (see Table 1) demonstrate that, in the wake of 
the 2001 Westminster election, the party has lost considerable ground among Unionist 
voters and is now substantially weakened and less popular than Paisley’s DUP. 
A similar fate has befallen the SDLP.  Ironically, the party with arguably the most 
consistent vision for resolving the Troubles and the principal architect behind the three-
strand approach contained in the GFA appears to have reached the point of political 
irrelevance.  Having carried the province’s Nationalists, the southern political parties, and 
the British government to the realization that progress required an integrated approach 
accounting for Catholic and Protestant traditions, the SDLP seems to have reached its 
zenith by concluding the GFA.  The party’s role in building the peace should not be 
underestimated.  Indeed, had it not been for the efforts of then party leader John Hume to 
bring Sinn Fein into the mainstream of constitutional politics, the PIRA might yet be 
plying its craft.  The SDLP’s mandate was often viewed by Republicans as “a brake on 
the revolutionary forces within the nationalist population until such time as the British 
and Irish governments could persuade a majority of Republicans to abandon insurrection 
and participate in the Northern Ireland system.”248 
For their part, Sinn Fein was able to point to the obstructionist nature of Unionist 
demands as a sign that their political leaders were negotiating in bad faith.  By constantly 
impeding progress towards devolution, Unionists were again demonstrating their 
unwillingness to share power with an increasingly empowered Nationalist community.  
Remarkably, in transitioning to a constitutional party, Sinn Fein has abandoned its core 
demands and has been rewarded, via the ballot box, for doing so.  Gone is the rhetoric 
condemning the Stormont Assembly, the rejection of the principle of consent for northern 
Unionists, and the demand for an end to British interference in what it viewed as Irish 
affairs.  The reality was that, in light of the changing political environment within the 
                                                 
248 Murray and Tonge, 267. 
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province, Republicans could either support a political solution or risk losing their 
constituency from the Nationalist electorate by abstaining from the governance of the 
statelet or by returning to political violence.249  The option of returning to the campaign 
of terror was limited by the politicization of the Republican movement which placed 
electoral constraints on their actions.  Republicans wishing to achieve a united and free 
32-county all-island republic would have to pursue the path of constitutional politics 
within the confines of Northern Ireland’s political arrangement. 
Ultimately, it is not surprising that those who invested the least in the peace 
process are those poised to reap its greatest rewards.  The premise is that, by remaining 
on the periphery, the hardliners had the least political capital invested in the process.  As 
such, it was easy for them to point out flaws in the GFA and play to the fears of their 
respective communities.  When Unionists felt that the UUP had indulged Republicans on 
the issues of decommissioning, prisoner release, and disbandment of the IRA, they could 
vent their anger by casting their votes for the DUP or UKUP who carried no 
responsibility for the agreement because they had recused themselves from participating.  
Within the Nationalist community, the rationale for moving from the moderate SDLP to 
the extreme Sinn Fein was quite different.  While the SDLP had played a large part in 
improving the lot of the province’s Catholic population via the AIA and GFA, they 
lacked a vision for carrying the cause beyond the achievements of 1998.  Their concept of 
Irish union in the context of a European nation state250 has been lost on the elcectorate.  
As such, their manifesto had achieved its objective with the signing of the GFA.  
Nationalists seeking to achieve the ultimate objective of Irish unity could turn to Sinn 
Fein whose uncompromising commitment to the cause of a united Ireland is beyond 
question.  Indeed, the party is unencumbered by the weight of historic negotiations with 
Unionists and brings a youthful exuberance to the Nationalist cause.  Electoral results 
support the view of the party as best postured to meet their community’s needs. 
By assuming the extremes across the political divide the DUP and Sinn Fein have 
generally been successful in insulating themselves from internal divisiveness.  Both have 
benefited from their peripheral role played in bringing peace to the province.  In effect, 
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neither was soiled by doing the heavy lifting of negotiating peace.  Both emerged 
relatively unburdened and untainted by the belief that either had traded on issues near and 
dear to their respective constituents’ hearts.  Their positions have translated into electoral 
mandates and they are ideally postured as the parties most capable of bringing the 
province out of its current state of political stagnation.  The moderate UUP and SDLP 
who had crafted the path to a peaceful resolution to the Troubles have found themselves 
marginalized and replaced by the DUP and Sinn Fein.  The parties heretofore at the  
opposite ends of the political extreme are becoming the center and, devoid of extremist 
enemies, they are becoming the center capable of delivering a stable settlement to the 
province.251 
E. CONCLUSION 
While all indications are that the campaign of terror within Northern Ireland is 
now over, the political situation remains undetermined.  Decommissioning and an end to 
the PIRA’s activities have been achieved.  Police reform is on-going and independent 
assessments indicate that the province is on the verge of emerging from the shadow of 
sectarian strife.  The British and Irish governments have worked tirelessly to restore 
devolved assembly and executive powers, yet progress has been painfully slow.  The 
latest initiative, the Saint Andrews Accord, attempts to bridge the gap between Sinn 
Fein’s position on supporting the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the 
DUP’s unwillingness to enter government with Sinn Fein.252  While the accord calls for 
the restoration of devolved government by 26 March 2007, it remains to be seen if the 
differences between the two main parties can be resolved.  As such, it will remain 
incumbent upon the governments to continue their role as facilitators for a devolved 
power-sharing government.  Intransigence on behalf of the DUP cannot be rewarded with 
a continuation of the status quo of direct rule from Westminster.  To do so would invite 
further dissent within the Nationalist community and encourage some to contemplate a 
return to violence.  Similarly, Sinn Fein must demonstrate their commitment to uphold 
the rule of law within the province by supporting the reformed PSNI.  To bridge the gap, 
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the governments must continue to promote a carrot and stick approach to the political 
impasse.  The carrot of devolution must provide both communities with ownership and 
equality in government.  The stick for failure to pursue power-sharing must be some form 
of joint political administration of the province by the two sovereign governments.  The 
unfortunate truth is that if the political extremes fail to progress together they may force 
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APPENDIX A.  THE SUNNINGDALE AGREEMENT  
The Sunningdale Agreement 
December 1973 
1. The Conference between the British and Irish Governments and the parties involved in 
the Northern Ireland Executive (designate) met at Sunningdale on 6, 7, 8 and 9 December 
1973. 
2. During the Conference, each delegation stated their position on the status of Northern 
Ireland. 
3. The Taoiseach said that the basic principle of the Conference was that the participants 
had tried to see what measure of agreement of benefit to all the people concerned could 
be secured. In doing so, all had reached accommodation with one another on practical 
arrangements. But none had compromised, and none had asked others to compromise, in 
relation to basic aspirations. The people of the Republic, together with a minority in 
Northern Ireland as represented by the SDLP delegation, continued to uphold the 
aspiration towards a united Ireland. The only unity they wanted to see was a unity 
established by consent. 
4. Mr Brian Faulkner said that delegates from Northern Ireland came to the Conference 
as representatives of apparently incompatible sets of political aspirations who had found 
it possible to reach agreement to join together in government because each accepted that 
in doing so they were not sacrificing principles or aspirations. The desire of the majority 
of the people of Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom, as represented 
by the Unionist and Alliance delegations, remained firm. 
5. The Irish Government fully accepted and solemnly declared that there could be no 
change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland 
desired a change in that status. The British Government solemnly declared that it was, 
and would remain, their policy to support the wishes of the majority of the people of 
Northern Ireland. The present status of Northern Ireland is that it is part of the United 
Kingdom. If in the future the majority of the people of Northern Ireland should indicate a 
wish to become part of a united Ireland, the British Government would support that wish. 
6. The Conference agreed that a formal agreement incorporating the declarations of the 
British and Irish Governments would be signed at the formal stage of the Conference and 
registered at the United Nations. 
7. The Conference agreed that a Council of Ireland would be set up. It would he confined 
to representatives of the two parts of Ireland, with appropriate safeguards for the British 
Government's financial and other interests. It would comprise a Council of Ministers with 
executive and harmonising functions and a consultative role, and a Consultative 
Assembly with advisory and review functions. The Council of Ministers would act by 
unanimity, and would comprise a core of seven members of the Irish Government and an 
equal number of members of the Northern Ireland Executive with provision for the 
participation of other non-voting members of the Irish Government and the Northern 
Ireland Executive or Administration when matters within their departmental competence 
were discussed. The Council of Ministers would control the functions of the Council. The 
Chairmanship would rotate on an agreed basis between representatives of the Irish 
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Government and of the Northern Ireland Executive. Arrangements would be made for the 
location of the first meeting, and the location of subsequent meetings would be 
determined by the Council of Ministers. The Consultative Assembly would consist of 60 
members, 30 members from Dail Eireann chosen by the Dail on the basis of proportional 
representation by the single transferable vote, and 30 members from the Northern Ireland 
Assembly chosen by that Assembly and also on that basis. The members of the 
Consultative Assembly would be paid allowances. There would be a Secretariat to the 
Council, which would be kept as small as might be commensurate with efficiency in the 
operation of the Council. The Secretariat would service the institutions of the Council and 
would, under the Council of Ministers, supervise the carrying out of the executive and 
harmonising functions and the consultative role of the Council. The Secretariat would be 
headed by a Secretary-General. Following the appointment of a Northern Ireland 
Executive, the Irish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive would nominate 
their representatives to a Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers would then 
appoint a Secretary-General and decide upon the location of its permanent headquarters. 
The Secretary-General would be directed to proceed with the drawing up of plans for 
such headquarters. The Council of Ministers would also make arrangements for the 
recruitment of the staff of the Secretariat in a manner and on conditions which would, as 
far as is practicable, be consistent with those applying to public servants in the two 
administrations.  
8. In the context of its harmonising functions and consultative role, the Council of Ireland 
would undertake important work relating, for instance, to the impact of EEC 
membership. As for executive functions, the first step would be to define and agree these 
in detail. The Conference therefore decided that, in view of the administrative 
complexities involved, studies would at once be set in hand to identify and, prior to the 
formal stage of the conference, report on areas of common interest in relation to which a 
Council of Ireland would take executive decisions and, in appropriate cases, be 
responsible for carrying those decisions into effect. In carrying out these studies, and also 
in determining what should be done by the Council in terms of harmonisation. the 
objectives to be borne in mind would include the following:  
(1) to achieve the best utilisation of scarce skills, expertise and resources;  
(2) to avoid in the interests of economy and efficiency, unnecessary duplication of 
effort; and  
(3) to ensure complementary rather than competitive effort where this is to the 
advantage of agriculture, commerce and industry.  
In particular, these studies would be directed to identifying, for the purposes of executive 
action by the Council of Ireland, suitable aspects of activities in the following broad 
fields:  
(a) exploitation, conservation and development of natural resources and the 
environment;  
(b) agricultural matters (including agricultural research, animal health and 
operational aspects 
of the Common Agriculture Policy), forestry and fisheries;  
(c) co-operative ventures in the fields of trade and industry;  
(d) electricity generation;  
(e) tourism;  
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(f) roads and transport;  
(g) advisory services in the field of public health;  
(h) sport, culture and the arts. 
It would be for the Oireachtas and the Northern Ireland Assembly to legislate from time 
to time as to the extent of functions to be devolved to the Council of Ireland. Where 
necessary, the British Government will cooperate in this devolution of functions. Initially, 
the functions to be vested would be those identified in accordance with the procedures set 
out above and decided, at the formal stage of the conference. to be transferred.  
9.  
 
(i) During the initial period following the establishment of the Council, the revenue of 
the Council would be provided by means of grants from the two administrations in 
Ireland towards agreed projects and budgets, according to the nature of the service 
involved.  
 
(ii) It was also agreed that further studies would be put in hand forthwith and 
completed as soon as possible of methods of financing the Council after the initial 
period which would be consonant with the responsibilities and functions assigned to 
it.  
 
(iii) It was agreed that the cost of the Secretariat of the Council of Ireland would be 
shared equally, and other services would he financed broadly in proportion to where 
expenditure or benefit accrues.  
 (iv) The amount of money required to finance the Council's activities will depend upon the functions assigned to it from time to time.  
 
(v) While Britain continues to pay subsidies to Northern Ireland, such payments 
would not involve Britain participating in the Council, it being accepted nevertheless 
that it would be legitimate for Britain to safe-guard in an appropriate way her financial 
involvement in Northern Ireland.  
10. It was agreed by all parties that persons committing crimes of violence, however 
motivated, in any part of Ireland should be brought to trial irrespective of the part of 
Ireland in which they are located. The concern which large sections of the people of 
Northern Ireland felt about this problem was in particular forcefully expressed by the 
representatives of the Unionist and Alliance parties. The representatives of the Irish 
Government stated that they understood and fully shared this concern. Different ways of 
solving this problem were discussed; among them were the amendment of legislation 
operating in the two jurisdictions on extradition, the creation of a common law 
enforcement area in which an all-Ireland court would have jurisdiction, and the extension 
of the jurisdiction of domestic courts so as to enable them to try offences committed 
outside the jurisdiction. It was agreed that problems of considerable legal complexity 
were involved, and that the British and Irish Governments would jointly set up a 
commission to consider all the proposals put forward at the Conference and to 
recommend as a matter of extreme urgency the most effective means of dealing with 
those who commit these crimes. The Irish Government undertook to take immediate and 
effective legal steps so that persons coming within their jurisdiction and accused of 
murder, however motivated, committed in Northern Ireland will be brought to trial, and it 
was agreed that any similar reciprocal action that may be needed in Northern Ireland be 
taken by the appropriate authorities. 
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11. It was agreed that the Council would be invited to consider in what way the principles 
of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms would be 
expressed in domestic legislation in each part of Ireland. It would recommend whether 
further legislation or the creation of other institutions, administrative or judicial, is 
required in either part or embracing the whole island to provide additional protection in 
the field of human rights. Such recommendations could include the functions of an 
Ombudsman or Commissioner for Complaints, or other arrangements of a similar nature 
which the Council of Ireland might think appropriate.  
12. The Conference also discussed the question of policing and the need to ensure public 
support for and identification with the police service throughout the whole community. It 
was agreed that no single set of proposals would achieve these aims overnight, and that 
time would be necessary. The Conference expressed the hope that the wide range of 
agreement that had been reached, and the consequent formation of a power-sharing 
Executive, would make a major contribution to the creation of an atmosphere throughout 
the community where there would be widespread support for and identification with all 
the institutions of Northern Ireland.  
13. It was broadly accepted that the two parts of Ireland are to a considerable extent inter-
dependent in the whole field of law and order, and that the problems of political violence 
and identification with the police service cannot be solved without taking account of that 
fact. 
14. Accordingly, the British Government stated that, as soon as the security problems 
were resolved and the new institutions were seen to be working effectively, they would 
wish to discuss the devolution of responsibility for normal policing and how this might be 
achieved with the Northern Ireland Executive and the Police. 
15. With a view to improving policing throughout the island and developing community 
identification with and support for the police services, the governments concerned will 
cooperate under the auspices of a Council of Ireland through their respective police 
authorities. To this end, the Irish Government would set up a Police Authority, 
appointments to which would be made after consultation with the Council of Ministers of 
the Council of Ireland. In the case of the Northern Ireland Police Authority, appointments 
would be made after consultation with the Northern Ireland Executive which would 
consult with the Council of Ministers of the Council of Ireland. When the two Police 
Authorities are constituted, they will make their own arrangements to achieve the 
objectives set out above. 
16. An independent complaints procedure for dealing with complaints against the police 
will be set up. 
17. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will set up an all-party committee from 
the Assembly to examine how best to introduce effective policing throughout Northern 
Ireland with particular reference to the need to achieve public identification with the 
police. 
18. The Conference took note of a reaffirmation by the British Government of their firm 
commitment to bring detention to an end in Northern Ireland for all sections of the 
community as soon as the security situation permits, and noted also that the Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland hopes to be able to bring into use his statutory powers of 
selective release in time for a number of detainees to be released before Christmas. 
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19. The British Government stated that, in the light of the decisions reached at the 
Conference, they would now seek the authority of Parliament to devolve full powers to 
the Northern Ireland Executive and Northern Ireland Assembly as son as possible. The 
formal appointment of the Northern Ireland Executive would then be made. 
20. The Conference agreed that a formal conference would be held early in the New year 
at which the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland Executive would 
meet together to consider reports on the studies which have been commissioned and to 
































































APPENDIX B.  THE ANGLO IRISH AGREEMENT  
ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT 1985 
between 
THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND 
and 
THE GOVERNMENT OF 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
CONTENTS  
• A. STATUS OF NORTHERN 
IRELAND  
• B. THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
CONFERENCE  
• C. POLITICAL MATTERS  
• D. SECURITY AND RELATED 
MATTERS  
• E. LEGAL MATTERS, INCLUDING 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE  
• F. CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION 
ON SECURITY, ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL MATTERS  
• G. ARRANGEMENTS FOR REVIEW  
• H. INTERPARLIAMENTARY 
RELATIONS  
• I. FINAL CLAUSES  
The Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom: 
Wishing further to develop the unique relationship between their peoples and the close 
co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the 
European Community;  
 
Recognising the major interest of both their countries and, above all, of' the people of 
Northern Ireland in diminishing the divisions there and achieving lasting peace and 
stability;  
 
Recognising the need for continuing efforts to reconcile and to acknowledge the rights of 
the two major traditions that exist in Ireland, represented on the one hand by those who 
wish for no change in the present status of Northern Ireland and on the other hand by 
those who aspire to a sovereign united Ireland achieved by peaceful means and through 
agreement;  
 
Reaffirming their total rejection of any attempt to promote political objectives by 
violence or the threat of violence and their determination to work together to ensure that 
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those who adopt or support such methods do not succeed;  
 
Recognising that a condition of genuine reconciliation and dialogue between unionists 
and nationalists is mutual recognition and acceptance of each other's rights;  
 
Recognising and respecting the identities of the two communities in Northern Ireland, 
and the right of each to pursue its aspirations by peaceful and constitutional means;  
 
Reaffirming their commitment to a society in Northern Ireland in which all may live in 
peace, free from discrimination and intolerance, and with the opportunity for both 
communities to participate fully in the structures and processes of government;  
 
Have accordingly agreed as follows: 
 
A. STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
ARTICLE 1  
 
The two Governments 
(a) affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with 
the consent of a majority of' the people of' Northern Ireland;  
 
(b) recognise that the present wish of a majority of' the people of' Northern Ireland is for 
no change in the status of Northern Ireland;  
 
(c) declare that, if in the future a majority of the people of' Northern Ireland clearly wish 
for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, they will introduce and 
support in the respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish.  
 




(a) There is hereby established, within the framework of the Anglo-Irish 
Intergovernmental Council set up after the meeting between the two Heads of 
Government on 6 November 1981, an Intergovernmental Conference (hereinafter referred 
to as "the Conference"), concerned with Northern Ireland and with relations between the 
two parts of' the island of Ireland, to deal, as set out in this Agreement, on a regular basis 
with  
(i) political matters;  
(ii) security and related matters;  
(iii) legal matters, including the administration of justice;  
(iv) the promotion of cross-border co-operation.  
(b) The United Kingdom Government accept that the Irish Government will put forward 
views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland within the field of activity of 
the Conference in so far as those matters are not the responsibility of a devolved 
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administration in Northern Ireland. In the interest of promoting peace and stability, 
determined efforts shall be made through the Conference to resolve any differences. The 
Conference will be mainly concerned with Northern Ireland; but some of' the matters 
under consideration will involve cooperative action in both parts of the island of' Ireland, 
and possibly also in Great Britain. Some of the proposals considered in respect of' 
Northern Ireland may also be found to have application by the Irish Government. There is 
no derogation from the sovereignty of either the Irish Government or the United 
Kingdom Government, and each retains responsibility for the decisions and adminis-




The Conference shall meet at Ministerial or official level, as required. The business of the 
Conference will thus receive attention at the highest level. Regular and frequent 
Ministerial meetings shall be held; and in particular special meetings shall be convened at 
the request of' either side. Officials may meet in subordinate groups. Membership of the 
Conference and of sub-groups shall be small and flexible. When the Conference meets at 
Ministerial level an Irish Minister designated as the Permanent Irish Ministerial 
Representative and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland shall be joint Chairmen. 
Within the framework of the Conference other Irish and British Ministers may hold or 
attend meetings as appropriate: when legal matters are under consideration the Attorneys 
General may attend. Ministers may be accompanied by their officials and their 
professional advisers: for example, when questions of' security policy or security co-
operation are being discussed, they may be accompanied by the Commissioner of the 
Garda Siochána and the Chief Constable of' the Royal Ulster Constabulary; or when 
questions of economic or social policy, or co- operation are being discussed, they may be 
accompanied by officials of' the relevant Departments. A Secretariat shall be established 
by the two Governments to service the Conference on a continuing basis in the discharge 
of its functions as set out in this Agreement.  
 
ARTICLE 4  
 
(a) In relation to matters coming within its field of activity, the Conference shall be a 
framework within which the Irish Government and the United Kingdom Government 
work together  
(i) for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions which exist in 
Northern Ireland; and  
(ii) for peace, stability and prosperity throughout the island of Ireland by promoting 
reconciliation, respect for human rights, co-operation against terrorism and the 
development of economic, social and cultural co-operation.  
(b) It is the declared policy of the United Kingdom Government that responsibility in 
respect of certain matters within the powers of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
should be devolved within Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread 
acceptance throughout the community. The Irish Government support that policy.  
(c) Both Governments recognise that devolution can be achieved only with the co-
operation of constitutional representatives within Northern Ireland of both traditions 
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there. The Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish Government may put 
forward views and proposals on the modalities of bringing about devolution in Northern 
Ireland, in so far as they relate to the interests of the minority community.  
 
C. POLITICAL MATTERS 
 
ARTICLE 5  
 
(a) The Conference shall concern itself' with measures to recognise and accommodate the 
rights and identities of' the two traditions in Northern Ireland, to protect human rights and 
to prevent discrimination. Matters to be considered in this area include measures to foster 
the cultural heritage of both traditions, changes in electoral arrangements, the use of flags 
and emblems, the avoidance of economic and social discrimination and the advantages 
and disadvantages of a Bill of Rights in some form in Northern Ireland.  
(b) The discussion of these matters shall be mainly concerned with Northern Ireland, but 
the possible application of any measures pursuant to this Article by the lrish Government 
in their jurisdiction shall not be excluded.  
(c) If it should prove impossible to achieve and sustain devolution on a basis which 
secures widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland, the Conference shall be a framework 
within which the Irish Government may, where the interests of' the minority community 
are significantly or especially affected, put forward views on proposals for major 
legislation and on major policy issues, which are within the purview of' the Northern 
Ireland Departments and which remain the responsibility of the Secretary of' State for 
Northern Ireland.  
 
ARTICLE 6  
 
The Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish Government may put 
forward views and proposals on the role and composition of bodies appointed by the 
Secretary of' State for Northern Ireland or by Departments subject to his direction and 
control including  
 
the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights; 
the Fair Employment Agency; 
the Equal Opportunities Commission; 
the Police Authority for Northern Ireland; 
the Police Complaints Board. 
 
D. SECURITY AND RELATED MATTERS  
 
ARTICLE 7  
 
(a) The Conference shall consider 
(i) security policy; 
(ii) relations between the security forces and the community; 
(iii) prisons policy. 
121 
(b) The Conference shall consider the security situation at its regular meetings and thus 
provide an opportunity to address policy issues, serious incidents and forthcoming events.  
(c) The two Governments agree that there is a need for a programme of special measures 
in Northern Ireland to improve relations between the security forces and the community, 
with the object in particular of making the security forces more readily accepted by the 
nationalist community. Such a programme shall be developed, for the Conference's 
consideration, and may include the establishment of local consultative machinery, 
training in community relations, crime prevention schemes involving the community, 
improvements in arrangements for handling complaints, and action to increase the 
proportion of members of the minority in the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Elements of' the 
programme may be considered by the Irish Government suitable for application within 
their jurisdiction.  
(d) The Conference may consider policy issues relating to prisons. Individual cases may 
be raised as appropriate, so that information can be provided or inquiries instituted.  
 
E. LEGAL MATTERS, INCLUDING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE  
 
ARTICLE 8  
 
The Conference shall deal with issues of concern to both countries relating to the 
enforcement of the criminal law. In particular it shall consider whether there are areas of 
the criminal law applying in the North and in the South respectively which might with 
benefit be harmonised. The two Governments agree on the importance of public 
confidence in the administration of justice. The Conference shall seek, with the help of 
advice from experts as appropriate, measures which would give substantial expression to 
this aim, considering inter alia the possibility of mixed courts in both jurisdictions for the 
trial of certain offences. The Conference shall also be concerned with policy aspects of 
extradition and extra-territorial jurisdiction as between North and South.  
 
F. CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION ON SECURITY, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL MATTERS  
 
ARTICLE 9  
 
(a) With a view to enhancing cross-border co-operation on security matters, the 
Conference shall set in hand a programme of work to be undertaken by the Commissioner 
of the Garda Siochána and the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and, 
where appropriate, groups of officials, in such areas as threat assessments, exchange of 
information, liaison structures, technical co-operation, training of personnel, and 
operational resources.  
(b) The Conference shall have no operational responsibilities; responsibility for police 
operations shall remain with the heads of the respective police forces, the Commissioner 
of the Garda Siochána maintaining his links with the Minister for Justice and the Chief 
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary his links with the Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland.  
ARTICLE 10  
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(a) The two Governments shall co-operate to promote the economic and social 
development of those areas of both parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely 
from the consequences of the instability of recent years, and shall consider the possibility 
of securing international support for this work. 
(b) If it should prove impossible to achieve and sustain devolution on a basis which 
secures widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland, the Conference shall be a framework 
for the promotion of co-operation between the two parts of Ireland concerning cross 
border aspects of economic, social and cultural matters in relation to which the Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland continues to exercise authority. 
(c) If responsibility is devolved in respect of certain matters in the economic, social or 
cultural areas currently within the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland, machinery will need to be established by the responsible authorities in the North 
and South for practical co-operation in respect of cross-border aspects of these issues.  
 




At the end of three years from signature of this Agreement, or earlier if requested by 
either Government, the working of the Conference shall be reviewed by the two 
Governments to see whether any changes in the scope and nature of its activities are 
desirable.  
 




It will be for Parliamentary decision in Dublin and in Westminster whether to establish an 
Anglo-lrish Parliamentary body of the kind adumbrated in the Anglo-lrish Studies Report 
of November 1981. The two Governments agree that they would give support as 
appropriate to such a body, if it were to be established.  
 
I. FINAL CLAUSES 
 
ARTICLE 13 
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the two Governments 
exchange notifications of their acceptance of this Agreement.  
 
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their respective 
Governments, have signed this Agreement.  
 
Done in two originals at Hillsborough on the 15th day of November 1985  
 
For the Government of Ireland ...................... Gearoid Mac Gearailt 
For the Government Of the United Kingdom ...................... Margaret Thatcher 
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DECLARATION OF SUPPORT  
  
1. We, the participants in the multi-party negotiations, believe that the agreement we have 
negotiated offers a truly historic opportunity for a new beginning. 
2. The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable legacy of 
suffering. We must never forget those who have died or been injured, and their families. 
But we can best honour them through a fresh start, in which we firmly dedicate ourselves 
to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and 
vindication of the human rights of all. 
3. We are committed to partnership, equality and mutual respect as the basis of 
relationships within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and between these 
islands. 
4. We reaffirm our total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful 
means of resolving differences on political issues, and our opposition to any use or threat 
of force by others for any political purpose, whether in regard to this agreement or 
otherwise. 
5. We acknowledge the substantial differences between our continuing, and equally 
legitimate, political aspirations. However, we will endeavour to strive in every practical 
way towards reconciliation and rapprochement within the framework of democratic and 
agreed arrangements. We pledge that we will, in good faith, work to ensure the success of 
each and every one of the arrangements to be established under this agreement. It is 
accepted that all of the institutional and constitutional arrangements - an Assembly in 
Northern Ireland, a North/South Ministerial Council, implementation bodies, a British-
Irish Council and a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference and any amendments to 
British Acts of Parliament and the Constitution of Ireland - are interlocking and 
interdependent and that in particular the functioning of the Assembly and the North/South 
Council are so closely inter-related that the success of each depends on that of the other. 
6. Accordingly, in a spirit of concord, we strongly commend this agreement to the people, 
North and South, for their approval. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES  
  
1. The participants endorse the commitment made by the British and Irish Governments 
that, in a new British-Irish Agreement replacing the Anglo-Irish Agreement, they will: 
(i) recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority 
of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to 
continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland; 
(ii) recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement 
between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise 
their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently 
given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, 
accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the 
agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland; 
(iii) acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland 
share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of Ireland for a 
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united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, 
freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union and, accordingly, that 
Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon 
that wish; and that it would be wrong to make any change in the status of 
Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people; 
(iv) affirm that if, in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise their 
right of self-determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and (ii) above to 
bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both Governments 
to introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect 
to that wish; 
(v) affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of 
Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there 
shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the 
diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of 
full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of 
freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just 
and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities; 
(vi) recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify 
themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, 
and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship 
is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future change 
in the status of Northern Ireland. 
2. The participants also note that the two Governments have accordingly undertaken in 
the context of this comprehensive political agreement, to propose and support changes in, 
respectively, the Constitution of Ireland and in British legislation relating to the 




DRAFT CLAUSES/SCHEDULES FOR INCORPORATION IN BRITISH 
LEGISLATION 
1.  (1) It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the 
United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the 
people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section in 
accordance with Schedule 1.  
 
(2) But if the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that Northern Ireland 
should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland, the 
Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament such proposals to give effect to that 
wish as may be agreed between Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
and the Government of Ireland.  





POLLS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 1 
1. The Secretary of State may by order direct the holding of a poll for the purposes of 
section 1 on a date specified in the order. 
2. Subject to paragraph 3, the Secretary of State shall exercise the power under paragraph 
1 if at any time it appears likely to him that a majority of those voting would express a 
wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part 
of a united Ireland. 
3. The Secretary of State shall not make an order under paragraph 1 earlier than seven 
years after the holding of a previous poll under this Schedule. 




IRISH GOVERNMENT DRAFT LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE 
CONSTITUTION 
Add to Article 29 the following sections:  
7.  
1. The State may consent to be bound by the British-Irish Agreement done at 
Belfast on the ... day of ... 1998, hereinafter called the Agreement.  
2. Any institution established by or under the Agreement may exercise the powers 
and functions thereby conferred on it in respect of all or any part of the island of 
Ireland notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution conferring a like 
power or function on any person or any organ of State appointed under or created 
or established by or under this Constitution. Any power or function conferred on 
such an institution in relation to the settlement or resolution of disputes or 
controversies may be in addition to or in substitution for any like power or 
function conferred by this Constitution on any such person or organ of State as 
aforesaid.  
3. If the Government declare that the State has become obliged, pursuant to the 
Agreement, to give effect to the amendment of this Constitution referred to 
therein, then, notwithstanding Article 46 hereof, this Constitution shall be 
amended as follows:  
i. the following Articles shall be substituted for Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Irish text: 
"2. [Irish text to be inserted here] 
3. [Irish text to be inserted here] 
(ii) the following Articles shall be substituted for Articles 2 and 3 of the 
English text:  
"Article 2  
It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of 
Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish nation. 
That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified in 
accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation 
cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad 
who share its cultural identity and heritage.  
128 
Article 3  
1. It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite 
all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the 
diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that a united Ireland 
shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a 
majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in 
the island. Until then, the laws enacted by the Parliament established by 
this Constitution shall have the like area and extent of application as the 
laws enacted by the Parliament that existed immediately before the 
coming into operation of this Constitution.  
2. Institutions with executive powers and functions that are shared 
between those jurisdictions may be established by their respective 
responsible authorities for stated purposes and may exercise powers and 
functions in respect of all or any part of the island."  
iii. the following section shall be added to the Irish text of this Article:  
"8. [Irish text to be inserted here]"  
and  
iv. the following section shall be added to the English text of this Article:  
"8. The State may exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction in accordance with 
the generally recognised principles of international law."  
4. If a declaration under this section is made, this subsection and subsection 3, 
other than the amendment of this Constitution effected thereby, and subsection 5 
of this section shall be omitted from every official text of this Constitution 
published thereafter, but notwithstanding such omission this section shall continue 
to have the force of law. 
5. If such a declaration is not made within twelve months of this section being 
added to this Constitution or such longer period as may be provided for by law, 
this section shall cease to have effect and shall be omitted from every official text 
of this Constitution published thereafter.  
 
STRAND ONE 
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND  
1. This agreement provides for a democratically elected Assembly in Northern Ireland 
which is inclusive in its membership, capable of exercising executive and legislative 
authority, and subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all sides of the 
community.  
The Assembly  
2. A 108-member Assembly will be elected by PR(STV) from existing Westminster 
constituencies. 
3. The Assembly will exercise full legislative and executive authority in respect of those 
matters currently within the responsibility of the six Northern Ireland Government 
Departments, with the possibility of taking on responsibility for other matters as detailed 
elsewhere in this agreement. 
4. The Assembly - operating where appropriate on a cross-community basis - will be the 
prime source of authority in respect of all devolved responsibilities. 
Safeguards  
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5. There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community can participate 
and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections 
of the community are protected, including:  
(a) allocations of Committee Chairs, Ministers and Committee membership in 
proportion to party strengths;  
(b) the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of Rights 
for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public 
bodies can infringe, together with a Human Rights Commission; 
(c) arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation are proofed to 
ensure that they do not infringe the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland; 
(d) arrangements to ensure key decisions are taken on a cross-community basis;  
(i) either parallel consent, i.e. a majority of those members present and 
voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations 
present and voting;  
(ii) or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, 
including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations 
present and voting.  
Key decisions requiring cross-community support will be designated in advance, 
including election of the Chair of the Assembly, the First Minister and Deputy 
First Minister, standing orders and budget allocations. In other cases such 
decisions could be triggered by a petition of concern brought by a significant 
minority of Assembly members (30/108). 
(e) an Equality Commission to monitor a statutory obligation to promote equality 
of opportunity in specified areas and parity of esteem between the two main 
communities, and to investigate individual complaints against public bodies. 
Operation of the Assembly  
6. At their first meeting, members of the Assembly will register a designation of identity - 
nationalist, unionist or other - for the purposes of measuring cross-community support in 
Assembly votes under the relevant provisions above. 
7. The Chair and Deputy Chair of the Assembly will be elected on a cross-community 
basis, as set out in paragraph 5(d) above. 
8. There will be a Committee for each of the main executive functions of the Northern 
Ireland Administration. The Chairs and Deputy Chairs of the Assembly Committees will 
be allocated proportionally, using the d'Hondt system. Membership of the Committees 
will be in broad proportion to party strengths in the Assembly to ensure that the 
opportunity of Committee places is available to all members. 
9. The Committees will have a scrutiny, policy development and consultation role with 
respect to the Department with which each is associated, and will have a role in initiation 
of legislation. They will have the power to: 
• consider and advise on Departmental budgets and Annual Plans in the context of 
the overall budget allocation;  
• approve relevant secondary legislation and take the Committee stage of relevant 
primary legislation;  
• call for persons and papers;  
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• initiate enquiries and make reports;  
• consider and advise on matters brought to the Committee by its Minister. 
10. Standing Committees other than Departmental Committees may be established as 
may be required from time to time. 
11. The Assembly may appoint a special Committee to examine and report on whether a 
measure or proposal for legislation is in conformity with equality requirements, including 
the ECHR/Bill of Rights. The Committee shall have the power to call people and papers 
to assist in its consideration of the matter. The Assembly shall then consider the report of 
the Committee and can determine the matter in accordance with the cross-community 
consent procedure.  
12. The above special procedure shall be followed when requested by the Executive 
Committee, or by the relevant Departmental Committee, voting on a cross-community 
basis.  
13. When there is a petition of concern as in 5(d) above, the Assembly shall vote to 
determine whether the measure may proceed without reference to this special procedure. 
If this fails to achieve support on a cross-community basis, as in 5(d)(i) above, the special 
procedure shall be followed.  
Executive Authority  
14. Executive authority to be discharged on behalf of the Assembly by a First Minister 
and Deputy First Minister and up to ten Ministers with Departmental responsibilities. 
15. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister shall be jointly elected into office by the 
Assembly voting on a cross-community basis, according to 5(d)(i) above.  
16. Following the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, the posts of 
Ministers will be allocated to parties on the basis of the d'Hondt system by reference to 
the number of seats each party has in the Assembly. 
17. The Ministers will constitute an Executive Committee, which will be convened, and 
presided over, by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. 
18. The duties of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister will include, inter alia, 
dealing with and co-ordinating the work of the Executive Committee and the response of 
the Northern Ireland administration to external relationships.  
19. The Executive Committee will provide a forum for the discussion of, and agreement 
on, issues which cut across the responsibilities of two or more Ministers, for prioritising 
executive and legislative proposals and for recommending a common position where 
necessary (e.g. in dealing with external relationships). 
20. The Executive Committee will seek to agree each year, and review as necessary, a 
programme incorporating an agreed budget linked to policies and programmes, subject to 
approval by the Assembly, after scrutiny in Assembly Committees, on a cross-
community basis. 
21. A party may decline the opportunity to nominate a person to serve as a Minister or 
may subsequently change its nominee. 
22. All the Northern Ireland Departments will be headed by a Minister. All Ministers will 
liaise regularly with their respective Committee. 
23. As a condition of appointment, Ministers, including the First Minister and Deputy 
First Minister, will affirm the terms of a Pledge of Office (Annex A) undertaking to 
discharge effectively and in good faith all the responsibilities attaching to their office. 
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24. Ministers will have full executive authority in their respective areas of responsibility, 
within any broad programme agreed by the Executive Committee and endorsed by the 
Assembly as a whole. 
25. An individual may be removed from office following a decision of the Assembly 
taken on a cross-community basis, if (s)he loses the confidence of the Assembly, voting 
on a cross-community basis, for failure to meet his or her responsibilities including, inter 
alia, those set out in the Pledge of Office. Those who hold office should use only 
democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded or removed 
from office under these provisions.  
Legislation  
26. The Assembly will have authority to pass primary legislation for Northern Ireland in 
devolved areas, subject to:  
(a) the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it which, 
if the courts found to be breached, would render the relevant legislation null and 
void; 
(b) decisions by simple majority of members voting, except when decision on a 
cross-community basis is required; 
(c) detailed scrutiny and approval in the relevant Departmental Committee; 
(d) mechanisms, based on arrangements proposed for the Scottish Parliament, to 
ensure suitable co-ordination, and avoid disputes, between the Assembly and the 
Westminster Parliament; 
(e) option of the Assembly seeking to include Northern Ireland provisions in 
United Kingdom-wide legislation in the Westminster Parliament, especially on 
devolved issues where parity is normally maintained (e.g. social security, 
company law). 
27. The Assembly will have authority to legislate in reserved areas with the approval of 
the Secretary of State and subject to Parliamentary control. 
28. Disputes over legislative competence will be decided by the Courts. 
29. Legislation could be initiated by an individual, a Committee or a Minister.  
Relations with other institutions  
30. Arrangements to represent the Assembly as a whole, at Summit level and in dealings 
with other institutions, will be in accordance with paragraph 18, and will be such as to 
ensure cross-community involvement. 
31. Terms will be agreed between appropriate Assembly representatives and the 
Government of the United Kingdom to ensure effective co-ordination and input by 
Ministers to national policy-making, including on EU issues. 
32. Role of Secretary of State:  
(a) to remain responsible for NIO matters not devolved to the Assembly, subject 
to regular consultation with the Assembly and Ministers;  
(b) to approve and lay before the Westminster Parliament any Assembly 
legislation on reserved matters; 
(c) to represent Northern Ireland interests in the United Kingdom Cabinet; 
(d) to have the right to attend the Assembly at their invitation. 
33. The Westminster Parliament (whose power to make legislation for Northern Ireland 
would remain unaffected) will: 
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(a) legislate for non-devolved issues, other than where the Assembly legislates 
with the approval of the Secretary of State and subject to the control of 
Parliament; 
(b) to legislate as necessary to ensure the United Kingdom's international 
obligations are met in respect of Northern Ireland; 
(c) scrutinise, including through the Northern Ireland Grand and Select 
Committees, the responsibilities of the Secretary of State. 
34. A consultative Civic Forum will be established. It will comprise representatives of the 
business, trade union and voluntary sectors, and such other sectors as agreed by the First 
Minister and the Deputy First Minister. It will act as a consultative mechanism on social, 
economic and cultural issues. The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister will by 
agreement provide administrative support for the Civic Forum and establish guidelines 
for the selection of representatives to the Civic Forum.  
Transitional Arrangements  
35. The Assembly will meet first for the purpose of organisation, without legislative or 
executive powers, to resolve its standing orders and working practices and make 
preparations for the effective functioning of the Assembly, the British-Irish Council and 
the North/South Ministerial Council and associated implementation bodies. In this 
transitional period, those members of the Assembly serving as shadow Ministers shall 
affirm their commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means 
and their opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any political purpose; to 
work in good faith to bring the new arrangements into being; and to observe the spirit of 
the Pledge of Office applying to appointed Ministers.  
Review  
36. After a specified period there will be a review of these arrangements, including the 
details of electoral arrangements and of the Assembly's procedures, with a view to 
agreeing any adjustments necessary in the interests of efficiency and fairness.  
  
ANNEX A 
PLEDGE OF OFFICE 
To pledge:  
(a) to discharge in good faith all the duties of office; 
(b) commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means; 
(c) to serve all the people of Northern Ireland equally, and to act in accordance with the 
general obligations on government to promote equality and prevent discrimination; 
(d) to participate with colleagues in the preparation of a programme for government; 
(e) to operate within the framework of that programme when agreed within the Executive 
Committee and endorsed by the Assembly; 
(f) to support, and to act in accordance with, all decisions of the Executive Committee 
and Assembly; 
(g) to comply with the Ministerial Code of Conduct.  
CODE OF CONDUCT  
Ministers must at all times:  
•  observe the highest standards of propriety and regularity involving impartiality, 
integrity and objectivity in relationship to the stewardship of public funds;  
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•  be accountable to users of services, the community and, through the Assembly, for the 
activities within their responsibilities, their stewardship of public funds and the extent to 
which key performance targets and objectives have been met;  
•  ensure all reasonable requests for information from the Assembly, users of services and 
individual citizens are complied with; and that Departments and their staff conduct their 
dealings with the public in an open and responsible way;  
•  follow the seven principles of public life set out by the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life;  
•  comply with this code and with rules relating to the use of public funds;  
•  operate in a way conducive to promoting good community relations and equality of 
treatment;  
•  not use information gained in the course of their service for personal gain; nor seek to 
use the opportunity of public service to promote their private interests;  
•  ensure they comply with any rules on the acceptance of gifts and hospitality that might 
be offered;  
•  declare any personal or business interests which may conflict with their 
responsibilities. The Assembly will retain a Register of Interests. Individuals must ensure 
that any direct or indirect pecuniary interests which members of the public might 
reasonably think could influence their judgement are listed in the Register of Interests;  
 
STRAND TWO  
NORTH/SOUTH MINISTERIAL COUNCIL  
1. Under a new British/Irish Agreement dealing with the totality of relationships, and 
related legislation at Westminster and in the Oireachtas, a North/South Ministerial 
Council to be established to bring together those with executive responsibilities in 
Northern Ireland and the Irish Government, to develop consultation, co-operation and 
action within the island of Ireland - including through implementation on an all-island 
and cross-border basis - on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the 
Administrations, North and South. 
2. All Council decisions to be by agreement between the two sides. Northern Ireland to 
be represented by the First Minister, Deputy First Minister and any relevant Ministers, 
the Irish Government by the Taoiseach and relevant Ministers, all operating in 
accordance with the rules for democratic authority and accountability in force in the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and the Oireachtas respectively. Participation in the Council 
to be one of the essential responsibilities attaching to relevant posts in the two 
Administrations. If a holder of a relevant post will not participate normally in the 
Council, the Taoiseach in the case of the Irish Government and the First and Deputy First 
Minister in the case of the Northern Ireland Administration to be able to make alternative 
arrangements. 
3. The Council to meet in different formats: 
(i) in plenary format twice a year, with Northern Ireland representation led by the 
First Minister and Deputy First Minister and the Irish Government led by the 
Taoiseach; 
(ii) in specific sectoral formats on a regular and frequent basis with each side 
represented by the appropriate Minister;  
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(iii) in an appropriate format to consider institutional or cross-sectoral matters 
(including in relation to the EU) and to resolve disagreement. 
4. Agendas for all meetings to be settled by prior agreement between the two sides, but it 
will be open to either to propose any matter for consideration or action. 
5. The Council:  
(i) to exchange information, discuss and consult with a view to co-operating on 
matters of mutual interest within the competence of both Administrations, North 
and South; 
(ii) to use best endeavours to reach agreement on the adoption of common 
policies, in areas where there is a mutual cross-border and all-island benefit, and 
which are within the competence of both Administrations, North and South, 
making determined efforts to overcome any disagreements; 
(iii) to take decisions by agreement on policies for implementation separately in 
each jurisdiction, in relevant meaningful areas within the competence of both 
Administrations, North and South; 
(iv) to take decisions by agreement on policies and action at an all-island and 
cross-border level to be implemented by the bodies to be established as set out in 
paragraphs 8 and 9 below. 
6. Each side to be in a position to take decisions in the Council within the defined 
authority of those attending, through the arrangements in place for co-ordination of 
executive functions within each jurisdiction. Each side to remain accountable to the 
Assembly and Oireachtas respectively, whose approval, through the arrangements in 
place on either side, would be required for decisions beyond the defined authority of 
those attending. 
7. As soon as practically possible after elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, 
inaugural meetings will take place of the Assembly, the British/Irish Council and the 
North/South Ministerial Council in their transitional forms. All three institutions will 
meet regularly and frequently on this basis during the period between the elections to the 
Assembly, and the transfer of powers to the Assembly, in order to establish their modus 
operandi. 
8. During the transitional period between the elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly 
and the transfer of power to it, representatives of the Northern Ireland transitional 
Administration and the Irish Government operating in the North/South Ministerial 
Council will undertake a work programme, in consultation with the British Government, 
covering at least 12 subject areas, with a view to identifying and agreeing by 31 October 
1998 areas where co-operation and implementation for mutual benefit will take place. 
Such areas may include matters in the list set out in the Annex. 
9. As part of the work programme, the Council will identify and agree at least 6 matters 
for co-operation and implementation in each of the following categories: 
(i) Matters where existing bodies will be the appropriate mechanisms for co-
operation in each separate jurisdiction; 
(ii) Matters where the co-operation will take place through agreed implementation 
bodies on a cross-border or all-island level.  
10. The two Governments will make necessary legislative and other enabling 
preparations to ensure, as an absolute commitment, that these bodies, which have been 
agreed as a result of the work programme, function at the time of the inception of the 
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British-Irish Agreement and the transfer of powers, with legislative authority for these 
bodies transferred to the Assembly as soon as possible thereafter. Other arrangements for 
the agreed co-operation will also commence contemporaneously with the transfer of 
powers to the Assembly. 
11. The implementation bodies will have a clear operational remit. They will implement 
on an all-island and cross-border basis policies agreed in the Council. 
12. Any further development of these arrangements to be by agreement in the Council 
and with the specific endorsement of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Oireachtas, 
subject to the extent of the competences and responsibility of the two Administrations. 
13. It is understood that the North/South Ministerial Council and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly are mutually inter-dependent, and that one cannot successfully function 
without the other. 
14. Disagreements within the Council to be addressed in the format described at 
paragraph 3(iii) above or in the plenary format. By agreement between the two sides, 
experts could be appointed to consider a particular matter and report. 
15. Funding to be provided by the two Administrations on the basis that the Council and 
the implementation bodies constitute a necessary public function. 
16. The Council to be supported by a standing joint Secretariat, staffed by members of 
the Northern Ireland Civil Service and the Irish Civil Service. 
17. The Council to consider the European Union dimension of relevant matters, including 
the implementation of EU policies and programmes and proposals under consideration in 
the EU framework. Arrangements to be made to ensure that the views of the Council are 
taken into account and represented appropriately at relevant EU meetings. 
18. The Northern Ireland Assembly and the Oireachtas to consider developing a joint 
parliamentary forum, bringing together equal numbers from both institutions for 
discussion of matters of mutual interest and concern. 
19. Consideration to be given to the establishment of an independent consultative forum 
appointed by the two Administrations, representative of civil society, comprising the 
social partners and other members with expertise in social, cultural, economic and other 
issues.  
ANNEX 
Areas for North-South co-operation and implementation may include the following:  
1. Agriculture - animal and plant health.  
2. Education - teacher qualifications and exchanges.  
3. Transport - strategic transport planning.  
4. Environment - environmental protection, pollution, water quality, and waste 
management.  
5. Waterways - inland waterways.  
6. Social Security/Social Welfare - entitlements of cross-border workers and fraud 
control.  
7. Tourism - promotion, marketing, research, and product development.  
8. Relevant EU Programmes such as SPPR, INTERREG, Leader II and their 
successors.  
9. Inland Fisheries.  
10. Aquaculture and marine matters  
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11. Health: accident and emergency services and other related cross-border issues.  
12. Urban and rural development. 
Others to be considered by the shadow North/ South Council.  
 
STRAND THREE  
BRITISH-IRISH COUNCIL  
1. A British-Irish Council (BIC) will be established under a new British-Irish Agreement 
to promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of 
relationships among the peoples of these islands. 
2. Membership of the BIC will comprise representatives of the British and Irish 
Governments, devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, when 
established, and, if appropriate, elsewhere in the United Kingdom, together with 
representatives of the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. 
3. The BIC will meet in different formats: at summit level, twice per year; in specific 
sectoral formats on a regular basis, with each side represented by the appropriate 
Minister; in an appropriate format to consider cross-sectoral matters. 
4. Representatives of members will operate in accordance with whatever procedures for 
democratic authority and accountability are in force in their respective elected 
institutions. 
5. The BIC will exchange information, discuss, consult and use best endeavours to reach 
agreement on co-operation on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the 
relevant Administrations. Suitable issues for early discussion in the BIC could include 
transport links, agricultural issues, environmental issues, cultural issues, health issues, 
education issues and approaches to EU issues. Suitable arrangements to be made for 
practical co-operation on agreed policies. 
6. It will be open to the BIC to agree common policies or common actions. Individual 
members may opt not to participate in such common policies and common action. 
7. The BIC normally will operate by consensus. In relation to decisions on common 
policies or common actions, including their means of implementation, it will operate by 
agreement of all members participating in such policies or actions. 
8. The members of the BIC, on a basis to be agreed between them, will provide such 
financial support as it may require. 
9. A secretariat for the BIC will be provided by the British and Irish Governments in co-
ordination with officials of each of the other members. 
10. In addition to the structures provided for under this agreement, it will be open to two 
or more members to develop bilateral or multilateral arrangements between them. Such 
arrangements could include, subject to the agreement of the members concerned, 
mechanisms to enable consultation, co-operation and joint decision-making on matters of 
mutual interest; and mechanisms to implement any joint decisions they may reach. These 
arrangements will not require the prior approval of the BIC as a whole and will operate 
independently of it.  
11. The elected institutions of the members will be encouraged to develop 
interparliamentary links, perhaps building on the British-Irish Interparliamentary Body. 
12. The full membership of the BIC will keep under review the workings of the Council, 
including a formal published review at an appropriate time after the Agreement comes 
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into effect, and will contribute as appropriate to any review of the overall political 
agreement arising from the multi-party negotiations. 
BRITISH-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE  
1. There will be a new British-Irish Agreement dealing with the totality of relationships. 
It will establish a standing British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which will 
subsume both the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council and the Intergovernmental 
Conference established under the 1985 Agreement. 
2. The Conference will bring together the British and Irish Governments to promote 
bilateral co-operation at all levels on all matters of mutual interest within the competence 
of both Governments. 
3. The Conference will meet as required at Summit level (Prime Minister and Taoiseach). 
Otherwise, Governments will be represented by appropriate Ministers. Advisers, 
including police and security advisers, will attend as appropriate. 
4. All decisions will be by agreement between both Governments. The Governments will 
make determined efforts to resolve disagreements between them. There will be no 
derogation from the sovereignty of either Government. 
5. In recognition of the Irish Government's special interest in Northern Ireland and of the 
extent to which issues of mutual concern arise in relation to Northern Ireland, there will 
be regular and frequent meetings of the Conference concerned with non-devolved 
Northern Ireland matters, on which the Irish Government may put forward views and 
proposals. These meetings, to be co-chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, would also deal with all-island and cross-border 
co-operation on non-devolved issues. 
6. Co-operation within the framework of the Conference will include facilitation of co-
operation in security matters. The Conference also will address, in particular, the areas of 
rights, justice, prisons and policing in Northern Ireland (unless and until responsibility is 
devolved to a Northern Ireland administration) and will intensify co-operation between 
the two Governments on the all-island or cross-border aspects of these matters. 
7. Relevant executive members of the Northern Ireland Administration will be involved 
in meetings of the Conference, and in the reviews referred to in paragraph 9 below to 
discuss non-devolved Northern Ireland matters. 
8. The Conference will be supported by officials of the British and Irish Governments, 
including by a standing joint Secretariat of officials dealing with non-devolved Northern 
Ireland matters. 
9. The Conference will keep under review the workings of the new British-Irish 
Agreement and the machinery and institutions established under it, including a formal 
published review three years after the Agreement comes into effect. Representatives of 
the Northern Ireland Administration will be invited to express views to the Conference in 
this context. The Conference will contribute as appropriate to any review of the overall 
political agreement arising from the multi-party negotiations but will have no power to 





RIGHTS, SAFEGUARDS AND EQUALITY OF 
OPPORTUNITY  
HUMAN RIGHTS  
1. The parties affirm their commitment to the mutual respect, the civil rights and the 
religious liberties of everyone in the community. Against the background of the recent 
history of communal conflict, the parties affirm in particular: 
• the right of free political thought;  
• the right to freedom and expression of religion;  
• the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations;  
• the right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means;  
• the right to freely choose one's place of residence;  
• the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of 
class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity;  
• the right to freedom from sectarian harassment; and  
• the right of women to full and equal political participation. 
 
 
United Kingdom Legislation  
2. The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with direct access to the courts, and 
remedies for breach of the Convention, including power for the courts to overrule 
Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency. 
3. Subject to the outcome of public consultation underway, the British Government 
intends, as a particular priority, to create a statutory obligation on public authorities in 
Northern Ireland to carry out all their functions with due regard to the need to promote 
equality of opportunity in relation to religion and political opinion; gender; race; 
disability; age; marital status; dependants; and sexual orientation. Public bodies would be 
required to draw up statutory schemes showing how they would implement this 
obligation. Such schemes would cover arrangements for policy appraisal, including an 
assessment of impact on relevant categories, public consultation, public access to 
information and services, monitoring and timetables. 
4. The new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (see paragraph 5 below) will be 
invited to consult and to advise on the scope for defining, in Westminster legislation, 
rights supplementary to those in the European Convention on Human Rights, to reflect 
the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, drawing as appropriate on international 
instruments and experience. These additional rights to reflect the principles of mutual 
respect for the identity and ethos of both communities and parity of esteem, and - taken 
together with the ECHR - to constitute a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. Among the 
issues for consideration by the Commission will be: 
• the formulation of a general obligation on government and public bodies fully to 
respect, on the basis of equality of treatment, the identity and ethos of both 
communities in Northern Ireland; and  
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• a clear formulation of the rights not to be discriminated against and to equality of 
opportunity in both the public and private sectors.  
New Institutions in Northern Ireland  
5. A new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, with membership from Northern 
Ireland reflecting the community balance, will be established by Westminster legislation, 
independent of Government, with an extended and enhanced role beyond that currently 
exercised by the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, to include keeping 
under review the adequacy and effectiveness of laws and practices, making 
recommendations to Government as necessary; providing information and promoting 
awareness of human rights; considering draft legislation referred to them by the new 
Assembly; and, in appropriate cases, bringing court proceedings or providing assistance 
to individuals doing so. 
6. Subject to the outcome of public consultation currently underway, the British 
Government intends a new statutory Equality Commission to replace the Fair 
Employment Commission, the Equal Opportunities Commission (NI), the Commission 
for Racial Equality (NI) and the Disability Council. Such a unified Commission will 
advise on, validate and monitor the statutory obligation and will investigate complaints of 
default. 
7. It would be open to a new Northern Ireland Assembly to consider bringing together its 
responsibilities for these matters into a dedicated Department of Equality. 
8. These improvements will build on existing protections in Westminster legislation in 
respect of the judiciary, the system of justice and policing. 
 
Comparable Steps by the Irish Government  
9. The Irish Government will also take steps to further strengthen the protection of human 
rights in its jurisdiction. The Government will, taking account of the work of the All-
Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution and the Report of the Constitution 
Review Group, bring forward measures to strengthen and underpin the constitutional 
protection of human rights. These proposals will draw on the European Convention on 
Human Rights and other international legal instruments in the field of human rights and 
the question of the incorporation of the ECHR will be further examined in this context. 
The measures brought forward would ensure at least an equivalent level of protection of 
human rights as will pertain in Northern Ireland. In addition, the Irish Government will: 
• establish a Human Rights Commission with a mandate and remit equivalent to 
that within Northern Ireland;  
• proceed with arrangements as quickly as possible to ratify the Council of Europe 
Framework Convention on National Minorities (already ratified by the UK);  
• implement enhanced employment equality legislation;  
• introduce equal status legislation; and  
• continue to take further active steps to demonstrate its respect for the different 
traditions in the island of Ireland.  
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A Joint Committee  
10. It is envisaged that there would be a joint committee of representatives of the two 
Human Rights Commissions, North and South, as a forum for consideration of human 
rights issues in the island of Ireland. The joint committee will consider, among other 
matters, the possibility of establishing a charter, open to signature by all democratic 
political parties, reflecting and endorsing agreed measures for the protection of the 
fundamental rights of everyone living in the island of Ireland. 
 
Reconciliation and Victims of Violence  
11. The participants believe that it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering 
of the victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation. They look forward to 
the results of the work of the Northern Ireland Victims Commission. 
12. It is recognised that victims have a right to remember as well as to contribute to a 
changed society. The achievement of a peaceful and just society would be the true 
memorial to the victims of violence. The participants particularly recognise that young 
people from areas affected by the troubles face particular difficulties and will support the 
development of special community-based initiatives based on international best practice. 
The provision of services that are supportive and sensitive to the needs of victims will 
also be a critical element and that support will need to be channelled through both 
statutory and community-based voluntary organisations facilitating locally-based self-
help and support networks. This will require the allocation of sufficient resources, 
including statutory funding as necessary, to meet the needs of victims and to provide for 
community-based support programmes. 
13. The participants recognise and value the work being done by many organisations to 
develop reconciliation and mutual understanding and respect between and within 
communities and traditions, in Northern Ireland and between North and South, and they 
see such work as having a vital role in consolidating peace and political agreement. 
Accordingly, they pledge their continuing support to such organisations and will 
positively examine the case for enhanced financial assistance for the work of 
reconciliation. An essential aspect of the reconciliation process is the promotion of a 
culture of tolerance at every level of society, including initiatives to facilitate and 
encourage integrated education and mixed housing. 
  
RIGHTS, SAFEGUARDS AND EQUALITY OF 
OPPORTUNITY  
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES  
1. Pending the devolution of powers to a new Northern Ireland Assembly, the British 
Government will pursue broad policies for sustained economic growth and stability in 
Northern Ireland and for promoting social inclusion, including in particular community 
development and the advancement of women in public life. 
2. Subject to the public consultation currently under way, the British Government will 
make rapid progress with: 
(i) a new regional development strategy for Northern Ireland, for consideration in 
due course by a the Assembly, tackling the problems of a divided society and 
social cohesion in urban, rural and border areas, protecting and enhancing the 
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environment, producing new approaches to transport issues, strengthening the 
physical infrastructure of the region, developing the advantages and resources of 
rural areas and rejuvenating major urban centres; 
(ii) a new economic development strategy for Northern Ireland, for consideration 
in due course by a the Assembly, which would provide for short and medium term 
economic planning linked as appropriate to the regional development strategy; 
and 
(iii) measures on employment equality included in the recent White Paper 
("Partnership for Equality") and covering the extension and strengthening of anti-
discrimination legislation, a review of the national security aspects of the present 
fair employment legislation at the earliest possible time, a new more focused 
Targeting Social Need initiative and a range of measures aimed at combating 
unemployment and progressively eliminating the differential in unemployment 
rates between the two communities by targeting objective need. 
3. All participants recognise the importance of respect, understanding and tolerance in 
relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, the Irish language, Ulster-
Scots and the languages of the various ethnic communities, all of which are part of the 
cultural wealth of the island of Ireland. 
4. In the context of active consideration currently being given to the UK signing the 
Council of Europe Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the British Government 
will in particular in relation to the Irish language, where appropriate and where people so 
desire it:  
• take resolute action to promote the language;  
• facilitate and encourage the use of the language in speech and writing in public 
and private life where there is appropriate demand;  
• seek to remove, where possible, restrictions which would discourage or work 
against the maintenance or development of the language;  
• make provision for liaising with the Irish language community, representing their 
views to public authorities and investigating complaints;  
• place a statutory duty on the Department of Education to encourage and facilitate 
Irish medium education in line with current provision for integrated education;  
• explore urgently with the relevant British authorities, and in co-operation with the 
Irish broadcasting authorities, the scope for achieving more widespread 
availability of Teilifis na Gaeilige in Northern Ireland;  
• seek more effective ways to encourage and provide financial support for Irish 
language film and television production in Northern Ireland; and  
• encourage the parties to secure agreement that this commitment will be sustained 
by a new Assembly in a way which takes account of the desires and sensitivities 
of the community. 
5. All participants acknowledge the sensitivity of the use of symbols and emblems for 
public purposes, and the need in particular in creating the new institutions to ensure that 
such symbols and emblems are used in a manner which promotes mutual respect rather 
than division. Arrangements will be made to monitor this issue and consider what action 




1. Participants recall their agreement in the Procedural Motion adopted on 24 September 
1997 "that the resolution of the decommissioning issue is an indispensable part of the 
process of negotiation", and also recall the provisions of paragraph 25 of Strand 1 above. 
2. They note the progress made by the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning and the Governments in developing schemes which can represent a 
workable basis for achieving the decommissioning of illegally-held arms in the 
possession of paramilitary groups. 
3. All participants accordingly reaffirm their commitment to the total disarmament of all 
paramilitary organisations. They also confirm their intention to continue to work 
constructively and in good faith with the Independent Commission, and to use any 
influence they may have, to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within 
two years following endorsement in referendums North and South of the agreement and 
in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement. 
4. The Independent Commission will monitor, review and verify progress on 
decommissioning of illegal arms, and will report to both Governments at regular 
intervals. 
6. Both Governments will take all necessary steps to facilitate the decommissioning 
process to include bringing the relevant schemes into force by the end of June. 
 
SECURITY  
1. The participants note that the development of a peaceful environment on the basis of 
this agreement can and should mean a normalisation of security arrangements and 
practices. 
2. The British Government will make progress towards the objective of as early a return 
as possible to normal security arrangements in Northern Ireland, consistent with the level 
of threat and with a published overall strategy, dealing with: 
(i) the reduction of the numbers and role of the Armed Forces deployed in 
Northern Ireland to levels compatible with a normal peaceful society; 
(ii) the removal of security installations; 
(iii) the removal of emergency powers in Northern Ireland; and 
(iv) other measures appropriate to and compatible with a normal peaceful society. 
3. The Secretary of State will consult regularly on progress, and the response to any 
continuing paramilitary activity, with the Irish Government and the political parties, as 
appropriate. 
4. The British Government will continue its consultation on firearms regulation and 
control on the basis of the document published on 2 April 1998. 
5. The Irish Government will initiate a wide-ranging review of the Offences Against the 
State Acts 1939-85 with a view to both reform and dispensing with those elements no 








POLICING AND JUSTICE  
1. The participants recognise that policing is a central issue in any society. They equally 
recognise that Northern Ireland's history of deep divisions has made it highly emotive, 
with great hurt suffered and sacrifices made by many individuals and their families, 
including those in the RUC and other public servants. They believe that the agreement 
provides the opportunity for a new beginning to policing in Northern Ireland with a 
police service capable of attracting and sustaining support from the community as a 
whole. They also believe that this agreement offers a unique opportunity to bring about a 
new political dispensation which will recognise the full and equal legitimacy and worth 
of the identities, senses of allegiance and ethos of all sections of the community in 
Northern Ireland. They consider that this opportunity should inform and underpin the 
development of a police service representative in terms of the make-up of the community 
as a whole and which, in a peaceful environment, should be routinely unarmed. 
2. The participants believe it essential that policing structures and arrangements are such 
that the police service is professional, effective and efficient, fair and impartial, free from 
partisan political control; accountable, both under the law for its actions and to the 
community it serves; representative of the society it polices, and operates within a 
coherent and co-operative criminal justice system, which conforms with human rights 
norms. The participants also believe that those structures and arrangements must be 
capable of maintaining law and order including responding effectively to crime and to 
any terrorist threat and to public order problems. A police service which cannot do so will 
fail to win public confidence and acceptance. They believe that any such structures and 
arrangements should be capable of delivering a policing service, in constructive and 
inclusive partnerships with the community at all levels, and with the maximum 
delegation of authority and responsibility, consistent with the foregoing principles. These 
arrangements should be based on principles of protection of human rights and 
professional integrity and should be unambiguously accepted and actively supported by 
the entire community. 
3. An independent Commission will be established to make recommendations for future 
policing arrangements in Northern Ireland including means of encouraging widespread 
community support for these arrangements within the agreed framework of principles 
reflected in the paragraphs above and in accordance with the terms of reference at Annex 
A. The Commission will be broadly representative with expert and international 
representation among its membership and will be asked to consult widely and to report no 
later than Summer 1999. 
4. The participants believe that the aims of the criminal justice system are to:  
• deliver a fair and impartial system of justice to the community;  
• be responsive to the community's concerns, and encouraging community 
involvement where appropriate;  
• have the confidence of all parts of the community; and  
• deliver justice efficiently and effectively. 
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5. There will be a parallel wide-ranging review of criminal justice (other than policing 
and those aspects of the system relating to the emergency legislation) to be carried out by 
the British Government through a mechanism with an independent element, in 
consultation with the political parties and others. The review will commence as soon as 
possible, will include wide consultation, and a report will be made to the Secretary of 
State no later than Autumn 1999. Terms of Reference are attached at Annex B. 
6. Implementation of the recommendations arising from both reviews will be discussed 
with the political parties and with the Irish Government. 
7. The participants also note that the British Government remains ready in principle, with 
the broad support of the political parties, and after consultation, as appropriate, with the 
Irish Government, in the context of ongoing implementation of the relevant 
recommendations, to devolve responsibility for policing and justice issues. 
  
ANNEX A 
COMMISSION ON POLICING FOR NORTHERN IRELAND  
Terms of Reference  
Taking account of the principles on policing as set out in the agreement, the Commission 
will inquire into policing in Northern Ireland and, on the basis of its findings, bring 
forward proposals for future policing structures and arrangements, including means of 
encouraging widespread community support for those arrangements. 
Its proposals on policing should be designed to ensure that policing arrangements, 
including composition, recruitment, training, culture, ethos and symbols, are such that in 
a new approach Northern Ireland has a police service that can enjoy widespread support 
from, and is seen as an integral part of, the community as a whole. 
Its proposals should include recommendations covering any issues such as re-training, 
job placement and educational and professional development required in the transition to 
policing in a peaceful society. 
Its proposals should also be designed to ensure that: 
• the police service is structured, managed and resourced so that it can be effective 
in discharging its full range of functions (including proposals on any necessary 
arrangements for the transition to policing in a normal peaceful society);  
• the police service is delivered in constructive and inclusive partnerships with the 
community at all levels with the maximum delegation of authority and 
responsibility;  
• the legislative and constitutional framework requires the impartial discharge of 
policing functions and conforms with internationally accepted norms in relation to 
policing standards;  
• the police operate within a clear framework of accountability to the law and the 
community they serve, so:  
o they are constrained by, accountable to and act only within the law; 
o their powers and procedures, like the law they enforce, are clearly 
established and publicly available; 
o there are open, accessible and independent means of investigating and 
adjudicating upon complaints against the police; 
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o there are clearly established arrangements enabling local people, and their 
political representatives, to articulate their views and concerns about 
policing and to establish publicly policing priorities and influence policing 
policies, subject to safeguards to ensure police impartiality and freedom 
from partisan political control; 
o there are arrangements for accountability and for the effective, efficient 
and economic use of resources in achieving policing objectives; 
o there are means to ensure independent professional scrutiny and inspection 
of the police service to ensure that proper professional standards are 
maintained;  
• the scope for structured co-operation with the Garda Siochana and other police 
forces is addressed; and 
• the management of public order events which can impose exceptional demands on 
policing resources is also addressed. 
The Commission should focus on policing issues, but if it identifies other aspects of the 
criminal justice system relevant to its work on policing, including the role of the police in 
prosecution, then it should draw the attention of the Government to those matters. 
The Commission should consult widely, including with non-governmental expert 
organisations, and through such focus groups as they consider it appropriate to establish. 
The Government proposes to establish the Commission as soon as possible, with the aim 
of it starting work as soon as possible and publishing its final report by Summer 1999. 
  
ANNEX B 
REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM  
Terms of Reference  
Taking account of the aims of the criminal justice system as set out in the Agreement, the 
review will address the structure, management and resourcing of publicly funded 
elements of the criminal justice system and will bring forward proposals for future 
criminal justice arrangements (other than policing and those aspects of the system 
relating to emergency legislation, which the Government is considering separately) 
covering such issues as: 
• the arrangements for making appointments to the judiciary and magistracy, and 
safeguards for protecting their independence; 
• the arrangements for the organisation and supervision of the prosecution process, 
and for safeguarding its independence; 
• measures to improve the responsiveness and accountability of, and any lay 
participation in the criminal justice system; 
• mechanisms for addressing law reform; 
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• the scope for structured co-operation between the criminal justice agencies on 
both parts of the island; and 
• the structure and organisation of criminal justice functions that might be devolved 
to an Assembly, including the possibility of establishing a Department of Justice, 
while safeguarding the essential independence of many of the key functions in 
this area. 
The Government proposes to commence the review as soon as possible, consulting with 
the political parties and others, including non-governmental expert organisations. The 
review will be completed by Autumn 1999. 
 
PRISONERS  
1. Both Governments will put in place mechanisms to provide for an accelerated 
programme for the release of prisoners, including transferred prisoners, convicted of 
scheduled offences in Northern Ireland or, in the case of those sentenced outside 
Northern Ireland, similar offences (referred to hereafter as qualifying prisoners). Any 
such arrangements will protect the rights of individual prisoners under national and 
international law. 
2. Prisoners affiliated to organisations which have not established or are not maintaining 
a complete and unequivocal ceasefire will not benefit from the arrangements. The 
situation in this regard will be kept under review. 
3. Both Governments will complete a review process within a fixed time frame and set 
prospective release dates for all qualifying prisoners. The review process would provide 
for the advance of the release dates of qualifying prisoners while allowing account to be 
taken of the seriousness of the offences for which the person was convicted and the need 
to protect the community. In addition, the intention would be that should the 
circumstances allow it, any qualifying prisoners who remained in custody two years after 
the commencement of the scheme would be released at that point. 
4. The Governments will seek to enact the appropriate legislation to give effect to these 
arrangements by the end of June 1998. 
5. The Governments continue to recognise the importance of measures to facilitate the 
reintegration of prisoners into the community by providing support both prior to and after 
release, including assistance directed towards availing of employment opportunities, re-
training and/or re-skilling, and further education. 
 
VALIDATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW  
VALIDATION AND IMPLEMENTATION  
1. The two Governments will as soon as possible sign a new British-Irish Agreement 
replacing the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, embodying understandings on constitutional 
issues and affirming their solemn commitment to support and, where appropriate, 
implement the agreement reached by the participants in the negotiations which shall be 
annexed to the British-Irish Agreement. 
2. Each Government will organise a referendum on 22 May 1998. Subject to 
Parliamentary approval, a consultative referendum in Northern Ireland, organised under 
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the terms of the Northern Ireland (Entry to Negotiations, etc.) Act 1996, will address the 
question: "Do you support the agreement reached in the multi-party talks on Northern 
Ireland and set out in Command Paper 3883?". The Irish Government will introduce and 
support in the Oireachtas a Bill to amend the Constitution as described in paragraph 2 of 
the section "Constitutional Issues" and in Annex B, as follows: (a) to amend Articles 2 
and 3 as described in paragraph 8.1 in Annex B above and (b) to amend Article 29 to 
permit the Government to ratify the new British-Irish Agreement. On passage by the 
Oireachtas, the Bill will be put to referendum. 
3. If majorities of those voting in each of the referendums support this agreement, the 
Governments will then introduce and support, in their respective Parliaments, such 
legislation as may be necessary to give effect to all aspects of this agreement, and will 
take whatever ancillary steps as may be required including the holding of elections on 25 
June, subject to parliamentary approval, to the Assembly, which would meet initially in a 
"shadow" mode. The establishment of the North-South Ministerial Council, 
implementation bodies, the British-Irish Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental 
Conference and the assumption by the Assembly of its legislative and executive powers 
will take place at the same time on the entry into force of the British-Irish Agreement. 
4. In the interim, aspects of the implementation of the multi-party agreement will be 
reviewed at meetings of those parties relevant in the particular case (taking into account, 
once Assembly elections have been held, the results of those elections), under the 
chairmanship of the British Government or the two Governments, as may be appropriate; 
and representatives of the two Governments and all relevant parties may meet under 
independent chairmanship to review implementation of the agreement as a whole. 
Review procedures following implementation  
5. Each institution may, at any time, review any problems that may arise in its operation 
and, where no other institution is affected, take remedial action in consultation as 
necessary with the relevant Government or Governments. It will be for each institution to 
determine its own procedures for review. 
6. If there are difficulties in the operation of a particular institution, which have 
implications for another institution, they may review their operations separately and 
jointly and agree on remedial action to be taken under their respective authorities. 
7. If difficulties arise which require remedial action across the range of institutions, or 
otherwise require amendment of the British-Irish Agreement or relevant legislation, the 
process of review will fall to the two Governments in consultation with the parties in the 
Assembly. Each Government will be responsible for action in its own jurisdiction. 
8. Notwithstanding the above, each institution will publish an annual report on its 
operations. In addition, the two Governments and the parties in the Assembly will 
convene a conference 4 years after the agreement comes into effect, to review and report 











AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF  
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN  
AND NORTHERN IRELAND  
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND  
  
The British and Irish Governments:  
Welcoming the strong commitment to the Agreement reached on 10th April 1998 by 
themselves and other participants in the multi-party talks and set out in Annex 1 to this 
Agreement (hereinafter "the Multi-Party Agreement"); 
Considering that the Multi-Party Agreement offers an opportunity for a new beginning in 
relationships within Northern Ireland, within the island of Ireland and between the 
peoples of these islands; 
Wishing to develop still further the unique relationship between their peoples and the 
close co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the 
European Union;  
Reaffirming their total commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence 
which have been fundamental to the multi-party talks;  
Reaffirming their commitment to the principles of partnership, equality and mutual 
respect and to the protection of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights in 
their respective jurisdictions; 
Have agreed as follows:  
  
ARTICLE 1  
The two Governments:  
(i) recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority 
of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to 
continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland;  
(ii) recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement 
between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise 
their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently 
given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, 
accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the 
agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland; 
(iii) acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland 
share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of Ireland for a 
united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, 
freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union and accordingly, that 
Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon 
that wish; and that it would be wrong to make any change in the status of 
Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people;  
(iv) affirm that, if in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise their 
right of self-determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and (ii) above to 
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bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both Governments 
to introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect 
to that wish; 
(v) affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of 
Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there 
shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the 
diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of 
full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of 
freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just 
and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both communities; 
(vi) recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify 
themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, 
and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship 
is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future change 
in the status of Northern Ireland. 
  
ARTICLE 2  
The two Governments affirm their solemn commitment to support, and where appropriate 
implement, the provisions of the Multi-Party Agreement. In particular there shall be 
established in accordance with the provisions of the Multi-Party Agreement immediately 
on the entry into force of this Agreement, the following institutions:  
(i) a North/South Ministerial Council;  
(ii) the implementation bodies referred to in paragraph 9 (ii) of the section entitled 
"Strand Two" of the Multi-Party Agreement; 
(iii) a British-Irish Council;  
(iv) a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference.  
  
ARTICLE 3  
(1) This Agreement shall replace the Agreement between the British and Irish 
Governments done at Hillsborough on 15th November 1985 which shall cease to have 
effect on entry into force of this Agreement. 
(2) The Intergovernmental Conference established by Article 2 of the aforementioned 
Agreement done on 15th November 1985 shall cease to exist on entry into force of this 
Agreement. 
  
ARTICLE 4  
(1) It shall be a requirement for entry into force of this Agreement that:  
(a) British legislation shall have been enacted for the purpose of implementing the 
provisions of Annex A to the section entitled "Constitutional Issues" of the Multi-
Party Agreement; 
(b) the amendments to the Constitution of Ireland set out in Annex B to the 
section entitled "Constitutional Issues" of the Multi-Party Agreement shall have 
been approved by Referendum; 
(c) such legislation shall have been enacted as may be required to establish the 
institutions referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement. 
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(2) Each Government shall notify the other in writing of the completion, so far as it is 
concerned, of the requirements for entry into force of this Agreement. This Agreement 
shall enter into force on the date of the receipt of the later of the two notifications.  
(3) Immediately on entry into force of this Agreement, the Irish Government shall ensure 
that the amendments to the Constitution of Ireland set out in Annex B to the section 
entitled "Constitutional Issues" of the Multi-Party Agreement take effect.  
 
 
In witness thereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by the respective 
Governments, have signed this Agreement. 
Done in two originals at Belfast on the 10th day of April 1998. 
Tony Blair 
Marjorie ('Mo') Mowlam 
For the Government  
of the United Kingdom of  
Great Britain and Northern Ireland  
Bertie Ahern 
David Andrews 
For the Government 
of Ireland  
 
ANNEX 1 
The Agreement Reached  
in the Multi-Party Talks  
 
ANNEX 2 
Declaration on the Provisions of  
Paragraph (vi) of Article 1 
In Relationship to Citizenship  
 
The British and Irish Governments declare that it is their joint understanding that the term 
"the people of Northern Ireland" in paragraph (vi) of Article 1 of this Agreement means, 
for the purposes of giving effect to this provision, all persons born in Northern Ireland 
and having, at the time of their birth, at least one parent who is a British citizen, an Irish 
citizen or is otherwise entitled to reside in Northern Ireland without any restriction on 
their period of residence.  
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